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ABSTRACT
The Price of Territorial Politics: Economic Geography, Political Institutions and Party
Systems
by
Carolina G. de Miguel Moyer
Chairs: Allen Hicken and Kenneth Kollman
This dissertation explores the question of why some countries develop party systems dom-
inated by regional or local parties whereas other countries have party systems dominated
by parties with broad national constituencies and broad programmatic appeals. Scholars
have predominantly focused on institutions (such as decentralization, regime type or elec-
toral rules) to explain variation in the territorial structure of party systems. In contrast
with current scholarship, I argue that the interaction between the geography of societal
preferences and institutions better explains cross-national variation in the territorial struc-
ture of party systems. More specifically, I argue that the way in which economic interests
map onto politically relevant territorial units affects the incentives of candidates to coordi-
nate across these units. When rich and poor voters are territorially concentrated, and the
economic differences between these territorial units are large, conflicts over the territorial
distribution of central government resources will become salient. And these redistributive
pressures will motivate voters and candidates in regions that expect to “lose out” from the
redistributive process to coordinate under regional or local party labels, instead of joining
nation-wide political alliances. Furthermore, I argue that the effects of the geography of
economic preferences on the party system can be mitigated or exacerbated by institutions
such as bicameral chambers and flexible internal party organizations. Methodologically,
xiii
this dissertation adopts a multi-method approach that includes a large-N analysis based on
an original dataset comparing party systems in both developed and developing countries as
well as old and new democracies and three case studies: Post-War II Italy, Progressive Era




In the Fall of 2010, in the midst of the international financial crisis and the austerity
measures imposed by the Spanish central government, Oriol Pujol, the spokesman for Con-
vergència i Unió (CiU, an autonomy-minded party in the region of Catalunya in Spain)
said: “It’s time to tighten our belts, but it’s time for some people to do it more than
others. Why? Because we have been paying for [the rest of] Spain more than others”
(Los Angeles Times, August 15th, 2010). The party spokesman made these comments in
the context of the 2010 elections to the Parliament of Catalunya. One of Convergència i
Unió’s main campaign proposals during this regional election was budgetary independence
for Catalunya and a smaller contribution in the form of taxes collected by the central gov-
ernment and distributed to other regions of Spain (Pinol and Noguer, 2010; Minder, 2010).
The leader of CiU (Arthur Mas) said that he wanted Catalunya to become fiscally indepen-
dent from Madrid, because fiscal independence would be a way to prevent further transfers
from Catalunya to poorer regions of Spain (Pinol and Noguer, 2010; Minder, 2010).
Disputes over the territorial distribution of resources are at the heart of demands from
regional constituencies and/or regional political parties in many countries. Garrett and
Rodden (2005) and Rodden (2004) point out that rich regions in the Italian North and
wealthy German states like Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria argue that their regions over-
contribute to redistribution schemes that benefit other regions. According to an interview
by Ziblatt (2002), an official in the Bavarian Social Ministry said: “Why should a hard
working construction worker in Bavaria have to pay for the problems of unemployment
in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania?” (Ziblatt 2002, 637-638; also cited in Beramendi and
1
Anderson (2008, 255)). In Belgium, conflicts between the regions of Wallonia and Flanders
are largely manifestations of tensions about territorial solidarity regarding the distribution
of central resources across the regions of Belgium. “As Wallonia’s traditional industries like
coal and steel have declined, the Flemish increasingly feel that they are subsidizing the less
productive south [...] While the two regional governments have considerable autonomy, the
Flemish parties want to decentralize authority over justice, health, social security, taxation
and labor, while the poorer French speakers fear losing federal social security protections”
(Castle and Erlanger, 2010).
Similarly, Desposato notes that in Brazil “the more developed center and southern region
of the country accounts for about 80% of GDP, but only receives about 60% of tax revenue.
Brazilians from the South commonly complain about having to sustain poorer regions; those
in the North and Northeast argue that such redistribution is only fair given the extreme
poverty in those regions” (Desposato, 2001, Chapter 4, 207). Desposato’s account of Brazil
suggests that issues of territorial economic solidarity are salient, and that any change in
the distribution of resources “is certain to involve state political conflict, pitting states that
would gain from the redistribution against those that would lose” (Desposato, 2001, 207).
Conflicts over the territorial distribution of resources and over “who is paying too much
and who too little” into the common pool of central government resources are common
in quite a few countries. This dissertation explores the conditions under which these eco-
nomic conflicts shape parties and party systems. As Cayeros very well puts it, “revenue
centralization opens the gate to regional redistribution” (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006, 21). The ba-
sic argument of this dissertation is that the existence of large economic disparities between
politically relevant constituencies in a country increases the political tensions surrounding
central government redistribution of resources. In such a scenario I argue that candidates
representing constituencies that have very different economic interests will be more likely to
abandon national parties in favor of regional or local political parties as means to better rep-
resent the economic interests of their constituency at the national level. This effect however
is modified by several aspects of the internal organization or parties and of national-level
institutions.
2
1.1 The Role of Local Parties
The local or national character of parties influences a variety of political phenomena
ranging from the nature of policies produced in a country (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003;
Hicken et al., 2008; Rodden, 2009b) to levels of violent conflict and demands for secession
(Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Brancati, 2006a). See Figure 1.1.A. By way of example, Hicken
et al. (2008) argue that when political competition at the national level occurs between
parties that represent specific sub-national [i.e. regional or local] constituencies, then the
outcomes of policy debates and conflicts can lead to an oversupply of pork-barrel policies
and an undersupply of nationally-focused public goods (Hicken, 2009, 3). In contrast,
in nationalized party systems, political cleavages are more likely to fall along functional,
ideological, or class lines, rather than along lines that correlate with geography (Hicken,
2009, 3), which leads to nationalized, comprehensive policy programs. In a similar vein,
Rodden (2009b) argues that countries with parties that have national programmatic appeals
are more likely to enact progressive redistributive policies, whereas countries dominated by
parties that de-emphasize national appeals tend to develop a system of pork-barrel politics
that usually results in regressive inter-regional transfers.
The local or national character of parties also influences demands for secession and lev-
els of conflict (Brancati, 2009, 2006a; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Rose and Urwin, 1975).
Rose and Urwin (1975) note “that geographically narrow parties are frequently accompa-
nied by separatist goals, whereas parties with broad geographic support will tend to have
an integrating impact on the state and thus provide for a level of political stability that
would be absent without their presence” (Morgenstern et al., 2009, 1323-1324). More re-
cently, Brancati (2009) shows that regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism
(Brancati, 2009, 157) by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation
that favors certain groups over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict
and secessionism (Brancati, 2009, 14-15). Finally, Bakke and Wibbels find that if national
parties obtain votes in less than half of the regions in the country (and do not include any
minority regions), then the likelihood of conflict in a country increases considerably (Bakke
and Wibbels, 2006, 15).
3
1.1.1 Federalism and Local Parties
The focus on local or national character of parties and party systems is particularly
prominent within the literature on federalism and decentralization. Scholars have recently
argued that the local character of parties and party systems mediates the effect of federal
institutions on a variety of political and economic outcomes (Wibbels, 2005; Rodden, 2006).
Figure 1.1.B represents this type of argument. An excellent example is Wibbels’ book Feder-
alism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing
World (2005) in which he argues that a federations’ capacity to undertake economic pol-
icy reform depends on a bargaining process between national and regional political leaders
(Wibbels, 2005, 5). In Hamilton’s Paradox (2006) Rodden explores how the localized or de-
centralized nature of parties affects the fiscal discipline of subnational units, and argues that
“strong disciplined political parties that compete in all of the states [sub-units/regions] can
be a solution to underlying collective-good problems in federations” (Rodden, 2006, 121).
In addition to exploring the effects of federal or decentralized institutions, scholars have
recently begun addressing questions of institutional design in federations (Rodden, 2009a;
Bednar, 2009; Filippov et al., 2003). The local or national character of parties and party
systems is central to many arguments in this body of research (Riker, 1964; Filippov et al.,
2003; Bednar, 2009; Diaz-Cayeros, 2006; Beramendi, 2011). Figure 1.1.C represent this third
set of arguments. In his seminal 1964 book Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance,
Riker claims that the decentralized nature of parties in the United States (that is the
fact that candidates within US parties have both national and state-level allegiances) is
the feature of the party system that keeps the American federal system from becoming
completely unitary (Riker (1964, 91) in (Volden, 2004)).
“The federal relationship is centralized according to the degree to which the par-
ties organized to operate the central government control the parties organized
to operate the constituent governments. This amounts to the assertion that the
proximate cause of variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheraliza-
tion) in the constitutional structure of federalism is the variation in the degree
of party centralization” (Riker, 1964, 129).
Building on these early insights, current research points to various aspects of the local
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or national character of parties to explain why some federations are more stable than others
(Filippov et al., 2003; Bednar, 2009) or why certain countries are more (de)centralized than
others (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006; Beramendi, 2011). For example, Filippov et al. (2003) claim in
their book The Origins of Self-Sustaining Federations that stable federations are ultimately
the product of “vertically integrated parties”, which they define as parties that compete in
both levels of government (national and regional/subnational). And both Beramendi (2011)
and Diaz-Cayeros (2006) argue that the balance of power between national and regional
elites within parties is key to explain the degree (and type) of fiscal decentralization in
a country. In his book Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America,
Diaz-Cayeros argues that regional politicians will only give up fiscal authority to the central
government if they can guarantee that the central government will keep providing them with
transfers and will not overawe them. For Diaz-Cayeros national political parties can help
solve this commitment problem by linking “the fates of state or provincial politicians with
those of the federal level of government” (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006, 21).1
“[O]ne can think of outcomes of centralization as being divided according to
whether local politicians are nationally or locally oriented. This is the political
dimension of the centralized fiscal bargain” (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006, 27).
Beramendi’s recent book Regions and Redistribution: The Political Geography of In-
equality (2011) explores the variation in fiscal structures across countries and argues that the
choice of fiscal institutions in political unions depends on “the combined effect of economic
geography and political representation” (Beramendi, 2011, 4). By political representation
he refers to a set of institutions that affect “the balance of power between the regional and
national elites” (Beramendi, 2011, 18) which include electoral rules, bicameral institutions
and most notably party systems (Beramendi, 2011, 4). He argues that in countries with
highly fragmented party organizations regional elites have more power within the party and
thus territorial regional interests become more salient. Highly fragmented party systems will
thus encourage fiscal decentralization. In contrast, when national party elites are stronger
1The argument presented in the book is more complex. The problem of commitment hinges on the nature
of parties as well as on the amount of revenue that can be extracted and used for transfers. Both of these
factors (one political and one economic) help explain the variation in fiscal arrangements in Latin America.
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Figure 1.1: Arguments Involving National/Local Parties and Party Systems
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within the party organization then territorial conflicts become less salient which results in
more centralized fiscal structures.
In sum, several scholars have developed arguments that hinge on the local of national
character of parties and party systems to explain a variety of institutional choices and of
policy outcomes. These scholars, however, have paid less attention to how countries end
up with local or national parties and party systems in the first place. This dissertation
examines to this precise question. I seek to understand the conditions under which local or
national parties develop. Developing a better understanding of these conditions will shed
light on the ways in which local or national parties influence public good provision, conflict
and institutional design. Furthermore, it will clarify clarify issues of endogeneity in trying
to account for these various political and economic outcomes.
1.2 What are Local Parties?
Scholars attribute a range of meanings to the concept of local or national political par-
ties. In order to clarify the question of my dissertation I distinguish between three different
features of parties that are associated with the terms “local” or “national”: party territori-
alization, party decentralization and party integration. Figure 1.2 schematically represents
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these different aspects of parties. The first characteristic – party territorialization– refers
to the extent to which a political party obtains uniform electoral support across the entire
territory of a country. If we think of a country as divided into electoral districts, a party
is considered to be nationalized if it competes across all electoral districts and obtains a
similar proportion of votes in all of them. Conversely, if a party obtains votes unevenly
across districts or exclusively in some districts and not others then the party is considered
to be territorialized (Cox, 1999; Hicken, 2009).2
The second characteristic – party decentralization – refers to the relationship between
party leaders and party candidates. Party decentralization describes to the extent to which
candidates within a political party are autonomous ideologically and/or organizationally.
For example, rules of candidate selection affect the degree of party decentralization. Open
primaries tend to foster autonomy, whereas the lack of primaries hinder autonomy and
instead promote centralization. The concept of “party decentralization” is thus closely re-
lated to the concept of personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995) and of party discipline.
Finally, the third characteristic – party integration – defines the relationship between na-
tional and sub-national party branches or party elites within the party. Whereas the two
previous dimensions describe parties in the national electoral arena, this third dimension
describes parties in federal contexts, which have both a national and a sub-national elec-
toral arena. This dimension of parties defines the extent to which sub-national elites can
challenge national politicians.
Scholars often refer to one (or several) of these three characteristics of political parties
when they describe those parties as being “local” or “national”.3 This dissertation specifi-
cally focuses on the first characteristic – territorialization– and explores why some countries
develop territorialized political parties whereas other countries mostly develop nationalized
parties. However, one of the factors that I argue affect the extent of “territorialization” is
2Other scholars refer to “territorialization” as “de-nationalization” or “regionalization”. For the purpose
of this discussion we can considers these terms as equivalent. In Chapter 3, however, I provide a more
detailed explanation of the similarities and differences between these terms.
3Some scholars define local or national parties in ideological or programmatic terms. National parties
are parties that defend national issues or national interests, and regional or local parties are parties that
represent local or regional interests. This type of categorization is common in work on ethno-regional parties
in Western Europe, in which regional parties are associated with the specific defense of ethnic/regional claims.
For this particular project I stay away from definitions of local or regional parties based on ideology.
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Figure 1.2: Dimensions of the National/Local Character of Parties
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“party decentralization.” In other words, the degree to which individual candidates have
autonomy from party leaders (party decentralization) affects the degree to which parties
will be nationalized or territorialized. Keeping these dimensions of parties conceptually
distinct is thus key to the framing of part of my argument.4 In what follows I present the
puzzle, argument and research design of the dissertation.
1.3 Territory, Parties and Party Systems
The territorial nature of parties and party systems varies considerably across countries.
As an example, Figure 1.3 shows the degree of party system territorialization in 67 demo-
cratic countries. The measure of party system territorialization on the y-axis of this figure
captures the degree to which parties in a country are nationalized or territorialized. Lower
values on this measure indicate that most parties in the country compete and obtain votes
evenly across the territory of a country (i.e. all districts or regions). Higher values on this
measure indicate that most parties in the country compete and obtain votes in one small
portion of the country (i.e. one district or one region).5 The figure shows that countries
4This dissertation leaves aside the third characteristic of parties mentioned in the literature – integration
– since it is limited to federations.
5In subsequent chapters of the dissertation I provide a more detailed explanation of this.
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like Argentina, Thailand, Philippines, Belgium and India have highly territorialized party
systems, whereas countries such as Hungary, Slovenia or the Netherlands have very nation-
alized party systems. What explains this cross-national variation? Why do some countries
develop party systems dominated by regional or local parties whereas other countries have
party systems dominated by parties with broad national constituencies?
In the last ten years there has been a renewed interest in the territorial nature of parties
and party systems and its determinants (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Cox, 1999; Harbers,
2010; Hicken, 2009; Morgenstern and Swindle, 2005; Bochsler, 2009). Existing explanations
of why countries develop nationalized or territorialized party systems however do not ad-
equately account for the variation that we observe across countries, or across time within
some countries. One common argument in the literature is that territorialization is more
likely in decentralized countries, whereas nationalization is more likely in centralized coun-
tries. There are, however, numerous exceptions. Within federations, there is considerable
variation; countries such as Canada, Spain or the United States are relatively national-
ized compared to federations like Argentina, Belgium, Switzerland or Brazil. Furthermore,
changes in the territorial nature of party system over time within the same country do not
always correspond to changes in decentralization. In the UK for example the rise of the
Scottish National Party in Scotland and of the Plaid Cymru in Wales occurred prior to any
significant decentralization. On there other hand, Italy post-World War II has had periods
of nationalization under a context of decentralized political authority.
Another common argument associated with the territorialization of party systems in-
volves the presence of territorially concentrated ethnic, religious, and linguistic interests in
a country. According to this theory nationalized party systems are more likely in homoge-
nous countries, whereas territorialized party systems develop in heterogeneous countries.
However this account does not explain why Argentina, Brazil ad South Korea, which are
relatively homogeneous ethnically, linguistically and religiously have highly territorialized
party systems. It also does not explain why Germany post-1990 (linguistically and ethni-
cally homogenous) has become relatively territorialized. In general, societal explanations
on their own are not a sufficient explanation since they cannot account for changes in the
territorial nature of party systems over time within a country. Chapter 2 presents a more
9
























































































































































































































































































































































































detailed review of existing explanations and their shortcomings. In what follows I summa-
rize the argument put forth in this dissertation to explain variation in the territorial nature
of party systems both across countries and over time.
1.4 Overview of the Argument
This dissertation seeks to understand why some countries have party systems containing
significant local parties whereas other countries have party systems dominated by national
parties. In order to tackle this question I focus on the incentives that individual candidates
face to coordinate under local or regional party labels instead of national party labels when
competing in national-level elections.
I start with the assumption that candidates seek reelection in their particular con-
stituency, and that the amount of central government resources that they bring to their
constituency will influence their chances of reelection. The conventional wisdom suggests
that joining a national party is a better way for candidates to access resources and power at
the center because national parties are larger and thus have a higher probability of getting
10
into office at the national level. In contrast to this view, I argue that joining a national party
involves a tradeoff. A candidate who decides to join a national party increases her proba-
bility of getting into power “but at the risk of having to share that power with other actors
within the party” (Hicken, 2009, 29). Thus I argue that under certain conditions, joining
a national party is less beneficial than joining a regional or local party in national-level
elections. In particular this dissertation identifies three factors that affect this tradeoff, and
thus affect candidates’ decision to join smaller regional political parties instead of national
parties when competing for national-level office: a) the geography of interests, that is the
degree to which voter interests vary across politically relevant territorial units in a country;
b) the degree of autonomy of individual candidates with respect to party leaders within
national party organizations; and c) the degree to which national-level institutions (such as
upper legislative chambers) represent territorial interests in national policy-making.
The first factor affecting the incentives of candidates to join a national or regional
political party is the geography of interests. The cost of joining a national political party (or
conversely, the benefit of joining a smaller regional or local party) increases as a candidate’s
policy interests diverge from the policy interests of the rest of candidates in the country.
In this dissertation I pay particular attention to the geography of economic interests. I
argue that a candidate is more likely to join a local or regional political party as the
economic interests of her constituency become increasingly distinct from those of the rest
of constituencies in the country.
Two additional factors shape a candidate’s decision to join a national or regional po-
litical party by modifying the costs associated with intra-party heterogeneity of economic
interests: one is the degree of candidate autonomy within the national party (which is linked
to party discipline), and the other is the degree to which geographically concentrated inter-
ests are represented within national-level institutions. The way in which political parties
are internally organized determines whether or not they can cater to a broad nation-wide
constituency. For example, I argue that weakly disciplined political parties in which can-
didates have significant leeway to cater to their local constituencies can actually be useful
in maintaining diverse nation-wide political alliances, whereas political parties that enforce
strong party discipline will have a harder time preventing party splits or the emergence of
11
new local-level parties in districts or regions that have a very unique set of preferences.
Finally, the third claim I make is that institutions that give genuine representation to
territorial interests at the national level mediate the effect of economic geography on the
territorial nature of the party system. For example, I expect that countries with powerful
bicameral chambers will be less likely to develop regional parties and territorialized party
systems. In sum, I argue that party discipline and bicameralism modify the effect of an
uneven geography of economic interests. In other words, weak party discipline and directly
elected upper legislative chambers can reduce the costs of intra-party heterogeneity for
candidates, and thus reduce their likelihood of abandoning national political parties in
favor of smaller regional or local parties.
1.5 Research Design and Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 reviews the literature, fleshes out the argument of the dissertation and gen-
erates several testable propositions. The rest of the dissertation tests the propositions
developed in Chapter 2 using a multi-method approach that includes a quantitative anal-
ysis based on an original cross-national longitudinal data set (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4)
and three case studies: Post-World War Italy (Chapter 4), Progressive Era United States
(Chapter 4), and Germany Pre- and Post-Unification (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 concludes the
dissertation with a summary of the main findings and a discussion of the implications and
contributions of the dissertation.
The first part of my empirical strategy is to test the propositions developed in Chapter 2
using a large-N comparative approach. To this end I have created a data set of party system
territorialization that uses the largest (and most representative) sample of democracies to
date.6 This data set includes a measure of party system territorialization for 70 democratic
countries between 1970 and 2009. In order to create this measure I collected vote totals for
each party at each national legislative election disaggregated by district and by region. In
addition, I have collected economic data to match the level of aggregation of the electoral
data for each country/year. Specifically I collected GDP/capita at the district or regional
6There are few largely comparative studies of party system territorialization with the exception of Hicken
(2009) and Brancati (2009).
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level and I used this data to calculate a measure of territorial economic disparities for each
country/year observation. In addition the data set includes a set of institutional variables, as
well as variables capturing various aspects of a country’s societal make-up. Some of these
variables vary across countries and time, and some vary only across counties. I perform
analyses of this data with both the pooled version of the data set where the unit of analysis
is the country/election year, and with the averaged version of the data set where the unit
of analysis is the country.7
Chapters 3 uses the large-N data set just described to test the empirical support for the
proposition that the territorial concentration of economic interests is associated with more
territorialized party systems. Chapter 4 uses the same data set to test the two modifying
conditions of my argument. First I test the argument that strongly disciplined parties
magnify the effect of economic inequalities on party system territorialization. Second, I
test the argument that elected upper chambers mitigate the effect of economic inequalities
on party system territorialization. I find strong support for all three propositions. The
analyses presented in these two chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) address the issue of
potential endogeneity (or reverse causality) with the use of time-lags both in the pooled
and averaged analyses.
The second part of my empirical strategy is to use case studies as an additional test
of the argument (and the propositions) developed in Chapter 2. The criteria that I use to
select cases is to be able to reasonably isolate a change in one of the independent variables
of interest while keeping the rest of independent variables (and controls) relatively constant.
In order to do this I look at changes over time within the same polity. Grzymala-Busse
warns against using time as a proxy for causal mechanisms. As she puts it, “[t]iming does
not specify how the phenomenon unfolded” (Grzymala-Busse, 2011, 1288); so as much as
possible I try to complement my timing arguments with a description of the mechanisms
by which the changes in institutions or in geography of preferences affected the territorial
nature of the party system.
In Chapter 4 I present two cases that illustrate the modifying effect of party discipline
on the territorial nature of the party system. The first case is Italy post-War II, which
7I follow Hicken (2009) in this strategy in order to provide some robustness to the results.
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experienced two changes in electoral rules over the course of a period of time short enough
that other key variables remained unchanged. I argue that these changes in electoral rules
created different incentives for party discipline, which in turn had implications for the
decisions of candidates to stick with broad national coalitions instead of small regional or
local parties. I show that the change in electoral incentives affected the territorial nature of
the party system. The second case is the United States during the period of the introduction
of the open primary in the first half the twentieth century. This institutional change created
incentives for weaker party discipline, which contributed to the nationalization of the US
party system.
Chapter 5 develops the third case study of the dissertation, which is meant to evaluate
the impact of a change in economic geography on the party system (which is the proposition
tested in Chapter 3). Finding a case study to test this proposition is challenging since the
territorial concentration of economic interests tends to change over decades and not years,
and often times during this long period institutions and other variables tend to change as
well. The case of Germany is ideal however because German reunification represented an
exogenous shock that fundamentally altered the territorial distribution of economic interests
in the country while keeping the institutional structure fairly constant. The goal of these
three cases is to buttress the findings of the large-N analysis as well as to provide some new
insight into the development of the party system in these countries.8




Literature Review and Argument
“For the most part, when developing basic models addressing such crucial topics
as platform choice, party systems, representation, and the transformation of
preferences to policies, geography has been a blind spot for political scientists.”
– Jonathan Rodden 2010
This chapter develops the theoretical propositions of this dissertation. I argue that the
territorial nature of party systems is shaped by decisions taken by legislative candidates as
they seek reelection. These decisions are affected by how economic interests are distributed
across politically relevant constituencies in a country, as well as by aspects of the internal
organization of parties and by broader institutional and constitutional features. The chapter
is divided into three sections. The first section discusses existing research on party system
nationalization and reveals some of its theoretical and empirical shortcomings. The second
section sets the stage for the argument of the dissertation by pointing to a relatively recent
research agenda that focuses attention on the intersection between geography and societal
heterogeneity to explain a variety of political phenomena. Finally, the third section presents
my argument and develops several propositions that I test in subsequent chapters.
2.1 Why Link? Existing Explanations
Scholars have described the formation of national parties and national party systems as the
process of forming links between local candidates and local voters across a country’s territory
(Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Cox, 1999; Cox and Knoll, 2003; Kasuya and Moenius, 2008;
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Hicken, 2009). National parties form when candidates and voters from different districts
in the country coordinate under the same party labels. When the same set of parties
competes in every electoral district and voters vote for these parties evenly across all districts
then the outcome is a party system with nationally-oriented political parties or what the
literature refers to as a nationalized party system. In contrast, when voters and candidates
from different electoral districts fail to adopt common party labels the result is a party
system with locally oriented parties, or what the literature refers to as a denationalized
or territorialized party system. One of the questions at the center of current scholarship
interested in the development of parties and party systems is “why link?” In other words,
why are candidates and voters more inclined to form national electoral alliances in some
countries and not in others?
The majority of answers to this question in the current scholarship have focused on
institutions and the incentives they provide for candidates to coordinate (or not) across the
territory of a country. Among the different institutional factors mentioned in the literature
four stand out as particularly important: a) decentralization (i.e. the vertical division of
power in a country) probably holds the most prominent place; b) electoral rules (mainly the
electoral formula and the existence of upper tiers); c) the nature of the executive (whether
a country is presidential or parliamentary); and d) the division of power within the national
government (captured by the presence of a second legislative chamber among other insti-
tutional features). What follows is a brief review of the central theoretical claims in the
literature about how these constitutional features influence the territorial nature of a party
system.
2.1.1 Decentralization
The degree of decentralization of power and resources in a country holds a prominent
place in the literature as a factor that influences the formation of national parties and the
nationalization of party systems (Cox, 1999; Cox and Knoll, 2003; Chhibber and Kollman,
2004; Harbers, 2010; Morgenstern et al., 2009). Decentralization captures the degree to
which power is vertically divided in a country. The governments of decentralized countries
give some authority and some resources to subnational offices/governments, which means
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that power is divided between two levels of government. In centralized (or unitary) countries
the national government controls all the power and resources.1
Chhibber and Kollman’s (2004) book The Formation of National Party Systems: Feder-
alism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States argues
that if policy in a country is overwhelmingly made at the national level then candidates and
voters have more incentives to form national coalitions that will enable them to capture
the national government. This means that as countries centralize resources and power at
the national level we should expect to see a corresponding nationalization of their party
system. In contrast when power and resources lie predominantly at the sub-national level
(i.e. in highly decentralized countries) the control of the national government becomes less
important as a means to influence policy and thus candidates and voters have fewer incen-
tives to unite under national party labels. A similar argument resonates in Cox and Knoll
(2003), Cox (1999) and Hicken (2009). Candidates and parties link across districts in order
to increase their chances to control the central government, and “[h]ow much effort one is
willing to exert to attain this goal depends on, among other things how centralized power
is in the polity [...]” (Cox, 1999, p. 157).
Brancati (2006b) also focuses on decentralization but presents a different mechanism
connecting decentralization to the territorial nature of party systems. In the Origin and
Strength of Regional Parties Brancati argues that politically decentralized countries are
more likely to have more (and stronger) regional political parties2 because the presence
of subnational legislatures gives regional parties the opportunity to govern, allowing them
to gain experience and resources, which they can then use to facilitate a jump to the na-
tional electoral arena. “For regional parties, the costs of participating in national legislative
elections are smaller in decentralized systems than in centralized ones [...]. Among many
other things, these costs entail renting office space, hiring staff, and publicizing candidates”
(Brancati, 2009, 51). Finally, scholars like Morgenstern et al. (2009) have argued that fed-
1The United States and Germany are classic examples of decentralized countries, since the federal gov-
ernment and state governments share power and resources. Examples of centralized or unitary countries are
France, Sweden, Norway, Israel, and Belgium in the 1970’s. For a more detailed discussion on decentraliza-
tion see Hooghe et al. (2010), Bednar (2009) and Treisman (2007).
2Regional political parties are parties that have local/regional constituencies as opposed to national
constituencies. Brancati’s focus on regional parties captures to some extent the degree to which countries
have territorialized or nationalized party systems.
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eral (i.e. politically decentralized) countries should affect the territorial structure of party
systems for two reasons: first, decentralized polities contribute to “the development and
manifestation of the heterogeneity of the districts’ preferences” (Morgenstern et al., 2009,
17); and second, “federalism should breed politicians with ties to a region who have in-
terests in differentiating themselves from the party. Unitary systems should reduce such
independence, and by imposing more uniform campaigns, they would reduce [party sys-
tem nationalization].” (Morgenstern et al., 2009, 17-18). Once again, this theory predicts
that decentralization will intensify territorial politics whereas centralization will encourage
nationalization.3
Recent quantitative studies have yielded empirical results that run counter to the theo-
retical expectations developed in the literature. For example, based on a large-N analysis of
approximately fifty democracies Brancati (2009) finds that while political decentralization
increases the number and strength of regional parties in a country, fiscal decentralization
has either no effect or a negative effect on the number and strength of regional parties. In
his book Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies Hicken (2009) finds that fiscal
decentralization on its own does not have a significant direct effect on party system territo-
rialization (Hicken, 2009, 99). Instead Hicken argues that it is the combination of vertical
centralization and horizontal concentration of power at the national level that explains party
system nationalization. His data set includes around 228 elections in 46 countries. Simi-
larly Lago-Peñas and nas (2009)’s study of party system nationalization based on a sample
of 228 elections in seventeen Western European countries between 1945 and 1998 finds no
significant evidence that political and fiscal decentralization affect the territorial structure
of party systems. Morgenstern et al. (2009)’s work present similar non-significant findings
regarding the role of decentralization. In sum, these more recent studies cast doubt on the
hypothesized relationship between decentralization and they suggest that this hypothesized
relationship bears further exploration.
3There are a few scholars that actually posit the opposite relationship between decentralization and
regionalization or territorialization of the party system. In his book on the nationalization of politics in
Western European countries, Caramani argues that “rather than being a cause of territorialization of voting
behavior, federal structures reduce the expression of regional protest in the party system by opening up
institutional channels of voice” (Caramani, 2004, 300). For example, “[...] in federal Switzerland today the
territorial tensions are lower than in many (formerly) centralized states such as Belgium, Britain, or Spain.”
(Caramani, 2004, 300).
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Figure 2.1 presents some empirical evidence of the relationship between decentralization
and the territorial nature of party systems. Since decentralization is a multifaceted concept
I use two different operationalizations: fiscal decentralization and political decentralization.
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between party system territorialization (on the vertical
y-axis) and fiscal decentralization (on the horizontal x-axis). Fiscal decentralization is
measured as the country’s subnational revenues expressed as a proportion of GDP.4 Higher
values on this measure of fiscal decentralization indicate that a higher proportion of revenue
is collected at the subnational level relative to the overall GDP of the country which means
that the country is more decentralized. Party system territorialization (on the y-axis)
captures the extent to which parties in a country obtain votes across all electoral districts.
Low values indicate that the party system is nationalized meaning that most parties obtain
the same proportion of votes in all electoral districts. Higher values indicate that the
party system is localized meaning that (in the extreme) each electoral district has its own
different set of parties.5 The graph suggests that the relationship between party system
territorialization and fiscal decentralization is not particularly strong (the fitted regression
line is practically flat). The bottom graph in Figure 2.1 shows the same relationship using
a measure of political decentralization, which captures the degree to which subnational
levels of government are politically independent. The measure I use is based on Hooghe
et al. (2010) and it is a categorical variable that ranges from 0 (no independent regional
legislature and regional executive) to 4 (completely independent regional legislature and
regional executive). The fitted regression line in this graph indicates that the relationship
is positive but not very strong. Figure 2.9 at the end of the chapter shows the same bivariate
graphs using the averaged sample (instead of the pooled sample) and the patterns look very
similar.
4The measure comes from the World Bank Fiscal Indicators. The original measure published by the
World Bank is expressed in percentages. I have transformed the measure into proportions by dividing by
100.
5This is a commonly used measure in the literature on party system nationalization. Scholars refer to
this measure as “inflation” (Hicken, 2009; Cox, 1997). In Chapter 3 I provide a more detailed description of
this measure and alternative specifications which I will be using.
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In contrast with scholars focused exclusively on decentralization, Hicken (2009) shows
in his book Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies that centralization of power
is not sufficient to induce “aggregation,” and thus to produce a nationalized party system.
Hicken argues that candidates’ incentives to aggregate across districts in a country
depend on the size of the payoff at the national-level, and the probability of getting that
payoff. Regarding the size of the payoff, candidates will want to coordinate across districts
in a country and form nation-wide electoral alliances if the payoff that they expect to
receive once in government is large. According to Hicken the size of the payoff depends
on the level of vertical centralization of power in a country (in line with Chhibber and
Kollman’s argument), as well as on the level of horizontal centralization, which he defines
as the degree to which power and resources are concentrated or dispersed at the national
level. Thus the more resources at the center (i.e. the more vertical centralization) and the
more concentrated these resources are (i.e. the more horizontal centralization), the more
incentives candidates have to coordinate under common party labels and form nation-wide
political parties.
According to Hicken, one of the factors contributing to the degree of horizontal cen-
tralization is the presence of an upper legislative chamber.6 Hicken argues that bicameral
legislatures diffuse power at the national level and thus contribute to decreases the size of
the aggregation payoff, whereas unicameral legislature concentrate national power (Hicken,
2009, 59). Bicameral countries should thus lead to more party system territorialization
whereas unicameral systems (especially together with unitary forms of government) should
lead to party system nationalization. To my knowledge, Hicken is the first to theorize (and
test) the relationship between bicameralism and the territorial nature of party systems. The
box plot presented in Figure 2.2 suggests that countries with bicameral legislatures have
more territorialized party systems than countries with just one legislative chamber. Given
the categorical nature of the bicameralism data the box plot graph conveys the information
6Hicken also considers two other factors that influence horizontal centralization: the presence of reserve
domains and the degree of party cohesion.
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better than a scatter plot.7
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2.1.3 Executive Type
A few scholars have suggested that executive type8 not only affects the number of par-
ties that develop in a country (Filippov et al., 2003; Cox and Knoll, 2003; Hicken and Stoll,
2008; Lijphart, 1994; Powell, 1982) but also the nature of these parties both in terms of
their internal organization, and in terms of the breadth of their appeals and the breadth
7Boxplots split the data into quartiles, give the maximum and minimum values and show the outliers.
The horizontal line across the box represents the median of the data. The lower edge of the box represents
the lower quartile (i.e. 25% of the data are less than that value); the upper edge of the box represents the
upper quartile (i.e. 25% of the data are greater than that value); the bottom and top “whiskers” represent
the minimum and maximum values respectively; and finally the dots are considered outliers in the data,
which means that they are more than 3/2 times of the upper quartile.
8The most basic distinction regarding the type of executive is between presidential and parliamentary
countries. This distinction is based on how the executive is selected. In presidential regimes there is
separation of powers which means that the selection (and the survival) of the executive do not depend
on the support of the legislature; that is presidents are popularly elected. In contrast, in parliamentary
systems the executive (i.e. the prime minister) is chosen by the legislature, which means that there is
no independence or separation of powers between branches of government. There are more fine-grained
categorizations of executive type; however, for the purpose of simplicity here I focus on the dichotomous
distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes. For an excellent in depth treatment of types
of executives see Samuels and Shugart (2010)’s recent book Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How
the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior.
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of their constituency (Samuels, 2002; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). According to Samuels
and Shugart (2010) if presidential elections tend to “reduce party system fragmentation
and thus the number of important partisan actors then logically they must also generate
incentives for parties to aggregate into relatively larger organizations, with broader ap-
peals.”(Samuels and Shugart, 2010, 13). Thus presidential systems should encourage party
system nationalization.
The argument that is most commonly advanced in the literature is that presidential
systems lead to more nationalized party systems because presidents are often elected by
plurality and parties that nominate presidential candidates for presidential office need to
gain votes from a “large portion of the national electorate” (Samuels, 2002). In contrast,
in parliamentary systems parties can obtain representation at the national level without
being the largest party in the country and without having to appeal to a broad sector
of the electorate. This general argument is echoed by Cox (1997) in his book Making
Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems in which he explores
several factors that lead candidates and voters to link across electoral districts.9 When
talking about presidential systems he argues that “would-be presidents must necessarily
gather votes nationwide” (Cox, 1997, 187). This is especially true under two conditions:
1) when the presidential prize is large, and 2) when the president is elected by a procedure
that approximates plurality rule (Cox, 1997, 190).
As examples of how the existence of a president might encourage party system nation-
alization, Cox (1997) cites research on the cases of France and the United States. When
France was a parliamentary system (during the Third and Fourth Republics) candidates
remained largely unlinked and there was a multiparty system (Cox, 1997, 188). However,
since Charles de Gaulle successfully forced the French parliament to accept a directly elected
president in 1962 the party system in France has been characterized by greater linkage and
“almost all seats have been won by candidates linked to national parties” (Cox, 1997, 188).
Regarding the United States, Cox (1997) cites McCormick (1967)’s work on the formation
and development of the second American party system. McCormick (1967) argues that the
9The term linkage refers to the “coordination” of candidates and voters across electoral districts to form
national parties. Different scholars used different terms (“linkage,” “coordination,” “aggregation”) to refer
to the same concept.
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critical factor for the formation of national parties in the US after 1790 was the adoption
of the Federal Constitution. In particular he argues that the constitutional arrangement
to elect a president became an important factor to encourage co-operation among politi-
cal leaders throughout the nation on behalf of particular candidates” (McCormick, 1967,
94). In other words, competition for the presidency in the United States contributed to the
nationalization of its once very fragmented party system.
Unfortunately Cox does not test his propositions empirically beyond the two examples
on France and the United States. Furthermore, in some parts of his book he implies that
scholars should expect no differences between parliamentary and executive regimes in terms
of the incentives for linkage. He says “[t]he fight to capture the premiership or the presidency
is equally important and parties will look to broaden their coalitions in order to increase their
changes of conquering executive office in either political system” (Cox, 1997). Similarly,
Hicken (2009) and Morgenstern et al. (2009) do not expect presidential and parliamentary
regimes to generate different incentives for aggregation, and thus they do not expect the
type of executive to have an effect on party system nationalization.10.
The box plot presented in Figure 2.3 on page 25 suggests that there might not be sig-
nificant differences between executive types. Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between
party system territorialization (vertical axis) and executive type (horizontal axis). I classify
the countries in my data set as presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential based on
Samuels and Shugart (2010). The boxplot suggests that party systems in parliamentary and
presidential regimes are quite similar. The median value for both categories (represented by
the horizontal line inside each box) is practically the same, and so is the lower quartile and
to some extent the upper quartile. If anything the presidential and semi-presidential cate-
gory seems to have slightly higher values on party system territorialization, which suggests
that parliamentary system actually seem to be have more nationalized party systems than
presidential and semi-presidential systems. Figure 2.11 on page 50 at the end of the chapter
10Hicken and Stoll (2011, 2013)’s recent work looks into the effect of presidential races on the legislative
party system in presidential regimes. They find that presidential elections “shape the incentives of candidates
to coordinate across legislative electoral districts under a common party banner, leading to more aggregated
or nationalized party systems when there are few presidential candidates”(Hicken and Stoll, 2011, 854)
However, very few studies have actually looked into the comparison between presidential and parliamentary
systems, and whether there are differential incentives for aggregation.
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presents the “executive type” variable divided into its three categories: “parliamentary,”
“presidential” and “semi-presidential.”
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2.1.4 Electoral Rules
Scholars seem to agree that electoral rules affect coordination within districts and thus
shape the number of parties at the district level. Yet there is more disagreement about
whether electoral rules matter for coordination across districts, and thus whether they
matter to explain the number and types of parties at the national level. Duverger’s predic-
tions11 only apply at the district level and not at the national level (Cox, 1999; Chhibber
and Kollman, 2004; Hicken, 2009). A country can have an electoral system that promotes
two parties per district (SMD plurality electoral systems according to Duverger), but if
voters in each electoral district elect a different set of two parties then there will be more
11In very simple terms Duverger’s Law states that plurality rule electoral systems tend to produce two
parties, whereas proportional representation systems produce multipartism (i.e. several parties) (Duverger,
1964, 204-205). In other words, when a country has single member districts (SMD) and candidates are
elected by plurality rule, voters and candidates tend to coordinate into only two political parties, since
forming a third party or voting for a third party is not an optimal strategy. In contrast, countries that elect
their candidates in multimember districts with proportional rules encourage party system fragmentation.
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than two parties at the national level (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Hicken, 2009; Cox,
1997, 1999). Morgenstern et al. (2009) however argue that electoral rules are important
for cross-district coordination. In their piece Party Nationalization and Institutions the
authors argue that countries with single-member district (SMD) plurality systems will have
more territorialized party systems than countries with proportional representation. They
offer two distinct mechanisms that explain why this is the case. First, “since a plurality is
required to win the seat in SMD systems, parties may avoid spending the resources (good
candidates, costs, and effort) to compete where they have little chance of winning. In pro-
portional representation (PR) systems, by contrast, wasted vote-winning opportunities are
costly, because it takes far fewer votes to win a legislative seat” (Morgenstern et al., 2009,
1327).
Second, SMD plurality systems are associated with a greater number of districts than
proportional representation (PR) systems. This has three implications. First, a greater
number of districts according to Morgenstern et al. (2009) means that districts will be
small and thus that preferences within each district will be more homogeneous and that
preferences across districts will be more diverse.12 This should encourage candidates to be
more locally oriented, and thus should encourage party system territorialization (Morgen-
stern et al., 2009, 1327). Second, a greater number of districts implies greater coordination
costs for a party and greater costs of control of a party’s candidates. In other words, hav-
ing a large number of districts discourages candidates to form cross-district alliances that
will result in nationwide parties. In contrast, in PR (proportional representation) electoral
systems the reduced number of electoral districts should facilitate the parties’ coordination
of campaign platforms and strategies (Morgenstern et al., 2009, p. 1327). Finally, “more
districts should yield greater variability in terms of candidate qualities, which again should
increase the distinctiveness of electoral districts” (Morgenstern et al., 2009, 1327-1328) and
decrease party system nationalization.
Figure 2.4 presents the relationship between electoral formula (PR, Majoritarian and
12As I will argue later, whether this assumption is true or not is an empirical question. The degree of
preference homogeneity within districts and the degree of preference heterogeneity across districts actually
depends on how preferences are distributed in a country. We cannot assume that all SMD plurality systems
have internally homogeneous districts.
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Mixed) and party system territorialization. The top graph presents the mixed electoral
system category together with the PR electoral systems, whereas the bottom graph shows
the three types of electoral rules separately. Surprisingly, electoral rules are the institutional
factor that have the greatest impact in producing different party systems across countries.
Majoritarian electoral rules are associated with more territorialized party systems than
proportional representation systems. Mixed electoral systems fall somewhere in between
(which means that careful categorization of these systems is needed). Although it is not clear
whether these differences are statistically significant, the pattern indicates that electoral
rules have some explanatory power. According to Morgenstern et al. (2009) one of the
mechanisms linking SMD plurality systems to greater party system territorialization is that
SMD plurality systems have more (and smaller) electoral districts, and thus it becomes
harder to coordinate across a large number of such districts. According to Figure 2.5(b) the
number of districts does not seem strongly related to party system territorialization, and
nor does district magnitude. This is consistent with recent empirical findings by Hicken
(2009).
2.1.5 Institutional Determinants of Party System Territorialization
I test the explanations reviewed above using the data set collected for this project I
present. The various bivariate scatterplots and box plots are useful in that they provide
a general picture of key relationships. However, a multivariate analysis provides a better
test of the extent to which these different explanatory factors account for variation in the
territorial nature of party systems. I present the results of these analyses both with the
data set pooled and with the data set averaged. As a reminder, the measure of party system
territorialization captures the degree to which the average district-level party system mirrors
the national party system, and ranges from 0 (a perfectly nationalized party system) to 1
(a perfectly territorialized party system). This is the dependent variable.
Table 2.1 presents six different model specifications using the pooled data set. “Political
decentralization” and “bicameralism” are significant in one of the six models (Model 1 and
Model 4 respectively). Their significance level is not very strong and it is not robust to
alternative specifications. None of the other institutional variables is statistically significant.
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For robustness I run the same regression models with the averaged data set, and the results
are very similar. Results with the averaged data set are presented in Table 2.3 on page 52 at
the end of this chapter. These tables show similar results, except that “bicameralism” is no
longer significant in Model 4, and that “parliamentary system” is negative and significant
but only in one of the models (Model 3).
These results strongly suggest that on their own institutional variables cannot explain
variation in party system territorialization across countries and time. This conclusion is
supported by the relatively small R-squared in all these model specifications both in the
pooled and averaged samples. The last model in Table 2.1 includes “ethnic fractionalization”
as a control variable. Introducing this variable does not change the effect of any of the
institutional variables. “Ethnic fractionalization,” which is a proxy for social heterogeneity
or social diversity in a country, is not significant in the analysis with the pooled sample,
but it is significant in the analysis with the averaged sample (Table 2.3 on page 52). More
ethnically diverse countries are associated with more territorialized party systems.13 In the
next section I turn to a more in depth discussion of the role of social diversity in explaining
variation in party system territorialization.
2.2 A Role for Societal Interests
The literature on nationalization of party systems reviewed in the previous section stands
out for its lack of attention to societal interests, and for portraying institutions “as if they
were operating in a social vacuum” (Adsera and Boix, 2004, 2-3). This is surprising given
that the neo-institutionalist tenet that institutions alone can explain the political world
has long been replaced with more nuanced approaches. Since the 1990’s there has been
an increasing focus on the origins and effects of institutions in the context of underlying
socio-economic structures (Pontusson, 1995). According to Boone (2003), recent work on
13I have conducted some robustness tests which are presented in Table 2.2 on page 31. Model 1 includes
a different measure of fiscal decentralization (subnational revenues as a proportion of the country’s GDP),
which is not statistically significant. Model 2 tests the interactive hypothesis between “bicameralism” and
“fiscal decentralization” (based on Hicken (2009)), which is not significant either. The same two models are
run with the averaged sample and presented in Table 2.4 on page 53 at the end of the chapter. The results
are similar with the averaged sample, except for “ethnic fractionalization” which is significant in the analysis
with the averaged sample.
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Table 2.1: OLS Multivariate Regression: Pooled Sample
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Political Decentralization (lag) .024* .020 .011 .011 .015
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag)+ .002 .001 .001 .001 .001
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Bicameral .092* .084 .057
(.05) (.06) (.06)
Parliamentary –.056 –.043 –.056 –.044 –.042 –.037
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Electoral System (PR+Mixed) –.032 –.068 –.071 –.041 –.012 .010
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07)




Constant .185*** .232*** .217*** .139 .112 .031
(.06) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.09) (.11)
Adj. R2 .081 .069 .092 .131 .132 .155
No. of cases 268 184 177 177 177 171
Sig:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
DepVar: Inflation Scores (idn)
Robust Std Errors Clustered by Country
+Subnational rev. as % total revenues
30
Table 2.2: OLS Multivariate Regression: Pooled Sample
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2
Political Decentralization (lag) .021 .017
(.02) (.01)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag)+ .003
(.00)








Electoral System (PR+Mixed) –.004 .004
(.07) (.07)
Number of Districts .000 .000
(.00) (.00)




Adj. R2 .169 .157
No. of cases 172 171
Sig:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
DepVar: Inflation Scores (idn)
Robust Std Errors Clustered by Country
+Subnational revenue as % total revenues
++Subnational revenue as % GDP
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institutional choice has become more sensitive to “the features of social context that de-
fine the parameters and players in institutional choice” (19). As an example the work
of Boix (2003) and Adsera and Boix (2004) emphasize the role of socio-economic factors
(and especially of economic inequalities) to explain the origins and stability of democratic
regimes.
Today many works in political science scholarship explicitly model political phenomena
as an interaction between societal interests and institutions (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997;
Clark and Golder, 2006; Stoll, 2005, Stoll), and several recent projects have made significant
contributions to theorizing and measuring “societal interests,” which the previous scholar-
ship had neglected. Just to present a few examples, Stoll’s forthcoming book “Changing
Societies, Changing Party Systems” explores how social heterogeneity (and its interaction
with institutions) explains the number of parties in a political system. This project builds
on a relatively long lineage of research that explores the interaction between social het-
erogeneity and electoral rules (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Cox, 1999, 1997; Clark and
Golder, 2006; Ferree et al., 2007; Filippov et al., 2003; Hicken, 2009; Powell, 1982). Her
book is particularly noteworthy in that it places societal interests at the center of her theo-
retical analysis and proposes innovative measures of social heterogeneity that allow for both
cross-country and cross-time comparisons.
One of the less explored aspects in Stoll’s book, as well as in the work of others such
as Amorim Neto and Cox (1997); Cox (1999, 1997); Clark and Golder (2006); Filippov
et al. (2003); Hicken (2009) is the intersection between social heterogeneity and political
geography. This intersection however is central to the object of this dissertation: the
territorial nature of parties and party systems.
2.2.1 The Role of Geography
The way in which societal interests are distributed across space within countries is
particularly relevant to the question of this dissertation as well as to broader questions
about “representation and the (imperfect) transformation of preferences into public policy”
(Rodden, 2010, 323). The role of clustering of preferences is prominent among scholars of
federalism (Duchacek, 1986; Kymlicka, 1995; Riker, 1964; Elazar, 1999), yet the early in-
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sights of these scholars have not been fully developed theoretically and empirically. Despite
recent attention to the role of social heterogeneity in explanations of political phenomena,
scholars have neglected the aspect of how heterogeneity is geographically distributed.
“For the most part, when developing basic models addressing such crucial topics
as platform choice, party systems, representation, and the transformation of
preferences to policies, geography has been a blind spot for political scientists”
(Rodden, 2010, 322).
Scholars have assumed, often for analytical simplicity, that the same mix of societal
interests is present in every single district or region of a country; or in the words of Kendall
and Stuart that “voters are scattered at random” across constituencies in a country (Kendall
and Stuart, 1950, 188). Rodden challenges this long-held assumption and suggests that for
various historical and sociological reasons voters tend to cluster geographically: “individuals
sort themselves into neighborhoods with similar demographic, occupational, income, and
ultimately political profiles” (Rodden, 2010, 322).
Taking into account this clustering of political profiles is key to understand a variety of
political phenomena. For example, Rodden argues that the concentration of left-wing voters
in urban areas (which is a common phenomenon in most industrialized countries) helps ex-
plain why left-wing parties have struggled to win majorities in parliamentary countries with
single-member districts” (Rodden, 2010, 335). Jusko’s research agenda on the relationship
between the electoral geography of low-income voters and anti-poverty programs across a
wide variety of OECD countries is another example of the importance of considering polit-
ical geography. Jusko argues that the effect of electoral rules on legislators’ incentives to
cater to poor voters depends on the geographic distribution of low-income voters “such that
when low-income voters are pivotal in the allocation of a large number of seats, even under
SMD electoral rules, legislators may have strong incentives to craft generous antipoverty
policies” (Jusko, 2009, 1).14
The distribution of voters across constituencies is also important to understand the
incentives facing politicians in building political alliances at the local and national levels.
The importance of geography is prominent in the literature on the development of European
14Both Rodden (2011) and Jusko are producing book versions of their arguments.
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party systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Caramani, 2004), which alludes to “territorial
cleavages” as the main ingredient in explaining the territorialization of electoral behavior
and party systems. For example, Cox’s article Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination
explores the institutional factors that contribute to the nationalization of party systems,
and only briefly at the article’s conclusion does he claim that social diversity should matter
to explain linkage15 when preferences are concentrated in space.
“Social diversity matters for linkage when Basques are concentrated in one re-
gion of Spain, Swedes are concentrated in one region of Finland, and Scots are
concentrated in one region of Britain. But the relevant level of concentration
depends on where districts lines are drawn and on the relevant electoral thresh-
olds” (Cox, 1999, 159).
Unfortunately, Cox does not develop the logic further, nor does he test it empirically.
More recently Morgenstern et al. (2009) and Hicken (2009) have tested Cox’s argument,
but the measures of social heterogeneity that they use (fractionalization indices) do not
capture “geographic concentration” and instead focus on social diversity that is related
to ethnic, linguistic or religious difference. Selway’s measures of geographic concentration
of social diversity (based on the concept of cross-cuttingness and included in the CIMMSS
data set) constitute a substantial contribution to the empirical analysis of this issue. Selway
conceptualizes and measures several relevant dimensions of social heterogeneity (fraction-
alization, cross-cuttingness, bipolarization...) and uses these measures to test how electoral
rules interact with the geographic concentration of social diversity to affect the number and
types of parties that develop in a country.16 Aside from Selway’s recent work, however,
the relationship between the geography of social heterogeneity and party systems is largely
underdeveloped theoretically and empirically. The goal of this dissertation is to build (and
expand) on this budding research agenda by examining more closely the geography of social
heterogeneity and its role in explaining the territorial nature of party systems in a country.
I now turn to develop the argument of the dissertation.
15The term linkage is equivalent to the term aggregation or the term coordination both of which are used
in the literature. They are a synonym of nationalization.




As Cox and Knoll (2003) explain: “[i]n most nations in the world, votes are cast and seats
awarded within a number of geographically defined electoral districts. [...] Any group with
sufficiently concentrated support in a given district can hope to win seats in that district
[...] and the question arises: should such a group go at it alone or should it link with other
groups in other districts?” (Cox and Knoll, 2003, 5). In other words, should candidates
representing local/regional constituencies join large national party organizations, or should
they stick with smaller local or regional political parties?
The existing literature has focused mostly on what candidates stand to gain if they
join a broad national party. Hicken (2009) argues that national parties are large-scale
organizations and as such they have a considerable chance of winning national-level elections
and making it into government. Furthermore, since national parties are larger, candidates
stand to gain more of the prize (i.e. resources, power, policy influence) that comes from
winning office. In contrast, regional or local parties are smaller and less likely to attain
substantial electoral victory in national elections, which means that candidates from local
or regional parties have less of a chance of controlling a significant share of the prize at the
national level.
Given that candidates want to capture the resources and power associated with national
office and that national parties are in a better position than regional parties to capture those
resources and power, it is a puzzle why politicians run under local or regional party labels in
national elections. To address this puzzle I explore the individual-level incentives that guide
candidates to join local/regional parties, instead of national parties, in national-level elec-
tions. And I specifically focus on understanding the costs associated with joining a national
party, or alternatively the benefits of joining a regional/local party. Ultimately, under-
standing the conditions under which candidates will decide to join local/regional political
parties (instead of national parties) in national-level elections will allow us to understand
the factors that affect the degree to which party systems are nationalized or territorialized.
In what follows I present a hypothetical example that illustrates the tradeoff that can-
didates face when deciding to abandon a national party in favor of a local/regional political
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party. As a preview to the reader I will argue that this tradeoff is influenced by three
factors: a) the geography of interests, that is the degree to which voter interests vary across
politically relevant territorial units in a country; b) the degree of autonomy of individual
candidates with respect to party leaders within national party organizations; and c) the
degree to which national-level institutions (such as upper legislative chambers) represent
territorial interests in national policy-making.
2.3.1 Tradeoff
Imagine a candidate running for office in a national election representing a certain
constituency. For now we can think of this constituency as a region that is also an electoral
district.17 Ultimately the candidate’s goal is to secure the election at the national level and
influence policy in ways that will benefit her constituency, which in turn will guarantee her
subsequent reelection.18 This candidate faces a choice; she can run in the national election
with a regional party representing her particular regional constituency, or she can join forces
with a national political party.19 The regional party will only field candidates in her region
whereas the national party will field candidates in all regions (i.e. in all electoral districts)
in the country. The choice that the candidate makes will depend on how she evaluates
the costs and benefits of joining a national party (instead of a regional party) in light of
her ultimate goal: influencing national policy in order to secure reelection. This tradeoff is
illustrated in Figure 2.5.
National parties have a clear advantage over regional or local parties, which is that they
have a higher probability of winning national-level elections and making it into government.
From a candidate’s perspective, however, being part of the winning party is a necessary but
not sufficient condition to influence policy at the national level. Because national parties
are large organizations that field candidates in all electoral constituencies in a country, they
are accountable to a large and potentially very diverse set of interests. Given this internal
17Empirically speaking the relevant constituency can vary depending on the country and time period. In
Chapter 3 I elaborate further on this point and I present a more concrete definition of “politically relevant
constituency.”
18She might have other policy goals, but ultimately she wants to get reelected to attain these other goals.
19Hicken (2009) and Cox and Knoll (2003) present a similar tradeoff as a way to think about candidate’s
choices. The tradeoff I present in this section is very much inspired in theirs, but my focus is on the costs
of “going national” or conversely the benefits of going regional, which have been less explored.
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Figure 2.5: Tradeoff for Hypothetical Candidate
Benefits Costs
Joining a National Party
Larger probability
of winning elections








diversity our candidate runs the risk that the party leaders ignore her policy interests once
in government.
“Party leaders have strong incentives to move their parties’ policies toward the
position of the median voter in the national electorate (Downs, 1957). This is
the strategy most likely to deliver the party an overall electoral victory (i.e.
a majority of seats in parliament), but not necessarily one that is in the best
interests of each of the party’s MP’s” (Kam, 2009, 23).
In other words, a candidate that decides to join a national party increases her probability
of getting into power “but at the risk of having to share that power with other actors within
the party” (Hicken, 2009, 29). This requirement to share power with other actors in the
party becomes more of a threat to the candidate’s reelection as the candidate’s policy
interests become more dissimilar from the policy interests of the rest of candidates within
the national party.
In contrast, local or regional parties are smaller, which means that they have a relatively
lower chance of winning national-level electoral contests and gaining representation at the
national-level. However, local or regional parties have the advantage that they are account-
able to a more homogenous set of interests since they compete and obtain votes in only one
constituency in the country. This is an advantage for candidates whose policy-preferences
are not aligned with those of the rest of candidates/constituencies in the country. If such
a candidate joins a local or regional party then she will be less likely to win a national
election than if she had decided to run under a national party label; however, if she does
gain a sufficient amount of seats in the legislature to bargain with the majority party, then
being part of a relatively homogeneous regional party (instead of a heterogeneous national
party) will increases her influence on national-level policy-making.
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Trying to influence national policy from within a national party that is very diverse is
harder than trying to negotiate with a national party as an independent (and internally
homogenous) regional party. Regional parties are better at this because they are mostly
held accountable for one particular policy issue that is of interest to their constituency,
so they have room to sacrifice on other policy dimensions; whereas the national party
is held accountable for all policy dimensions and thus will have to make some tradeoffs.
This distinction in the nature of accountability between national and regional political
parties is inspired by Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006)’s work that distinguishes between parties
that “represent narrow interests and build temporary majorities following an election” and
parties that “are themselves ‘long coalitions’ forged to create a potential majority before
the election and intended to last beyond the next election (Aldrich 1995; Schwartz 1989)”
(Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006, 125). Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) argue that:
“[a] single party in government is accountable for all of its policy decisions since
it must promote the collective interest of a broad support base if it wants to
keep its majority (Cox 1990). Participants in multiparty coalition governments,
by contrast, are held primarily responsible for only a subset of policy decisions:
those in the policy areas in which they have the biggest stake” (Bawn and
Rosenbluth, 2006, 125).
Because regional political parties and their candidates are accountable for only a “subset
of policy decisions” they are able to exercise greater influence at the national level about the
policy that their region most cares about. So if a candidate represents a constituency that
has interests that are very different from the rest of constituencies in the country, regional
parties might be a better way to get her voice heard at the national level. This argument
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. As the difference in interests between a candidate’s con-
stituency and the rest of constituencies in the country increases the candidate
will be less likely to stick with the national political party.
Figure 2.6 presents a simple illustration of the argument so far. The extent to which
a candidate’s policy interests are similar to those of the rest of members in the national
party is what I refer to as “intra-party heterogeneity” (or conversely, “intra-party homo-
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geneity”),20 and it is a direct function of how voter interests are distributed across electoral
constituencies, which I refer to as the “geography of interests.”21 If the set of interests that
voters care about is similar in all constituencies/regions in the country, then we should
expect national parties to have greater intra-party homogeneity, and we should expect most
candidates to stick with the national party. In contrast, when voter interests vary consid-
erably across constituencies then we expect candidates within the national party to have
fairly heterogeneous policy interests leading to greater intra-party heterogeneity. In this
case we should expect some candidates to join regional or local parties.22







 “go national” or 
“go regional”
2.3.1.1 Geography of Economic Interests
I specifically focus on the geography of economic interests as a factor affecting can-
didates’ incentives to join national or regional political parties. Issues regarding who gets
what and how resources should be distributed across individuals and jurisdictions are at the
heart of politics. When constituencies in a country have very different economic interests
then questions about the distribution of central government resources become particularly
salient to certain constituencies. In such a scenario we should expect candidates represent-
ing constituencies that have very different economic interests to be more likely to abandon
national parties in favor of regional or local political parties.
Another hypothetical will illustrate this point. Imagine a country with two regions A
and B. Region A is relatively poor, meaning that the majority of people living in this region
20The concept of “intra-party heterogeneity” is similar to Rohde (1991)’s concept of ideologically hetero-
geneity within political parties, and both refer to the diversity of interests/preferences represented within a
single party.
21Throughout the dissertation I use the term “geography of preferences” and “geography of interests”
interchangeably. I also use “interests” and “preferences” interchangeably.
22Several scholars describe a similar type of tradeoff when candidates are faced with the pressure of
responding to multiple constituencies(Kernell, 2010).
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have a relatively low income. Region B is relatively rich, meaning the majority of people in
that region are wealthy.23 And let’s assume that region A is larger (in terms of population)
than region B, meaning that the median voter in the country (as a whole) lives in the poor
region. I am thus describing a country where the geography of economic interests is relatively
uneven, which means that regional constituencies have very different economic interests.
Given this distribution of economic interests we would expect the voters in region B to have a
very different set of preferences over the redistribution of central government resources than
voters in region A. Voters in the two regions have similar preferences over certain types of
policies (i.e. foreign affairs, environmental policy), but they have different preferences about
economic policy and especially about the degree of redistribution of central government
resources from rich regions (i.e. rich voters) to poor regions (i.e. poor voters). These
different preferences are derived from the underlying territorial distribution of resources in
the country. Voters in richer regions prefer less redistribution than voters in poor regions.
Now let’s imagine that our hypothetical candidate represents voters in region B, the
richer region. If she decides to join a national political party, she is more likely to make
it into government and get credited for the policies implemented by the national party.
However, this choice implies a cost which is that she will have to accept some transfers
away from her region into the poorer region in the form of inter-territorial redistribution.
On the other hand, if she decides to join a regional party she will have greater influence
on redistributive policy at the national level, and might be able to block some transfers
away from her rich region to the poorer region. However, this choice implies a cost: she
will have to sacrifice influence on other policy issues. This choice that voters face in region
B will be affected (among other factors) by the expected magnitude of transfers away from
23I assume that wealthy regions tend to have a higher proportion of wealthy citizens, and that poorer
regions (regions with less resources and less developed economically-speaking) tend to have a higher pro-
portion of poor citizens. I am thus assuming a relative homogeneity of economic interests within regions.
This is a good assumption to make in order to keep things simple, and as I will show in Chapter 4, it is
an empirically sound assumption. I illustrate this for the case of Germany and Italy. Furthermore, other
scholars make a similar assumption (see Tucker (2006)’s book “Regional Economic voting: Russia, Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic 1990-1999). However, in the future it would be interesting to
explore whether intra-regional economic inequality has an effect on candidates’ decision to join regional
or national political parties. My intuition is that greater homogeneity of interests within regions should
increase the likelihood of candidates joining a regional party (instead of sticking with the national party).
In his book Regions and Redistribution: The Political Geography of Inequality Beramendi presents a model
in which both the level of inequality within regions and across regions are important to explain the choice
of fiscal institutions (Beramendi, 2011, see Chapter 2).
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their region to the poorer region, and the magnitude of the transfer depends directly on
the territorial distribution of economic resources in the country. As regional economic
inequalities increase, redistributive pressures will also increase and voting for a candidate
within a national party will become more costly for voters in the rich region (region B).
Voters in region B will thus be more likely to vote for a regional political party that will
prevent the transfer of economic resources away from their region.
Proposition 1.1 Candidates representing regions at the extremes of the re-
gional economic distribution (i.e. very rich or very poor regions) are more likely
to join regional political parties to compete in national-level elections.
Proposition 1.2 At the aggregate level, if economic interests are unevenly dis-
tributed across regions in a country we should expect to see more regional/local
political parties and a more territorialized party system.
In sum, candidates are influenced by the distribution of economic interests in a country.
Two additional factors shape a candidate’s decision to join a national or regional political
party by modifying the costs associated with intra-party heterogeneity of economic interests:
one is the degree of candidate autonomy within the national party (which is linked to party
discipline), and the other is the degree to which geographically concentrated interests are
represented within national-level institutions. In what follows, I elaborate on the role of
these two factors.
2.3.2 Party Discipline
The degree to which national political parties are weak or strong (i.e. the degree of
autonomy of individual candidates within the national party) modifies the costs associated
with intra-party heterogeneity. When candidates have very different policy preferences
than those of the rest of candidates in the country they risk losing influence over policy
outcomes. Given this situation they are more likely to stick with a national political party
if they expect to be able to pursue their own policy agenda once in office. Candidates with
divergent policy preferences will not defect from the national party if the national party
allows for a strong degree of candidate autonomy vis-a-vis party leaders, that is if the party
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has weak party discipline. In contrast, they will be less likely to stick with a national party
if the party is organized in such a way that individual candidates have to follow the wishes of
party leaders, and thus are unable to pursue their own policy agendas once in office. Highly
disciplined political parties are likely to push candidates with divergent policy preferences
to form smaller regional or local parties to represent their constituents’ interests. In sum,
the degree of candidate autonomy modifies the effect of intra-party heterogeneity. This
interactive proposition is summarized as follows:
Proposition 2.1. Weakly disciplined national parties (i.e. parties that allow
for a substantial degree of candidate autonomy) mitigate the positive effects
of intra-party heterogeneity on the likelihood that candidates will abandon the
national party in favor of a smaller regional political party. In contrast, strongly
disciplined parties exacerbate these positive effects.
The degree of party discipline will not have an independent effect on the likelihood that
a candidate will abandon the national party; instead its effect will depend on the degree
of intra-party heterogeneity. Party discipline generates ambiguous effects on an individual
candidate’s incentives to stick with the party. On the one hand, as Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2004) argue, parties with strong party discipline make “voters more confident
about the policy positions members of that party will pursue. Since voters are risk averse,
an increase in a party’s discipline increases the probability voters will vote for that party”
(Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2004, 1). This increases the chances of reelection of a
candidate. On the other hand, however, strong party discipline has a cost for individual
candidates which is that they will be “less able to pursue their own policy agendas once in
office” Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2004, 1). And this in turn has the potential to
affect their re-election chances in the future. Conversely, weak party discipline can make a
candidate’s efforts towards reelection more difficult in that it creates uncertainty for voters,
but weak party discipline also has the positive aspect of allowing for individual candidates
to pursue their own policy agendas within the parties.
In sum, the extent of party discipline on its own will not have a clear discernible effect
on the likelihood that candidates will abandon the national party. The effect depends on
whether voters and candidates value autonomy over certainty, and this depends on the
degree of intra-party heterogeneity. Under conditions of high intra-party heterogeneity,
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voters are more likely to value that their candidates have a voice within the party so that
once in office they can pursue the specific interests of their constituents. If this is the case
then voters and candidate will prefer weak party discipline. Under conditions of intra-party
homogeneity however, we should either see no effect (since the benefits of sticking with the
national party are so much larger), or we should see that weakly disciplined parties, voters
and candidates value candidate autonomy much less, and thus will put a premium on the
advantages of strong parties. This is summarized in the following two propositions:
Proposition 2.2.: The degree of candidate autonomy (i.e. the degree of party
discipline) should not have an independent effect on the likelihood that a can-
didate will abandon the national party.
Proposition 2.3.: Weakly disciplined national parties (i.e. parties that allow
for a substantial degree of candidate autonomy) should encourage candidates to
stick with them only if intra-party heterogeneity is high.








 “go national” or 
“go regional”
2.3.3 Bicameralism
The third part of my argument focuses on national-level institutions and their effect
on candidates’ incentives to join national or regional political parties under conditions of a
geographically uneven distribution of economic interests. In particular I focus on the role of
bicameralism. Upper legislative chambers play an important role in my argument because
they provide an institutionalized mechanism to represent geographical/territorial interests
in national-level policy-making.
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“The most common basis upon which senates [i.e. upper chambers] have been
constitutionally anointed is to provide territorial representation. [...] The paradig-
matic federal house is the U.S. Senate, whose one hundred members are dis-
tributed territorially on the basis of two senators for each of the fifty states
regardless of differences in state population size” (Patterson and Mughan, 1999,
10).
As explained earlier, a candidate representing a constituency with economic interests
very different from the rest of constituencies in the country is more likely to be held account-
able by her constituents for issues of redistribution of economic resources (than for other
issues). Given this she is more likely to join a regional political party in order to have a more
effective voice in national-policy making. However, if a country already has an institution
that specifically gives voice to territorial constituencies in national-level policy-making (i.e.
an upper house) then our legislative candidate is less likely to be held accountable for “ter-
ritorially specific issues” since voters know that these issues are represented by candidates
running for elections in the upper house. Therefore, the presence of an upper legislative
chamber should decrease the likelihood that our candidate will join a regional or local
political party.
In order for voters to engage in this balancing act in which they hold candidates for
upper chambers responsible for territorial issues (thus liberating candidates for the lower
house form this burden) the upper house must wield substantial influence in policy-making
and must be directly elected by the voters. Many countries have upper chambers that are
either indirectly elected or appointed and/or that do not have genuine power over policy-
making. In such cases (although the countries are bicameral) we should not expect an effect
of bicameralism. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Directly elected upper chambers mitigate the positive effects
of intra-party heterogeneity on the likelihood that candidates will abandon the
national party in favor of a smaller regional political party. In contrast, countries
without upper chambers (or with an upper chamber that is indirectly elected or
appointed) exacerbate these positive effects.
The logic of this proposition runs counter to some of the claims in the literature. As
explained in the literature review at the beginning of this chapter, Hicken (2009) posits
that a greater concentration of power at the national-level should encourage aggregation,
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whereas dispersion of power at the national-level will make candidates less likely to link
across constituencies and form national parties. For Hicken one of the factors affecting the
level of concentration of power at the national-level is the presence of an upper legislative
chamber. His argument implies that upper legislative chambers undermine the concentra-
tion of power at the national level and thus discourage “aggregation,” which means that
upper legislative chambers create incentives for candidates to abandon national political
parties. The argument that I posit regarding the role of bicameralism presents a different
mechanism and leads to opposite predictions. According to my expectations upper legisla-
tive chambers should make it easier for candidates to stick with national political parties
in a context of intra-party heterogeneity, whereas unicameral countries should create incen-
tives for candidates to abandon national parties in the context of high levels of intra-party
heterogeneity.
Hicken et al. (2008)’s argument and my own argument are not mutually exclusive.
In fact, it is probably the case that bicameralism has two different and counter-active
effects on candidates’ incentives to form nation-wide alliances, which would explain why its
direct effect (in Chapter 4) is often not robustly significant. On the one hand, bicameral
chambers tend to fragment power at the national and thus discourage the formation of
national parties. On the other hand, upper chambers institutionalize territorial interests,
which actually makes candidates more likely to stick with national political parties (since
territorial interests are already represented at the national level). In Chapter 4 I focus on
testing the latter argument (my own), which is based on the interaction between territorially
concentrated economic interests and bicameralism.
2.3.4 Summary of Argument
I argue that the territorial nature of party systems is shaped by decisions taken by can-
didates as they seek reelection in their particular (territorial) constituencies. Three factors
affect their decision to join smaller regional political parties instead of national parties when
competing for national-level office. The first factor is the geography of interests; in this dis-
sertation I pay particular attention to the geography of economic interests. A candidate is
more likely to join a regional political party as the economic interests of her constituency
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become increasingly distinct from those of the rest of constituencies in the country. The
second factor is party discipline; in this dissertation I pay particular attention to the degree
of candidate autonomy within the national party. The third factor is bicameralism and the
extent to which national-level institutions represent territorially concentrated interests. I
argue that party discipline and bicameralism modify the effect of an uneven geography of
economic interests. In other words, weak party discipline and directly elected upper leg-
islative chambers can reduce the costs of intra-party heterogeneity for candidates, and thus
reduce their likelihood of abandoning national political parties in favor of smaller regional
or local parties. In the aggregate, the individual-level decisions of candidates have an effect
on the territorial nature of the party system. Figure 2.8 shows a schematic representation
of my argument.



























Most of the existing literature on the development of national parties and party systems
has focused on institutions to explain candidates’ incentives to join national political par-
ties. One of the most common explanations of party system nationalization states that an
increase in power and resources at the national-level should create incentives for candidates
(and voters) to form national political parties as a way to better capture those resources
and power (Cox, 1999; Cox and Knoll, 2003; Hicken, 2009; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004).
In other words, a large pool of resources available for distribution at the national level is an
incentive for candidates to build nation-wide coalitions. In contrast, I argue that from the
point of view of an individual candidate what matters is not only the size of the pie but
also (and perhaps more importantly) how the pie will be distributed among the members
of the winning party. In other words, being part of a national party is not always the best
way of getting access to power and resources controlled by the central government. Under
certain conditions, the policy preferences of an individual candidate might be most easily
achieved by joining a regional political party.
The goal of this chapter has been to develop the conditions under which the decision to
join a regional party is best for a candidate. The three factors that condition candidates’
decisions are a) the distribution of interests across politically relevant constituencies in a
country, b) the internal organization of parties and c) directly elected upper chamber that
represent territorial interests. The rest of the dissertation seeks to test these propositions
with a mixed method approach. Chapter 3 tests the relationship between economic ge-
ography and party system territorialization using a large-N data set. Chapter 4 tests the
modifying effect of “party discipline” and “directly elected upper chambers” using the same
data set, as well as two brief case studies: Post-World War II Italy and Progressive Era
United States. Chapter 5 presents an in depth case study of Germany.
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Figure 2.13: Party System Territorialization and Av. District Magnitude
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression: Averaged Sample
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Political Decentralization (5-year lag) .023** .011 .008 .006 .010
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Fiscal Decentralization (5-year lag)+ .003 .002 .002 .001 .002
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Bicameralism .028 .019 –.012
(.05) (.05) (.05)
Parliamentary System –.055 –.067 –.073* –.067 –.064 –.061
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Electoral System (PR+Mixed) –.072 –.080 –.079 –.069 –.039 –.021
(.04) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)




Constant .208*** .224*** .218*** .195** .168** .086
(.05) (.06) (.06) (.08) (.08) (.09)
Adj. R2 .067 .068 .058 .045 .043 .102
No. of cases 63 52 52 52 52 50
Sig:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
DepVar: Inflation Scores (idn)
+Subnational rev. as % total revenues
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Table 2.4: OLS Regression: Averaged Sample
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2
Political Decentralization (5-year lag) .019 .011
(.02) (.02)




Fiscal Decen (lag) (revsharelagav) .003
(.00)




Electoral System (PR+Mixed) –.018 –.022
(.06) (.06)
Number of Districts .000 .000
(.00) (.00)




Adj. R2 .096 .083
No. of cases 51 50
Sig:* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
DepVar: Inflation Scores (idn)
+Subnational revenue as % total revenues
++Subnational revenue as % GDP
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CHAPTER III
Economic Geography and Party System Territorialization
In Chapter 2 I argue that the territorial nature of party systems is shaped by decisions taken
by candidates as they seek reelection in their particular constituencies. These decisions are
affected by how economic interests are distributed across constituencies in a country, as
well as by aspects of the internal organization of parties and by broader institutional and
constitutional features. This chapter (Chapter 3) and the next chapter (Chapter 4) test
these propositions. The focus of this chapter is on testing the proposition that the distri-
bution of economic interests across politically relevant constituencies in a country matters
in explaining variation in party system territorialization. The chapter proceeds as follows.
The first three sections introduce the reader to the data set that I assembled for this project.
I discuss the definition of “politically relevant units”, and present the operationalization of
the dependent variable “party system territorialization”. The fourth section introduces the
main independent variable, geography of economic interests, and presents a way to opera-
tionalize this concept to allow for cross-country and temporal comparisons. The fifth and
sixth sections discuss the model, methodology and control variables. The rest of the chapter
presents and discuses the results of my analyses,.
3.1 Politically Relevant Territorial Units
One of the propositions developed in Chapter 2 is that the distribution of economic in-
terests across politically relevant territorial units is a key factor in explaining cross-country
differences in party systems. A previous step to testing this proposition is to provide a
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definition of “politically relevant territorial units”. This definition will be useful in opera-
tionalizing the dependent variable “party system territorialization” as well as some of the
main independent variable “geography of economic interests”.
What constitutes a politically relevant territorial unit can vary from country to coun-
try and over time. For most countries, the “electoral district” is the politically relevant
territorial unit. Electoral districts delineate the boundaries of a candidate’s reelection con-
stituency and are the minimal unit over which seats are assigned. This makes electoral
districts politically meaningful for both candidates and voters. In some countries, however,
there are other territorial units that can also be politically relevant for candidates and vot-
ers. Federal or decentralized have sub-national units/regions1 with a significant degree of
political power and independent policy-making capacity. And oftentimes these regions are
represented in national-level policy-making through representation in an upper legislative
chambers.
Table 3.1 on page 57 shows a classification of all democracies in my data set according to
whether each has a regional tier in addition to the electoral district tier. I define “regional
tier” as a politically relevant territorial unit that has some degree of authority.2 On the
one hand, countries that do not have a “regional tier” are what the literature refers to as
“unitary countries” (in contrast with federal or decentralized countries). In unitary countries
the politically relevant territorial unit is the electoral district. Examples of such countries
are Bulgaria, Finland between 1970 and 1991, Iceland, Honduras, and UK between 1974
and 1997. On the other hand, there are countries that have a regional tier. These countries
can be of two types: a) countries where the regional tier coincides with the district tier
(region = district), and b) countries where the regional tier is different from the district tier
(region 6= district). In the former case, the politically relevant unit is the district/regional
tier.
In the latter case, the politically relevant tier can be wether the district or the region.
Examples of such countries are Australia which has 24 regions (i.e. states) and around 150
1The literature refers to sub-national units in various ways: states, provinces, regions. I use the term
“region” throughout the dissertation.
2The amount of power given to regional tiers ranges from administrative powers to full fledged autonomy
with taxing and policy-making authority.
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electoral districts (depending on the election year). Another example is Canada which has 12
regions (i.e. provinces) and between 264 and 308 electoral districts depending on the election
year. Finally, the UK has 4 regions and 635 electoral districts. For the interested reader,
Table 3.15 on page 113 at the end of this chapter lists the number of districts and the number
of regions (if any) for each democracy in my data set.3 In countries where the regional tier
is different from the district tier the question emerges as to what is the politically relevant
territorial unit for candidates. I argue that because these countries are decentralized or
federal, the region is more politically relevant than the district. So for example in the case
of Spain, I take the 13 “autonomous communities” (which are the regions in Spain) and not
the 52 “provinces (which correspond to the electoral districts) as the politically meaningful
territorial unit. Note that in this list there are four countries (Croatia, Netherlands, Slovakia
and Ukraine) that are unusual in that the number of electoral districts is smaller than the
number of regions. More specifically in the case of the Netherlands, Ukraine and Slovakia
the number of electoral districts is 1, since the entire nation is the electoral district. This
means that seats are not assigned to territorial constituencies. However, these countries
have decentralized regions, so I take these regions to be the politically relevant unit.
3.2 The Dependent Variable: Party System Territorialization
If we think of a country as divided up into electoral districts, a party system is “na-
tionalized” if all electoral districts have the same set of parties. When this is the case
the district-level party systems are the same in each district and the same at the national
level. In contrast, when the party system is completely “localized”, each electoral district
will have its own set of parties. This means that each district-level party system will be
different from each other and different from the national level party system. In sum, the
differences between the local and national party systems give us an intuition of the extent
of nationalization.
For example, let’s assume that each district produces two parties. A localized party
3Countries that do not have regions are classified as unitary countries in Table 3.1. Note that some
countries that do have regions are also classified as unitary, and it is noted in Table 3.15. This means that
they have a regional tier, but its existence is almost symbolic. They have no power whatsoever so they are
de facto unitary countries.
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Table 3.1: Classification of Countries by State Structure and Territorial Units
Regional Tier No Regional Tier
Federal Unitary
Region = District Region 6= District Only District Tier
Argentina Australia Bangladesh
Austria 1971-1994 Austria 1995-2006 Belgium 1974-1978
Bosnia-Herzegovina Belgium 1995-2007 Bolivia 1985-1993
Brazil Bolivia Botswana
Colombia 1998-2006 Canada Bulgaria
Czech Republic 2002-2006 Germany Colombia 1982-1990
Hungary 1994-2006 Indonesia 2004 Costa Rica
Indonesia 1999 Italy Cyprus
South Africa Japan Czech Republic 1996-1998
Switzerland Mexico Dominican Republic
Venezuela New Zealand 1990-2005 El Salvador
Philippines Estonia









Region = District Region 6= District
Denmark Belgium 1989-1991 Luxembourg
Ecuador 1984, 2006 Chile Malta
Finland 1995-2007 France Mauritius
Hungary 1990 Greece 1996-2000 Peru
Norway India Slovenia
Portugal Ireland 1994-2002 St. Kitts and Nevis
Romania Jamaica Taiwan
Lithuania Thailand
New Zealand 1981-1987 Trin.& Tobago 1971-1976










* No. districts < No. regions
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system would be such that each electoral district has a different set of two parties competing
and receiving votes in their respective district. If this is the case then the aggregation of
different sets of two parties would lead to N parties at the national level, and N being equal
to 2 x the number of districts in that country. However, if all electoral districts have the
same set of two parties then at the national level we will observe the same two parties as
well. Based on this logic Chhibber et al. (2004) and Chhibber and Kollman (2004) use a
measure of the extent of coordination across electoral districts in a country which is the
difference between the effective number of parties at the national level (ENPn) and the
effective number of parties at the district level averaged across districts (ENPd):4
ENP Difference = ENPn − ENPd (3.3)
According to this measure, if the effective number of parties at the district-level is similar
to the effective number of parties at the national level (i.e. if the ENP difference is small or
close to 0) we can assume that the same set of parties is present in all electoral districts. And
this implies that the party system is “nationalized”. However, if the difference is large it
means that coordination between districts is not good and creates an inflated party system
at the national level. In this case the party system is “localized”. This simple difference
is then transformed into a “ a percentage measure of how much larger the national party
system is than the average district-level party system” (Hicken, 2009, 22), which several
scholars refer to as “inflation”. This transformation, which I use as the measure of party
system localization, is presented in equation 3.4. The measure ranges from 0 (a perfectly
nationalized party system) to 1 (a perfectly localized party system).5 According to Hicken





















In equation 3.1, v is the number of votes obtained by party i; V is the total number of votes cast at the
national level; so the effective number of parties at the national level is the sum of squared vote shares. In
equation 3.2, D is the number of districts and vij is the vote share of each party in each district. Note that
this measure weights parties according to their size.
5This is a widely used measure of the degree of party system nationalization, but not the only one. For
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(2009), if this measure is 0.1 it “suggests that only 10 percent of the size of the national party
system can be attributed to different parties garnering votes in different parts [districts] of
the country (poor aggregation), with the other 90 percent due to the average number of
parties at the district level. In short, a measurement of 0.1 indicates a aggregation is very
good – the same parties are generally the frontrunners in most districts nationwide. On
the other hand, [if the measure is 0.6] we know that poor aggregation deserves most of the
credit for producing a large number of parties nationally while intra-district coordination





As explained in the previous section, however, in some countries electoral districts are
embedded within larger territorial units (regions) which have the potential to structure
political competition especially when these regions have significant powers to produce policy
and to control resources. Countries in which there is a regional tier (in addition to a district
tier) and in which the regional tier is distinct from the district tier are listed in column 2
of Table 3.1. The key question for the present analysis is whether it is appropriate to use
the “electoral district” to calculate the extent of party system nationalization (as is done
in equation 3.4), or whether we should use the “region” instead.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the different types of party systems that can emerge in countries
that have districts embedded within larger regions. The type of party system that emerges
is the result of coordination across districts within regions (intra-region coordination) and
across regions (inter-region coordination). In order to have a completely nationalized party
system, candidates and voters need to coordinate across districts within regions as well as
across regions, which is the equivalent to good coordination across all districts in the country.
However, depending on the level at which coordination fails we can find three different types
example, some scholars measure the extent to which each party in a country is nationalized and then take
an average to have a party system level measure. Jones and Mainwaring (2003) first measure the dispersion
of each party’s votes across different regions (their measure of dispersion is the Gini index) to create what
they call the “Party Nationalization Score (PNS)”. And then they aggregate these individual party scores
to create a party system measure. [Cite Morgenstern measures as well]. See Hicken (2009) or Leiras (2006)
for a good review on the different ways scholars have calculated this inflation measure and the logic behind
these different measures.
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of party systems: localized party systems, atomized party systems and regionalized party
systems (see Figure 3.2(a)).




























































In order to illustrate the differences between these types of party systems imagine a
country with two regions (R1 and R2) and two districts (D1 and D2) in each region (that
is a total of 4 districts). Also imagine for sake of simplicity that this country has a single-
member first-past the post electoral system, so in theory we expect to find two political
parties in each district. In a nationalized party system there is good coordination across all
four districts (D1 and D2 from R1 and D1 and D2 from R2), which results in the same set
of two parties (party A and party B) in each district. In contrast, if voters and candidates
fail to coordinate across districts within regions as well as across regions then each district
will have an entirely different set of two parties (parties A and B in district 1 of region
1, parties C and D in district 2 of region 1, parties E and F in district 1 of region 2, and
parties G and H in district 2 of region 2). The outcome is an atomized party system (third
quadrant in Figure 3.2(b)). If voters and candidates manage to coordinate perfectly across
districts within regions but imperfectly across regions we end up with two different sets
of parties in each region (parties A and B in both districts of region 1 and parties C and
D in both districts of region 2). This is the definition of a perfectly regionalized party
system (fourth quadrant in Figure 3.2(b)). In contrast, if voters and candidates decide to
coordinate perfectly across regions but imperfectly across districts within regions we end
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up with a party system where the two regions have the same set of parties (parties A, B, C
and D), but the districts within each of the regions have two different parties (A and B in
district 1 and C and D in district 2). This is what I call a localized party system (second
quadrant in Figure 3.2(b)).
Where countries lie in this two-by-two table is an empirical question. Figure 3.2 maps
party systems for all countries with districts that are embedded within regions (that is
countries in column 2 in Table 3.1). The vertical y-axis represents the degree of coordination
across districts within regions in a country.6 Higher values indicate poor coordination
across districts within regions, lower values indicate good coordination across districts within
regions. The horizontal x-axis represents the degree of coordination across regions.7 Higher
values indicate poor coordination across regions, lower values indicate good coordination
across regions. The graph thus mirrors the two dimensions in the tables in Figure 3.1.
The line is a 45 degree angle line that I use as a reference point. The graph tells us that
most of these countries (with the exception of France, UK, Jamaica, and the United States)
are below (i.e. to the right) of the 45 degree angle line, which means that most countries
with districts and regions tend to have more problems of coordination across regions than
across districts within regions. In other words, the relevant variation is expressed in the
dimension of regionalization (rather than the dimension of localization). This suggests that
the “region” is more politically relevant than the district.
There are also theoretical and methodological reasons that suggest that the use of “re-
gions” (instead of districts) is more appropriate for the set of countries that have both a
regional tier and a district tier. First, countries that have a regional tier are either decen-
tralized countries or federal countries, which means that the regional level has a substantial
amount of power (especially in federations) and thus would be an important unit of anal-
ysis when examining political competition. Second, countries that have both districts and
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Coordination Across Regions
regions tend to have a large number of very small electoral districts (i.e. the UK has 635
districts, the United States has 435 electoral districts, Canada has 264 electoral districts
and so on (see Table 3.15 for a list of countries with their corresponding number of dis-
tricts and regions). The small size of these districts suggests that parties competing in only
one district would not be viable nationally, and thus that candidates and voters have an
incentive to coordinate along larger territorial units (i.e. regions). Third, scholars (Chhib-
ber and Kollman, 2004; Hicken, 2009; Harbers, 2010) have pointed to political and fiscal
(de)centralization as a key determinant of the degree of party system nationalization or
territorialization. If this argument is correct decentralization should affect coordination
across regions and not across districts since regions are the unit to which power is devolved
in decentralized or federal countries.8 Finally, regions tend to have more stable territorial
boundaries than districts. The creation, alteration or elimination of regions is a rare oc-
currence since it is politically charged, yet the number of districts and/or their territorial
8Current research has actually only tested the argument about decentralization using the district, instead
of the region, as the unit of analysis. In order to correctly test this argument, however, the unit of analysis
should be the region.
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boundaries change often in countries with majoritarian electoral systems.9
Based on these reasons I construct a new measure of party system nationalization that
uses “regions” instead of “districts” for countries in my data set that have a distinct regional
tier (that is for countries in column 2 in Table 3.1). I call this measure “party system territo-
rialization” to distinguish it from the measure presented above “party system localization”.
Equation 3.7 shows the formula for the measure “party system territorialization”.




This measure differs from the one in equation 3.4 in that it uses the “region” as the
relevant territorial unit for countries with a regional tier that is different from the electoral
district tier (column 2 in Table 3.1). For the rest of countries it uses the only unit available:
“districts” in the case of unitary countries (column 3 in Table 3.1) and “districts”, which are
also “regions” in countries that have a regional tier that is the same as the electoral district
tier (column 1 in Table 3.1). The measure is thus constructed identically to “party system
localization”, but instead of using the effective number of parties in each district (ENPd)
across the board, I use the effective number of parties in each district in some countries and
the effective number of parties in each region in other countries. I call this measure ENPt
(which stands for effective number of parties in each politically relevant territorial unit).
The measure ranges from 0 indicating greater party system nationalization to 1 indicating
greater party system territorialization. This is my main dependent variable.10
3.3 Data Set and Patterns
There are few large-N comparative studies of party system territorialization. Cara-
mani’s (2004) work on the nationalization of European electorates in 17 Western European
countries and Chhibber and Kollman (2004)’s study of party system nationalization in four
9The size of regions varies across countries, but so does the size of electoral districts, so issues of varying
size of territorial units should not guide this decision.
10It should be noted that the correlation between the measure of “party system localization” and “party
system territorialization” is quite high (0.8) since many countries have the same values in both measures
(i.e. all unitary countries and all countries where region = district). However, distinguishing between these
two measures does yield different conclusions regarding the role of decentralization for example. I will show
this in my robustness checks.
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federations (Canada, India, UK and US) are some of the first attempts to study and measure
the territorial dimension of politics across several countries. The emphasis of both of these
studies however, is mostly diachronic; they focus on a long-term historical perspective of
party system change within a fairly reduced sample of countries. Furthermore, their samples
are limited to developed democracies (with the exception of the Indian case in Chhibber and
Kollman (2004)’s work). More recently some scholars have explored the territorial nature
of party systems outside of the developed Western world, but with the notable exceptions
of Hicken (2009) and Brancati (2009) these works have focused mostly on a subset of cases
in Latin America (Morgenstern et al., 2009; Harbers, 2010), and have not compared their
findings with other developing countries or with developed and long-established democra-
cies. In sum there are few comparative studies of party system nationalization that include
a representative sample of both developed and developing countries as well as new and old
democracies.
For this dissertation I have created a data set of party system territorialization that uses
the largest (and most representative) sample of democracies to date. The universe of cases
for my data set is all countries that have been democratic for at least two legislative election
periods starting in 1970 (or anytime after that if their transition to democracy happens at
a later year). I base the coding of democratic countries on a combination of sources. Until
1994 I use Boix (2003) who considers countries as democratic if there are free multiparty
elections and a majority of the population has the right to vote (Boix, 2003).11 His data
set only extends to 1994. I use the Freedom House Index and the polity variable from the
Polity V data set to code more recent years. I code a country as democratic if the polity
score is 6 or higher and the freedom house index indicates that the country is free.12 Table
3.16 on page 116 provides the list of countries, country codes and election years for which
I have data to calculate inflation scores. The data set contains a measure of party system
territorialization for 346 election years in 67 countries spanning the period from 1970 to
11For a more detailed explanation of the coding see page 66 in Boix (2003) and see Appendix 2.1 on page
98 for the list of countries and time periods that they are democratic.
12This decision rule coincides with coding decisions by other sources and scholars. The Election Results
Archive (ERA) for example considers countries as democratic as having at least 5.5 score in the Freedom
House ratings and at least a 6 on University of Maryland Polity III / IV rankings for the year in which the
elections took place in the polity score. See http://cdp.binghamton.edu/.
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2009.13
The data collected to construct the measure of “party system territorialization” consist
of electoral results for each party in each electoral district (and in each region if they have
a regional tier) at each national legislative election for every democratic country. Until
recently this type of data was practically inexistent. Today, two data collection projects
are underway to collect district-level electoral results for a comprehensive set of countries:
CLEA (Kollman et al., 2012) and CLE (Brancati, 2007). In addition I have used country
sources and other databases on electoral results (see Table 3.17 for all sources on electoral
data by country). The data can be analyzed as a pooled sample (cross-country and cross-
time variation) or as an averaged sample (cross-country variation). Figure 3.3 shows the
variation in the dependent variable (which was calculated based on equation 3.7) for all
countries in my data set. The top graph presents the variation across countries (values are
averaged across the series of elections available for each country). The top red horizontal
line represents the mean value of this measure, whereas the bottom green line represents the
median value for this measure. This average measure of “party system territorialization”
ranges from a low of 0 for Cyprus, which indicates that Cyprus has a perfectly nationalized
party system, to a high of 0.73 for Argentina, which indicates that it has a very territorialized
party system. The bottom graph shows both the variation across countries and across time
within each country.
3.4 The Geography of Economic Interests
Geographically concentrated interests are most frequently associated with ethnic, reli-
gious and/or linguistic characteristics. This makes sense since it is easy to imagine why
people of the same language, religion and/or ethnicity would end up clustering together in
space. There is a substantial literature on the relationship between geographically concen-
trated ethnicity, language and religion and the territorialization of politics (de Winter et al.
2006, de Winter and Turban 1997, Keating 1998). Especially in Western Europe, scholars
13Data for key independent variables such as “fiscal decentralization” and “territorial economic inequality”
are more limited than the electoral data that I use for the dependent variable (party system territorialization),
which reduces the number of cases when running the relevant regression analyses. As I will explain in the
empirical section the final data set used in the analyses contains around 137 election years across 38 countries.
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(b) Variation Across Countries and Time
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have associated the rise and the success of regional political parties with a “region’s cultural
or ethnic distinctiveness”(Ziegfeld, 2009, 16). Interestingly, economic interests have been
less frequently associated with regional parties and territorialized party systems. Although
there is a literature on economic grievances that predicts the rise of regional parties due
to economic dissatisfaction, there are few empirical studies testing these propositions.14 In
the case of Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Caramani (2004) (who are the
established authorities on the development of parties and party systems in Europe) argue
that economic interests (represented in the left-right dimension) are in fact nationalizing
forces that are responsible for the nationalization of the party system and electoral behavior.
“The progressive and rapid formation of nationalized electorates and party sys-
tems must be explained through the supremacy of the functional nonterritorial
left-right alignment that resulted from state-church conflicts and centralization
processes first –that is processes of state formation and nation-building– and,
later, from the class cleavages that developed out of industrialization and ur-
banization” (Caramani, 2004, 292).
In contrast with this view, I argue that for a variety of historical, sociological and
environmental reasons, economic interests are territorially concentrated in some countries
and at some time periods. The ways in which economic interests map onto politically
relevant territorial units can in turn have a profound impact on politics, and especially on
the development of certain types of parties and party systems. In what follows I show two
maps of Italy and Germany that serve as an illustration of the territorial concentration of
economic interests in these two European countries. In turn, I present regional economic
data on other democracies to show that the concentration of economic interests is even more
pervasive in other parts of the world. I then turn to proposing a measure of the territorial
concentration of economic interests.
Figure 3.4 on page 69 illustrates the geographic distribution of economic interests in Italy
using two different economic measures. The top map shows the geographic concentration
14There are some notable exceptions such as Jolly (2006, 2010), which considers the impact of culture,
economic interests and institutions on the success of regionalist parties in Europe. Also Sorens (2008) and
[cite van houten] considers the role of economic variables. Interestingly, most of these studies do not find a
strong effect of economic preferences on the success of regionalist or secessionist parties. Also mention the
work of Roland et al. on Economic heterogeneity.
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of low income citizens within the regions of Italy between 1988 and 1996.15 The map
shows that low-income citizens are not evenly distributed across the regions of Italy. A
higher proportion of poor citizens (between 31% and 40%) live in the southern regions,
whereas the northern regions of Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna have a significantly lower
proportion of low-income citizens (between 0 and 9%). The bottom map shows the GDP
per capita of Italian regions in 2001.16 According to this map southern Italian regions have
a lower GDP per capita than northern Italian regions. The distribution of GDP per capita
in this map is strikingly similar to the distribution of low-income citizens in the top map,
which suggests that poor and underdeveloped regions in Italy (that is regions with low
GDP per capita) tend to have a higher proportion of low-income citizens, whereas richer
and more developed regions (regions with a higher GDP per capita) have a lower proportion
of low-income citizens (or conversely, a higher proportion of high-income citizens). More
importantly, these two maps of Italy offer a good portrait of the territorial distribution of
economic interests and they show that economic interests are not evenly distributed across
the regions of Italy.
Italy is not an exception. Economic interests are also unevenly distributed in Germany.
Figure 3.5 maps the geographic distribution of economic interests in Germany. The top map
shows the geographic concentration of low income citizens within the regions of Germany
before German reunification (1984-1990) and after German reunification (1994-2000).17 The
map shows that low-income citizens were fairly evenly distributed across the regions of The
Federal Republic of Germany between 1984 and 1990 (prior to reunification). However,
after reunification in 1989 the distribution of low-income citizens became more unequal
with a relatively high proportion of poor people living in Eastern Lander (26-30%) and
a much lower proportion of poor citizens living in the Western Lander. Bavaria is the
Lander in Germany with the lowest proportion of low-income citizens. In sum reunification
15Low-income citizens “are those of woking age with market incomes in the first quintile in the national
market income distribution” (Jusko, 2006, 2). This map was created by Jusko (2006) based on household
income data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
16The measure of regional GDP per capita is regional GDP in $US, 2000 PPP. I created this
map based on data from the OECD regional statistics database and their explorer portal. See:
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDregionalstatistics/
17This map was created by Jusko (2006) based on household income data from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS). Low-income citizens “are those of woking age with market incomes in the first quintile in the
national market income distribution” (Jusko, 2006, 2).
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Figure 3.4: Geographic Distribution of Economic Interests in Italy
(a) Geographic concentration of low-income citizens within the regions of
Italy, 1988-1996; Source: Long-Jusko 2006
(b) GDP/capita of Italy’s Regions, 2001. Source: OECD regional statis-
tics
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created more income inequalities across Lander. The bottom map in Figure3.5 shows the
distribution of GDP per capita for Germany’s Lander in 2001. The map shows that Eastern
Lander have a much smaller GDP per capita ($14516 - $16179) than Western Lander. More
specifically all Eastern Lander (with the exception of Berlin) are at the bottom 5% of the
distribution of regional income in Germany. Whereas Bavaria, Baden-Wurttenberg and
Hesse are in the top 5% if the regional income distribution in Germany with regional
GDP/capita between 42,000 and 46,285 $US. As in the case of Italy, the distribution of
GDP per capita across German Lander overlaps quite nicely with the distribution of low-
income citizens across Landers. As in the case of Italy, these two maps of Germany suggest
that economic interests are territorially concentrated, and that Eastern Lander have less
economic resources and more poor citizens than Western Lander.
Other Western European countries such as Spain or Belgium have similar patterns of
territorial concentration of economic interests. Outside of Western Europe we find coun-
tries with much starker territorial differences in economic interests (i.e. Mexico, India,
Argentina), and also countries with a more even distribution of economic interests across
their regions (i.e. Slovenia, Austria). In order to provide a comparative view, Figure 3.6 on
page 73 presents the distribution of GDP per capita across regions for a larger (and more
diverse) sample of countries. Because individual income data disaggregated at the regional-
level for non-Western European countries is generally not available I focus on regional GDP
per capita to compare the distribution of economic interests in different countries. If we
assume that richer regions tend to have a higher proportion of rich citizens, whereas poorer
regions in a country tend to have a higher proportion of poor citizens, then we can use these
curves to map the territorial distribution of economic interests.18
18This is not an unusual assumption. Tucker makes this assumption in his book Regional Economic Voting.
“[T]he only assumption at work here is that there will be a larger proportion of economic
winners in areas of the country where the economy is performing better than where it is
performing worse, and similarly a larger proportion of economic losers in areas of the country
where economic conditions are worse than in areas where the economy is performing well”
(Tucker, 2006, 22).
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Figure 3.5: Geographic Distribution of Economic Interests in Germany
(a) Geographic concentration of low-income citizens within the regions of Ger-
many, 1984-1990, 1994-2001. Source: Long-Jusko 2006
(b) GDP/capita of Germany’s Lander, 2001. Source: OECD regional
statistics
71
The graphs in Figure 3.6 are kernel density graphs19, and the curves can be interpreted
as a histogram.20 The x-axis represents the GDP per capita of each region in the country
expressed as a share of the national average. The national average refers to the average
regional GDP per capita in the country. Regions that fall close to 1 on the x-axis have a
GDP per capita that is close to the average regional GDP per capita in the country. And
the further away regions are on this x-axis the more different their GDP per capita is with
respect to the average in the country. The y-axis can be interpreted loosely as the number
of regions at each point in the x-axis. The spread of the distribution represents the extent
to which regions in a country have a different GDP per capita. For example, Mexico has
a much wider distribution than Slovenia, which means that in Mexico more regions are
further away from the average regional income in the country (some are much richer than
the average regional income, and some are much poorer than the average). What we gather
from this wide distribution is that regional GDP per capita in Mexico is very unevenly
distributed. In contrast, the probability density graph for Slovenia is relatively narrow and
tight around 1 (on the x-axis), which means that regions in Slovenia are closer to the average
regional GDP per capita and thus that regions have similar GDP per capita and thus are
quite equal. Together, these density graphs tell us that economic interests are far from
being evenly distributed across regions, and thus do not serve as the “nationalizing forces”
that Caramani suggests. Next I turn to developing a measure of territorial concentration
of interests that can be used comparatively.
3.4.1 Measurement
In order to capture the degree of territorial concentration of economic interests I use
a measure of economic inequality or inequality amongst territorial units in a country (as
defined earlier). This measure captures whether territorial units in a country have similar
GDP per capita by calculating the dispersion of territorial GDP per capita around the
19These graphs are inspired by Rodden’s unpublished paper “Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribu-
tion” (Rodden, 2004) where he uses kernel density graphs to compare the regional distribution of income
and expenditures for a series of federal countries.
20According to King (1991), “the area under the curve between two values [of the horizontal x-axis] gives
the approximate proportion of observations falling in that range. The total area under the curve is equal to
1” (King, 1991, 125).
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mean territorial GDP per capita in the country. To construct this measure I follow Shankar
and Shah (2003) and Lessmann (2009) and use a measure of dispersion around the mean
(the coefficient of variation)21 to capture the dispersion of territorial GDP capita around the
mean territorial GDP per capita in the country.22 The formula for this measure is presented
in equation 3.8 where yi is GDP per capita of territory i, Yu is the mean territorial GDP per
capita and N is the number of territorial units in the country. In other words the measure
divides the standard deviation of territorial GDP per capita over the mean territorial GDP
per capita in the country.








This measure, which I call “territorial economic inequality index” varies from 0 for
perfect equality (equal GDP per capita for all the units in the country) to
√
N− 1 for
perfect inequality (only one territorial unit has all the GDP) (Shankar and Shah, 2003,
1422). This means that countries with low levels of territorial economic inequality should
have a fairly equal distribution of economic interests across regions, whereas countries with
high levels of territorial economic inequalities should have a fairly unequal distribution of
economic interests across regions. To show that this measure captures well the territorial
concentration of economic interests, Figure 3.7 presents the regional distribution of GDP per
capita in four very different countries: Slovenia, Italy, India and Ecuador. The differences
between these density graphs illustrate the levels of equality or inequality of the GDP per
capita of regions in each country. According to these density graphs, Slovenia shows the
most equality between regions’ GDP per capita whereas Ecuador shows the most inequality
between regions in terms of their GDP per capita. Below each graph is the corresponding
21The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
22There are other measures of economic inequalities across regions. Shankar and Shah’s article Bridging
the Economic Divide Within Countries: A Scorecard on the Performance of Regional Policies in Reducing
Regional Income Disparities (2003) provides a very good review of different measures of inequality, as does
Lessman’s article Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparity: Evidence from Cross-section and Panel
Data (2009). The Gini Index and the coefficient of variation (COV) are the two most widely used measures
of inequality (Shankar and Shah, 2003, 1423). I choose to use the coefficient of variation because of ease in
the calculations. Lessmann (2009) calculates territorial inequalities for 23 OECD countries using both the
coefficient of variation and the adjusted Gini index and he reports a correlation coefficient of 0.79 for these
two measures. In the future, I would like to conduct robustness tests with the Gini Index.
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“regional economic inequality index” for that country and year. The index is lowest in
Slovenia (0.19), second lowest in Italy (0.25), higher in India (0.53) and highest in Ecuador
(2.07).
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The upper bound of the index is defined as
√
N− 1, which means that this measure is
sensitive to the number of regions in a country. In Figure 3.7 I chose four countries that
have similar number of regions23 so the indices created for these countries are very much
comparable. However, there is a bit more variation in the number of regions across the
countries in my data set. I deal with this in two ways. First, whenever I include this index
in regression analyses I also add a control for the number of regions to make sure that the
effect of “regional economic inequality” is not biased by the number of regions in a country.
23Slovenia has 12 regions, Italy has 21 regions, India has 28 regions and Ecuador has 22 regions.
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Second, I conduct some robustness tests using a weighted version of this index where each
regional deviation is weighted by its share in the national population. Using the weighted
measure eliminates the sensitivity to the number of regions.24
To create this measure I collected data on regional GDP per capita for each region in
each country and election year in my data set. Table 3.18 lists the different sources for this
economic data collected at the regional level. For developed democracies I relied largely on
data from EUROSTAT (nd), from the OECD (nd) Regional Statistics Database25 and from
Lessmann (2009).26 For non-OECD countries I used different academic or country-specific
sources. See Table 3.18 in 121 at the end of the chapter for all sources by country. I located
and included regional-level (or district-level) economic data for 48 of the 71 countries for
which I have electoral data. This reduces my sample but does not bias it since I still have
a representative sample of countries based on key variables such as development, years
since democratization, degree of political and fiscal decentralization and other institutional
variables.
Figure 3.8 shows the variation in the “territorial economic inequality” index. The top
graph shows the variation across countries (values are averaged across time within each
country) and the line represents the mean value of this index across the sample of countries
for which I have regional economic data. The “regional economic inequality” index ranges
from a low of 0.1 in Denmark to a high of 1 in Chile. The bottom graph shows both the
variation across countries and across time. This bottom graph shows that the “regional
economic inequality index” varies across time within most countries. This is important
because the regression analyses will take full advantage of this time variation. Finally, Figure
3.9 presents a scatterplot showing the relationship between party system territorialization
24The formula for the weighted “regional economic inequality index” is the following:








P is the population share of each region and the rest of terms are the same as the ones defined in equation
3.8. Both the weighted and unweighted measures are based on Shankar and Shah (2003). These measures
are also used by Lessmann (2009).
25Their data also includes a few less developed countries such as Mexico, Chile and some Eastern European
countries.
26I want to give special thanks to Lessmann (2009) for making his European regional economic data
available for this project.
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(which is the dependent variable) and the “territorial economic inequality” index. These
bivariate graphs indicate a positive relationship between territorial economic inequalities
and party system territorialization. Figure 3.12 at the end of the chapter reproduces these
same scatterplots with the weighted index. The patterns look very similar.
3.5 Control Variables
I include several control variables to account for competing hypotheses. In this section
I first discuss the controls for geographically concentrated ethnic, linguistic and religious
diversity. I then introduce the more institutional controls: fiscal and political decentraliza-
tion, bicameralism, executive type, electoral system and number of territorial units (number
of districts and number of regions). Finally I discuss a set of controls that speak to mod-
ernization theories: level of development, years of democracy, and degree of party system
institutionalization.27
3.5.1 Geographically Concentrated Ethnicity, Religion and Language
I argue in Chapter 2 that geographically concentrated interests matter to explain the
territorial nature of party systems. In particular I argue that economic interests when
territorially concentrated create incentives for candidates to abandon nation-wide coalitions
in favor of smaller regional or local political parties. I argue that economic interests are
more important than interests that have traditionally been associated with regional or
local parties such as territorially concentrated ethnicity, religion and language. In order to
test this proposition I need to control for ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity that is
territorially concentrated. To do so, I include two types of measures.
First I include an average measure of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization,
which is based on three separate variables created by Alesina et al. (2003): ethnic fraction-
alization, linguistic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. Each of these measures
is based on the Herfindhal index,28 which captures the number (weighted by the size of the
group) of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups in a country. Each of these variables ranges
27In the future I would also like to include a variable that captures whether countries have passed legislation
that explicitly prohibits regional parties. I am in the process of coding this.
28The formula to calculate a fractionalization index is the following:
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from 0=perfectly homogenous country to 1-(1/N) for perfect heterogeneity, where N is the
number of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups (depending on the measure). I average these
three fractionalization measures created by Alesina et al. (2003) to get a summary mea-
sure of ethnic-religious-linguistic fractionalization that also ranges from 0 to 1-(1/N). This
type of fractionalization measures have been widely used in the literature to capture the
degree of social diversity in a country, which is why I include them in my analyses. How-
ever, these measures do not capture an important aspect of social diversity, its geographic
concentration.
Scholars have often assumed that ethnic, religious and/or linguistic diversity tends to be
geographically concentrated, and thus have used fractionalization measures as proxies for
geographically concentrated social diversity, but recent work by Selway (2011) suggests that
this assumption is inaccurate. Some countries might have many different linguistic groups
(in which case they might have a high linguistic fractionalization index) but these groups
might not be geographically concentrated, whereas other countries might have just two
linguistic groups (low linguistic fractionalization index) but these linguistic groups might
each be concentrated in a different region of the country. In a recent article “The Measure-
ment of Cross-cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures” Selway
(2011) introduces a new data set (CIMMSS) that includes several measures of geographically
concentrated social diversity. These measures build on the concept of “cross-cuttingness”
which Selway defines as the extent to which “groups on a first cleavage are identically
distributed amongst groups on a second cleavage”.29 For example, one such measure is
religion-geography cross-cuttingness which gets at the degree to which religion and terri-
tory overlap in a country. Low values of religion and geography cross-cuttingness mean that
individuals of religion A mostly live in region C whereas individuals of religion B mostly
live in region D. In other words, religion and geography reinforce each other. In contrast,
high values of religion-geography cross-cuttingness mean that individuals of religion A are
equally divided in terms of the region where they live, and so are individuals of religion B.




where pi is the population share of group i in a country.
29https://sites.google.com/site/joelsawatselway/CROSS-CUTTING-CLEAVAGES-DATA
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This means that religion and geography cross-cut.
I use two such measures from Selway (2011)’s data set as controls for territorially concen-
trated social diversity. The first measure is the one described above and which I re-baptize
“territorial concentration of religion”. The second measure I use is “territorial concentration
of language”. I invert the original cross-cuttingness measure so that higher values mean
higher territorial concentration (i.e. lower cross-cuttingness) of religion or language and
lower mean lower geographic concentration (i.e. higher cross-cuttingness).30 The measures
range from 0 to 1. It is important to note that these variables do not vary over time within
countries, in contrast with my measure of geographic concentration of economic interests
(“territorial economic inequality index”). Note that my measure of concentration of eco-
nomic interests (“regional economic inequality index”) does vary across time within each
country. My expectation is that including controls for social diversity and for territori-
ally concentrated social diversity should not overwhelm the effect of “territorial economic
inequality” on the territorial nature of the party system.
3.5.2 Institutional controls
As discussed in Chapter 2, decentralization has been a key explanation of party sys-
tem territorialization in the literature. The political dimension of decentralization refers to
the extent to which subnational levels of government hold independent elections. Political
decentralization is theoretically and empirically distinct from fiscal decentralization, which
measures the extent to which regional or local governments manage resources (Harbers,
2010, 610). Figure 3.10 on page 82 presents a scatter plot between these two dimensions
of decentralization with fiscal decentralization on the y-axis and political decentralization
on the x-axis. The scatter plot is divided into four quadrants based on the mean value
for each of the two dimensions of decentralization. The figure illustrates that these two
dimensions are somewhat independent. Politically centralized countries (that is countries
that do not have electorally independent subnational governments) tend to be more fiscally
centralized as well. However, politically decentralized countries can be either fiscally cen-
30Selway (2011)’s data set also include a measure of ethnic-geographic cross-cuttingness (i.e. territorial
concentration of ethnicity) but the coverage of this variable is too spotty to include as a control in my
models.
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tralized (Colombia, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain) or fiscally decentralized (Australia,
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Germany Switzerland). I thus include a measure of both political
and fiscal decentralization in my analyses.






























































































































iscal Dec ntralization = Sub ational Revenue as a Proportion of GDP
Fiscal Decentralization = Subnational Revenue as a Proportion of GDP
 = 51
N = 51
I build on Hooghe et al. (2010) for my measure of political decentralization. Hooghe
et al. (2010) have developed a coding scheme to measure the extent to which a region
is endowed with an independent legislature and executive: 0=no regional assembly; 1=an
indirectly elected regional assembly; 2=a directly elected assembly; 0=the regional executive
is appointed by central government ; 1=dual executives appointed by central government
and the regional assembly; 2= the regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or
directly elected. They then add up the scores for the assembly and for the executive for each
country and create a categorical variable that ranges from 0 (no independent legislature or
executive) to 4 (completely independent legislature and executive). Countries that score a
4 have subnational legislative and executive bodies that are independently elected and that
are independent from the central government. These are purely federal countries. Countries
scoring 0 have no subnational level of government or have a subnational level where officials
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are not independently elected. These are unitary countries. Hooghe et al. (2010) have coded
this variable annually for 42 OECD democracies between 1950 and 2006. I use their data
for OECD countries and code the remaining cases (and time periods) myself using the same
coding scheme.
For fiscal decentralization I use a measure that is commonly employed in the literature:
subnational revenues as a % of total revenues in a country. I also perform robustness tests
with a related measure that is also commonly used in the literature: subnational revenues
as a % of GDP. The data for both measures of fiscal decentralization comes from the World
Bank Fiscal Indicators.31 The measures are reported in percentages but I convert them
to proportions so that their scale is similar to that of the “regional economic inequality
index”. This will facilitate comparing the magnitude of the effects of the coefficients on the
regional inequality and fiscal decentralization variables in the regression analysis. Because
this measure has been collected for a far more limited sample of countries and time periods,
I perform some robustness tests without fiscal decentralization as a control.
For bicameralism I create a variable called “bicameral” that takes the value of 1 when the
country has an upper legislative chamber, and a value of 0 when the country is unicameral.
I base the coding of this variable on data from the Interparliamentray Union (IPU), and
my own coding from various country sources. I control for electoral system, which I code
dichotomously: “majoritarian electoral system” is equal to 1 if the electoral system is
majoritarian and 0 if the system is proportional representation or mixed. The data for
coding electoral systems comes from Golder (2005)’s data set “Democratic Electoral Systems
Around the World, 1946-2000”, and my own coding for countries and years that were not
available in Golder’s data set.
The nature of the executive (presidential versus parliamentary) is a proxy for the coali-
tion potential of regional political parties. Parliamentary systems allow for smaller regional
political parties to gain access to the legislative arena and to have an impact on govern-
ment policy through coalitions. This is less likely in presidential systems. The data for this
variable is taken from Samuels and Shugart (2010)’s recently published book Presidents,
Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of powers Affects Party Organization and
31http : //www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm
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Behavior. For the purpose of this chapter the executive is coded as a dichotomous variable
where 1=parliamentary system and 0=presidential (and semi-presidential) systems.
Finally, I control for the number of territorial units in a country for both substantive
and methodological reasons. First, I include the number of territorial units (regions and
districts) when including the unweighted version of the “regional economic inequality index”
since the measure is sensitive to the number of territorial units in a country. Furthermore,
the literature on party system nationalization argues that party coordination across districts
becomes harder as the number of districts increases (Morgenstern et al., 2009), therefore
I include the number of districts when using party system localization as the dependent
variable. Both the “number of regions” and the “number of districts” variables have right-
skewed distributions so I log these measures. The graphs on the left of Table 3.14 show the
distribution of these variables unlogged whereas the graphs on the right show the distribu-
tion of logged variables. Logging these variables creates a more normal distribution of these
two variables, which is preferable when doing OLS regression.
3.5.3 Development, Democracy and the Age of Parties
There are a few scholars that link party system territorialization (or its converse nation-
alization) to macro-historical processes of modernization and democratization. In the book
The Nationalization of Politics (2004), Caramani argues that a variety of macro-forces (such
as the consolidation of the nation-state, industrialization, and the advent of mass politics)
at the end of the First World War led to a rapid and inexorable development towards na-
tional electorates and national party systems in Western Europe. According to Caramani
the rise of the nation-state and the process of industrialization in Europe facilitated the
process by which functional left-right alignments and class cleavages slowly replaced terri-
torial cleavages so that electoral and party behavior became increasingly homogenous across
the territory in each country. Furthermore, he argues that the extension of the franchise
and the rise of political and party competition led to a push from parties to capture new
electorates and thus to expand across the territory.
In order to account for these explanations I include two controls. I include a measure
of the age of democracy called “years of democracy” which is the number of years since
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the last transition to democracy for each country. I base this measure on my coding of
democratic countries based on the Freedom House Index32 and Polity IV.33 See Table 3.20
for the coding. I also include a control for level of development. Following Boix (2003, 78)
I use the value of real per capita income (in constant dollars, Chain Index, expressed in
international prices, base 1985) taken from the “Penn World Tables” (Alan et al., 2011)34.
I divide the value by 1000, to have a more manageable interpretation of the coefficient
in the regression analysis. The expectation according to modernization theories is that
richer countries and older democracies should have more nationalized party systems, or
conversely, poorer countries and younger democracies should have more territorialized or
regionalized party systems. In addition, controlling for level of development addresses the
possible criticism that the argument I am advancing about territorial economic inequalities
is actually an argument about development.35
Finally, the literature suggests that party system territorialization might be a symp-
tom of weak parties with weak ties to society (Mainwaring, 1999; Hicken, 2009; Simmons,
2008). Mainwaring argues that weakly institutionalized political parties might not have
the required ties to society and organizational capacity to run nation-wide campaigns. In
contrast, if “parties have solid roots in society, there is a high degree of continuity in their
social bases, and therefore in patterns of electoral geography” (Mainwaring, 1999, 88). In
others words, fielding candidates across all districts (or regions) in the country requires
resources and experience that are only acquired over time. Therefore, we might expect that
more institutionalized party system are also more nationalized party systems.
Hicken (2009), Simmons (2008) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999, 581) argue that a good




35Among economists, low levels of economic development are often associated with higher levels of eco-
nomic inequality (both individual-level economic inequality and territorial economic inequality). In 1965,
Williamson (1965) developed the theory that there his a curvilinear relationship between development and
territorial economic disparities.
“[R]ising regional income disparities and increasing North-South dualism is typical of early
development stages, while regional convergence and a disappearance of severe North-South
problems is typical of the more mature stages of development” (Williamson, 1965, 44).
This is what has become to be known as the “Williamson Curve”.
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lived (Simmons, 2008, 93). The data that they use to measure the length of parties’ life
comes from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). “The
database covers the period 1975-2004 for well over 150 countries of all levels of political and
economic development. A party’s age is coded according to the number of years since the
party was founded under its current name. The investigators are aware of purely “cosmetic”
name changes in which the party’s name changes, but the party leaders, platform, and
constituency remain the same and they do not code an obviously cosmetic change as the
date of a new party’s formation” (Simmons, 2008, 94). Based on this data I construct a
measure that averages the age of the governing party and the age of the main opposition
party in each country at each election year. The expectation is that younger parties (i.e.
less institutionalized parties) are associated with more territorialized party systems, or
conversely that older parties (i.e. more institutionalized parties) are associated with more
nationalized party systems.
Because the measures of “years of democracy” and “age of parties” have fairly right-
skewed distributions I log these measures.36 The graphs on the left of Table 3.13 show the
distribution of these variables unlogged whereas the graphs on the right show the distribu-
tion of the logged variables. Logging creates a more normal distribution for both of these
two variables, which is better suited for the assumptions of OLS regression.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the summary statistics for the different variables in the regression
models using the pooled and averaged data set respectively. For variables that have been
logged I also include the unlogged version. The reader will notice that some variables are
lagged in time. The discussion about lags is part of the empirical modeling strategy which
I describe in the next section.
3.6 Model and Empirical Strategy
The set of propositions that I develop in Chapter 2 (and that I test in this chapter
and in subsequent chapters) argue for a specific causal claim which is that the territorial
36In doing so I follow what other scholars have done. See Simmons (2008, 94) and Hicken (2009).
86
Table 3.2: Summary statistics (pooled sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Party System Territorialization 0.154 0.157 -0.08 0.73 346
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) 0.352 0.224 0.09 1.58 175
Territorial Economic Inequality Weighted (lag) 0.309 0.183 0.06 0.98 178
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) 0.206 0.136 0.002 0.538 219
Political Decentralization (lag) 2.368 1.748 0 4 328
Ethnic/Relig/Linguistic Diversity 0.342 0.158 0.07 0.830 357
Territorial Concentration of Religion 0.163 0.09 0.07 0.92 342
Territorial Concentration of Religion (log) -1.902 0.384 -2.659 -0.083 342
Territorial Concentration of Language 0.22 0.207 0 0.93 320
Territorial Concentration of Language (log) -1.731 0.743 -3.507 -0.073 295
Personal Vote (lag) 0.881 0.61 0 1.67 260
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.275 0.447 0 1 345
Parliamentary System 0.53 0.5 0 1 353
Bicameralism 0.651 0.477 0 1 347
Age of main parties 50.31 40.83 2 188 316
Age of main parties (log) 3.502 1.028 0.693 5.236 316
Number of Units 32.047 54.918 2 450 344
Number of Units (log) 2.945 0.925 0.693 6.109 344
Years of Democracy 46.062 48.934 0 197 357
Years of Democracy (log) 3.315 1.176 0 5.283 338
Country GDP/capita (thousands $US) 16.965 10.258 1.429 59.292 343
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics (averaged sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Party System Territorialization 0.134 0.131 -0.06 0.560 70
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) 0.365 0.269 0.11 1.58 44
Territorial Economic Inequality Weighted(lag) 0.33 0.188 0.08 0.940 45
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) 0.172 0.129 0.009 0.514 55
Political Decentralization (lag) 1.758 1.689 0 4 71
Ethnic/Relig/Linguistic Diversity 0.346 0.168 0.07 0.830 70
Territorial Concentration of Religion 0.177 0.112 0.07 0.92 66
Territorial Concentration of Religion (log) -1.844 0.433 -2.659 -0.083 66
Territorial Concentration of Language 0.253 0.225 0 0.93 63
Territorial Concentration of Language (log) -1.648 0.815 -3.507 -0.073 60
Personal Vote (lag) 0.830 0.603 0 1.67 68
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.254 0.515 0 2.8 70
Parliamentary System 0.465 0.502 0 1 71
Bicameralism 0.514 0.5 0 1 71
Age of main parties 40.71 33.732 3.5 148.92 67
Age of main parties (log) 3.321 0.956 1.253 5.003 67
Number of Units 30.784 60.879 2 450 66
Number of Units (log) 2.84 0.935 0.693 6.109 66
Years of Democracy 32.212 38.871 0 179 71
Years of Democracy (log) 2.924 1.124 0.223 5.187 68
Country GDP/capita (thousands $US) 14.539 10.041 1.499 50.454 70
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distribution of economic interests (and the institutional and constitutional features of a
country) affect the nature of parties that develop in a country and thus the nature of
the party system. In the short term, the assumption that social structure and major
constitutional features in a country are exogenous is reasonable. In the long run however,
the territorial distribution of economic interests and especially political institutions (i.e.
electoral system, decentralization, bicameralism....) can change as a result of the types of
parties that are elected into government. This means that in the long run some independent
variables are endogenous to the nature of the party system.
According to Beramendi (2011) for example the pressure from regional political parties
in Spain has triggered the recent reforms towards more fiscal decentralization.37 Political
parties with narrow constituencies might also press for other institutional reforms such as
bicameral institutions or an electoral system that might help increase their representation
at the national level. In order to untangle this dynamic relationship I propose a model
that lags key independent variables with respect to the dependent variable. In particular
I use a five-year time lag for the following variables: “territorial economic inequality”,
“fiscal decentralization”, “political decentralization”, and “personal vote”. In the robustness
checks I also test the models with a 10-year lag for these variables.
Given the nature of the data (time-series cross-sectional data) I cannot assume that
observations within each country are independent. I thus use OLS regression with robust
standard errors that are clustered by country in all regression analyses using the pooled
data set (based on Harbers (2010) and Hicken (2009), which is based on Beck and Katz
(1995), Franzese (2006) and Golder (2006)). In addition, I also present the analyses using
the cross-section of my sample (what I refer to as the averaged sample). When running
models with the averaged sample I use a moving average for each variable and I also use
temporal lags for the same variables as in the pooled sample.
Equation 3.11 presents the general model that I use to test the proposition that “terri-
torial economic inequality” explains variation in party system territorialization controlling
for other societal interests and for key institutions. The dependent variable “party system
37Beramendi’s argument is that the structure of territorial inequality interacts with certain aspects of the
party system to explains levels of fiscal decentralization. In his argument, the party system is an exogenous
independent variable.
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territorialization” varies across countries i and across election years within each country
t. β0 is a constant term. The “territorial economic inequality” index also varies across
countries and time, and the variable is lagged 5-years with respect to election year t. The
rest of terms are controls. The term Xi, t-5 represents a set of control variables that are
also lagged 5 years with respect to election year t (i.e. political decentralization, fiscal de-
centralization, and personal vote). Zi, t corresponds to a set of controls that vary across
time and across countries but are not lagged such as country GDP per capita, average
age of parties, years of democracy, electoral system, and executive type (presidential ver-
sus parliamentary). This second set of controls is not lagged. Finally Pi corresponds to
a set of controls that only vary across countries (not across time) such as social diversity
measures (i.e. ”ethnic/religious/linguistic diversity”, “territorial concentration of language”
and “territorial concentration of religion”).
Party System Territorializationi, t = β0 + β1 Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-5 +
β3 Xi, t-5 + β4 Zi, t + β5 Pi + εi,t(3.11)
A few of the covariates included in this model are empirically correlated. The variables
of “age of parties” and ”years of democracy” are related concepts since younger democracies
tend to have younger parties, and older democracies tend to have older political parties.
The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.67. I am also concerned with
the correlations between “country GDP per capita” and “territorial economic inequality”
as well as between “country GDP per capita” and ”years of democracy” since they have
often been associated in the literature (see Boix (2003) for a review of the relationship
between development and democracy). Given these concerns I test for multicollinearity
of my predictors based on the baseline model (model 5 in Table 3.6). Tables 3.4 and 3.5
present the Variation Inflation Factors (VIF) for multicollinearity for the baseline model M5
in Table 3.6. Scholars argue that VIF values over 10 might be problematic (UCLA, 2012).
These tables suggests that none of my predictors poses a serious problem in the regression
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analysis due to problems of multicollinearity.
Table 3.4: Multicollinearity Test-Baseline Model (Pooled Sample)
Independent Variables VIF (1/VIF)
Years of Democracy (log) 3.76 0.25
Country GDP/capita 3.71 0.28
Age of main parties (log) 3.58 0.28
Majoritarian System 3.04 0.33
Number of Units (log) 2.62 0.38
Political Decentralization (lag) 2.38 0.42
Parliamentary 2.22 0.45
Ethnic/Relig/Language Diversity 1.88 0.53
Regional Inequality 1.79 0.56
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) 1.75 0.58
Bicameralism 1.65 0.61
Mean VIF 2.58
Table 3.5: Multicollinearity Test-Baseline Model (Averaged Sample)
Independent Variables VIF (1/VIF)
Country GDP/capita 2.97 0.34
Age of main parties (log) 2.92 0.34
Parliamentary 2.76 0.36
Years of Democracy (log) 2.49 0.40
Political Decentralization (lag) 2.35 0.43
Number of Units (log) 2.01 0.50
Ethnic/Relig/Language Diversity 1.89 0.53
Regional Inequality 1.88 0.53
Majoritarian System 1.67 0.60
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) 1.53 0.65
Bicameralism 1.15 0.87
Mean VIF 2.15
3.7 Empirical Analysis: Results
Table 3.6 on page 95 shows the results for equation 3.11 on page 3.11. I present four dif-
ferent models, which correspond to different specifications. Model 1 serves as a replication of
existing models in the literature, and does not include the “territorial economic inequality”
variable or the modernization-related variables (“years of democracy” and “country GDP
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per capita”). Model 2 adds the “territorial economic inequality” index. The model shows
that higher levels of territorial economic inequalities are more likely to lead to greater party
system territorialization. Conversely, lower levels of territorial economic inequalities lead to
greater party system nationalization. Model 3 includes the modernization-related variables
“years of democracy” and “country GDP per capita”. Finally, Model 4 includes politi-
cal decentralization as a dichotomous variable (instead of as a variable with 4 categories).
Models 2, 3 and 4 in this table show strong support for the proposition that “territorial
economic inequality” has a positive (and significant) effect on the territorial nature of the
party system. Note that the adjusted R-squared in these models, which include the “ter-
ritorial economic inequality” index is substantially larger than the adjusted R-squared in
Model 1.38 The results for the economic inequality variable remain robust when using the
averaged sample instead of the pooled sample. See Table 3.7 on page 96.
3.7.1 Results: The Role of Institutions
In terms of other variables in the model there are some noteworthy findings. “Bicamer-
alism” is only statistically significant in the first model, but looses significance in the more
fully specified models 2, 3 and 4. However, in Table 3.7, which uses the averaged sample,
“bicameralism” is statistically significant in three of the four models, although the signif-
icance levels are relatively low. The effect of “bicameralism” is positive, which indicates
that countries that posses upper legislative chambers are more likely to have territorialized
party systems. In sum, “bicameralism” seems to have an effect on the territorial nature
of party systems, but not a very robust one. In the next chapter (Chapter 4) I offer an
explanation for this lack of robust findings. In brief, I argue that “bicameralism” has two
distinct effects that cancel each other out. On the one hand, Hicken (2009) argues that
bicameralism fragments power at the national level and thus creates incentives for party
system territorialization. On the other hand, I argue that bicameralism creates incentives
against territorialization by institutionalizing voice for geographically concentrated inter-
ests. These two effects are probably operating simultaneously, which explains why we do
38Whereas R-squared is usually sensitive to the number of variables included in the model, the adjusted
R-squared is not. This means that the increase in the adjusted R-squared in models 2 and 3 is not due to
the inclusion of more variables in the model.
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not see a significant independent effect of bicameralism on party system territorialization.
However, when I properly test the mechanism of these effects (in Chapter 4) then I do find
strong support for the significance of bicameralism.
We observe a similar pattern with other institutional variables, which turn out to be less
significant than existing explanations would predict. In Table 3.6 “fiscal decentralization”
is statistically significant with a positive effect. Higher levels of fiscal decentralization lead
to a greater likelihood of having a territorialized party system, whereas lower levels of fiscal
decentralization (i.e. greater fiscal centralization) lead to more party system nationalization.
These results however are not robust in the models using the averaged sample (Table 3.7),
where fiscal decentralization is statistically significant only in models 1 and 2. In turn,
“political decentralization” is not statistically significant in any of the models using the
pooled or the averaged sample with the exception of model 4 in Table 3.6 where “political
decentralization” is positively (and significantly) related to party system territorialization.
In sum, the coefficients for both political and fiscal decentralization are not very robust.
These results suggests that the direct effect that some scholars in the literature hypothesize
does not hold. However, this does not mean that decentralization is not important. This
probably means that while decentralization is likely to have an effect on the territorial
nature of party systems, its effect has not been correctly specified.39 Other institutional
variables such as the electoral system and regime type (parliamentary or presidential) are
not statistically significant in neither Table 3.6 with the pooled sample nor Table 3.7 with
the averaged sample. In Chapter 4 I will show how regime type and electoral system do
have an important modifying role in explaining the development of territorialized party
systems.
Finally, there is a set of (non-institutional) variables that – as far as I know– have not been
tested before with a large-N dataset. These are “age of parties”, “years of democracy” and
“country GDP per capita”. “Age of parties”, which is a proxy for party system institution-
alization, has a negative and statistically significant effect on party system territorialization,
39Although my argument in this dissertation does not focus on the role of decentralization, exploring the
conditional relationship between decentralization and party system territorialization is an avenue for further
research.
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which suggests that older parties are more likely to be national in scope, whereas younger
parties are more territorialized. This is probably because older parties have had the time
to spread territorially. This effect disappears in model 4. When using the averaged sample
(Table 3.7) the effect of “age of parties” is only significant in two of the four models, which
means that the effect is not very robust. In terms of modernization-related variables, “coun-
try GDP per capita” is statistically significant in the models in Table 3.6. As a country
becomes richer (in terms of GDP per capita) it is more likely to develop a nationalized party
system. In contrast, poorer countries tend to have more territorialized party systems. This
is consistent with Caramani’s theoretical expectations. This effect however is not robust
when using the averaged sample in Table 3.7. Surprisingly, “years of democracy” has a
positive and statistically significant effect in all models using both the pooled and averaged
samples. This tells us that older democracies are more likely to have territorialized party
systems than younger democracies, which would contradict Caramani’s expectations, and
the expectations of modernization theorists in general.40
3.7.2 Results: The Role of Social Diversity
One of the goals of this chapter and the analyses I present is to evaluate whether the
effect of geographically concentrated economic interests remains significant when control-
ling for other types of societal interests (ethnicity, religion, language). To this end, the
models presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 include a measure called “ethnic/religious/linguistic
diversity.” The measure is not statistically significant in any of the models. This is not
particularly surprising given that this particular measure of diversity (although commonly
used in the literature) is a measure of fractionalization that does not capture the territo-
rial/geographic character of ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity.
In lieu of this blunt fractionalization measure, Table 3.8 presents a series of regression
models using two alternative measures of diversity: “territorial concentration of religion”
and “territorial concentration of language.”41 Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 3.8 show that
40It would be interesting to do some further research on why length of democracy is negatively associated
with party system nationalization.
41Selway (2011), from which I take these measures, unfortunately does not have a comprehensive measure
of “territorial concentration of ethnicity,” so I only include territorially concentrated religion and territorially
concentrated language in my regression models.
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression: Direct Effects (Pooled Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .497*** .487*** .448***
(.13) (.14) (.12)
Ethnic/Relig/Linguistic Diversity .014 –.061 –.108 –.108
(.15) (.16) (.15) (.15)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .348 .530*** .397** .353**
(.23) (.19) (.17) (.17)
Political Decentralization (lag) .002 –.001 .010
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Political Decentralization (dic) (lag) .092**
(.04)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.019 –.033 –.077 –.054
(.04) (.06) (.06) (.05)
Parliamentary System .000 .043 .041 .011
(.05) (.05) (.03) (.03)
Bicameralism (dic) .092** .043 .039 .023
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.05)
Age of Parties (log) –.054** –.052*** –.040* –.034
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Number of Units (log) .009 .004 .005 –.014
(.04) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Country GDP per capita –.007*** –.007***
(.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .064** .056**
(.03) (.03)
Constant .185 .040 –.057 .020
(.14) (.12) (.11) (.11)
Adj. R2 .194 .490 .553 .573
No. of cases 206 140 137 137
No. of countries/clusters 53 39 38 38
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression: Direct Effects (Averaged Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .216*** .205** .180**
(.08) (.08) (.09)
Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Diversity .111 –.018 –.036 –.045
(.12) (.14) (.15) (.15)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .307* .362* .308 .313
(.17) (.20) (.20) (.19)
Political Decentralization (lag) –.006 .002 .015
(.01) (.02) (.02)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .065
(.06)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.030 –.026 –.044 –.040
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Parliamentary System .009 .027 .014 .006
(.04) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Bicameralism (dic) .073* .073* .070 .076*
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Age of Parties (log) –.030 –.041 –.062* –.063*
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Number of Units (log) .063** .040 .020 .013
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.005 –.005
(.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .058** .056**
(.02) (.02)
Constant –.053 –.028 .003 .032
(.10) (.11) (.12) (.12)
Adj. R2 .195 .234 .308 .322
No. of cases 51 40 39 39
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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“territorial economic inequality” (my key independent variable that I use as a proxy for
the territorial concentration of economic interests) remains significant when controlling for
either territorially concentrated language or territorially concentrated religion. The variable
“territorial concentration of religion” is not significant, whereas the variable “territorial
concentration of language” is statistically significant and its effect its quite substantial.
Countries where language is territorially concentrated tend to have more territorialized
party systems. This is consistent with much of the literature on the emergence and success
of regional political parties in Western Europe, which argue that language is an important
marker of ethnic identity, which drives regionalization. What is important however, is that
the effect of linguistic concentration does not overwhelm the effect of “territorial economic
inequality,” which remains more important.42
The measures of “territorial concentration of language” and “territorial concentration of
religion” are particularly right skewed (see Figure 3.15) so I transform them to make their
distributions more normal. This allows for a more accurate regression analysis. Models
3 and 4 in Table 3.8 include these two variables logged. I also log my key independent
variable ”territorial economic inequality” in order to be able to compare the magnitude of
the coefficients between all the social diversity variables. The results suggest that the effect
of “territorial economic inequality” remains significant even when controlling for other forms
of territorial concentration of social diversity. In other words, the geography of economic
interests is a significant factor in explaining party system territorialization, even more so
than the geography of religion or the geography of language. The results are robust when
running these models with the averaged data set (see Table 3.9). “Territorial concentration
of language (logged)” is statistically significant when using the averaged data set but not
when using the pooled data set. “Territorial concentration of religion (logged)” is not
statistically significant in neither the pooled or averaged data sets.
42It is interesting that “territorially concentrated religion” is not significant, and would be interesting to
explore the different effects of various aspects of social diversity.
97
Table 3.8: OLS Regression: Direct Effects (Pooled Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .443*** .444***
(.12) (.13)
Territorial Concentration of Religion –.114
(.28)
Territorial Concentration of Language .174*
(.10)
Territorial Econ. Inequality (lag) (log) .153*** .156***
(.04) (.04)
Territorial Concentration of Religion (log) –.053
(.05)
Territorial Concentration of Language (log) .017
(.03)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (revsharelagav2) .347* .370** .336* .346**
(.18) (.17) (.18) (.16)
Political Decentralization (dic) (lag) .092** .077* .110** .107**
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.063 –.068 –.046 –.054
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)
Parliamentary System .010 –.020 .004 –.019
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Bicameralism (dic) .012 .004 –.006 –.011
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Number of Units (log) –.012 –.017 –.022 –.025
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03)
Age of Parties (log) –.039 –.035 –.041 –.032
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Country GDP per capita –.007*** –.005** –.007*** –.006**
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .055** .041 .050* .041
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Constant .028 .000 .300* .452**
(.11) (.13) (.17) (.18)
Adj. R2 .569 .596 .552 .546
No. of cases 137 136 137 136
No. of countries/clusters 38 37 38 37
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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Table 3.9: OLS Regression: Direct Effects (Averaged Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .176* .153**
(.09) (.07)
Territorial Concentration of Religion –.108
(.42)
Territorial Concentration of Language .373***
(.10)
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) (log) .120*** .114***
(.04) (.03)
Territorial Concentration of Religion (log) –.024
(.06)
Territorial Concentration of Language (log) .086***
(.03)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .326* .271* .376** .299*
(.19) (.15) (.18) (.15)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .058 .030 .034 .022
(.06) (.04) (.06) (.04)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.044 –.043 –.055 –.056*
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Parliamentary System .010 –.026 .030 –.002
(.06) (.05) (.06) (.04)
Bicameral .073* .028 .057 .014
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03)
Number of Units (log) .018 .010 .029 .023
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Age of Parties (log) –.069* –.072** –.079** –.083**
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.004 .001 –.003 .002
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .057** .049** .063*** .058***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Constant .042 –.009 .157 .378***
(.14) (.09) (.14) (.11)
Adj. R2 .322 .500 .414 .537
No. of cases 39 37 39 36
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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3.8 Robustness Checks
I conduct three sets of robustness checks. First, I test the baseline model (Model 4 in
Table 3.6) using two different operationalizations of my key independent variable “territorial
economic inequality”. The results are presented in Table 3.10. The first model in this
Table is the baseline model (for reference). As explained earlier, the measure of territorial
economic inequality that I use in this model is based on the coefficient of variation which
is sensitive to the number of units in a country. I thus run the baseline model with a
weighted version of this coefficient of variation. The results are presented in Model 2, and
the coefficient on the weighted version of “territorial economic inequality” is still positive
and statistically significant.
Finally, the third model in Table 3.10 use a measure of “territorial economic concentra-
tion” from Selway (2011). This measure is based on a measure of cross-cuttingness between
geography and individual income. The coefficient on this measure of territorial concentra-
tion of economic interests is also positive and significant but the magnitude of the effect
and the significance are smaller than those of my measures (“territorial economic inequal-
ity” and “territorial economic inequality (weighted”). I believe my measures are better for
two reasons: first they provide for time variation, whereas Selway’s measure of “territorial
concentration of income” is a constant value for each country over time. Whereas this is
somewhat justifiable when measuring ethnic or linguistic concentration (since they gener-
ally do not vary significantly over time) it is less justifiable for income. Second, Selway’s
measure is not consistent across countries in terms of how he defines “territorial units”.
In some countries he uses regions and in others districts (depending on where data are
available). My measure is systematically measured at the most politically important level
of aggregation and it matches the territorial unit that is used for the dependent variable. I
run these same models with the averaged data set (see Table 3.11) and the results are con-
sistent, except that in the third model the measure of “territorial concentration of income”
looses its statistical significance.
Second, in Table 3.12 I test the baseline model with three additional measures of fiscal
decentralization. The baseline model (Model 1) uses the measure “proportion of subnational
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revenues as a share of total revenues (revshare)” as a measure of fiscal decentralization. In
Model 2 I use the measure ‘total revenues as a proportion of GDP (revgdp)”. In Model 3
I use the measure “subnational expenditures as a percentage of total government expen-
ditures”. And in Model 4 I use the measure “subnational expenditures as a percentage of
GDP”. Table 3.13 presents these same models with the averaged sample and the results
are consistent with the ones obtained in Table 3.12.
The third robustness check adds a set of regional dummy variables to the baseline model.
This is to account for specific historical or cultural factors that are not capture through
development and democracy variables. See Table 3.14. The reference category is “Western
Europe”. Results are robust, once more. The variable “territorial economic inequality”
remains positive and statistically significant, and so is political and fiscal decentralization.
101
Table 3.10: Robustness A: OLS Regression (Pooled Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .448***
(.12)
Territorial Economic Inequality Weighted (lag) .599***
(.16)
Territorial Concentration of Income (log) .118*
(.07)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .353** .404* .411
(.17) (.24) (.27)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .092** .096 .110
(.04) (.06) (.07)
Ethnic/Relig/Linguistic Diversity –.108 –.044 –.073
(.15) (.17) (.16)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.054 –.023 –.003
(.05) (.05) (.03)
Parliamentary System .011 .027 –.034
(.03) (.04) (.06)
Bicameralism (dic) .023 .015 .066*
(.05) (.06) (.04)
Number of Units (log) –.014 –.008 –.013
(.02) (.04) (.04)
Age of Parties (log) –.034 –.028 –.026
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Country GDP per capita –.007*** –.006*** –.006***
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .056** .047 .004
(.03) (.03) (.02)
Constant .020 –.072 .448**
(.11) (.13) (.20)
Adj. R2 .573 .503 .315
No. of cases 137 139 191
No. of countries/clusters 38 39 48
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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Table 3.11: Robustness A: OLS Regression (Averaged Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .180**
(.09)
Territorial Economic Inequality Weighted (lag) .573***
(.16)
Territorial Concentration of Income (log) .060
(.08)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .313 .461** .323*
(.19) (.19) (.18)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .065 .050 .045
(.06) (.05) (.05)
Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Diversity –.045 –.140 .053
(.15) (.15) (.14)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.040 –.034 –.028
(.04) (.04) (.04)
Parliamentary System .006 .056 .013
(.06) (.05) (.05)
Bicameralism (dic) .076* .068 .068
(.04) (.04) (.04)
Number of Units (log) .013 .025 .048*
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Age of Parties (log) –.063* –.077** –.042
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.005 –.003 –.005
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .056** .071** .029
(.02) (.03) (.02)
Constant .032 –.145 .112
(.12) (.12) (.20)
Adj. R2 .322 .431 .211
No. of cases 39 40 47
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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3.9 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the effects of economic geography on party system territorializa-
tion. The main finding is that countries where economic interests are unevenly distributed
across politically relevant territorial units are more likely to develop territorialized party
systems. Conversely, countries with a fairly even distribution of economic interests across
politically relevant territorial units are more likely to develop nationalized party systems.
This effect is significant when controlling for other explanatory factors and it is robust to
alternative specifications. The chapter further demonstrates that the geography of other
societal interests (such as ethnicity, language and religion), which scholars typically al-
lude to in order to explain the success of regional or local parties are not as important as
the geography of economic interests. Finally, the chapter shows that the effect of insti-
tutional variables such as electoral system, regime type, bicameralism, decentralization is
insignificant or not robust to alternative specifications. As I argue this does not mean that
institutions do not matter, but rather that the effects that scholars have posited are not
correctly specified. The next chapter continues to test the argument developed in Chapter
2 and shows that some institutional variables such as bicameralism, regime type and the
electoral system do play an important modifying role in accounting for variation in party
system territorialization.
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Table 3.12: Robustness B: OLS Regression (Pooled Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .448*** .466*** .475*** .460***
(.12) (.14) (.11) (.14)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (revshare) .353**
(.17)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (revgdp) .559
(.39)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (expshare) .427**
(.18)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (expgdp) .371
(.28)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .092** .112** .076* .115**
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.05)
Ethnic/Relig/Language Diversity –.108 –.111 –.037 –.098
(.15) (.17) (.12) (.16)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.054 –.045 –.072 –.037
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Parliamentary System .011 –.000 .000 –.017
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.04)
Bicameralism (dic) .023 .025 .010 .026
(.05) (.05) (.04) (.05)
Age of Parties (log) –.034 –.023 –.035* –.017
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Number of Units (log) –.014 –.011 –.021 –.015
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Years of Democracy (log) .056** .063** .050** .056*
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.007*** –.009*** –.007*** –.009***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Constant .020 –.006 .008 .003
(.11) (.11) (.10) (.11)
Adj. R2 .573 .544 .586 .539
No. of cases 137 135 137 135
No. of countries/clusters 38 37 38 37
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country
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Table 3.13: Robustness B: OLS Regression (Averaged Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .180** .183* .169* .175*
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (revshare) .313
(.19)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (revgdp) .586
(.46)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (expshare) .165
(.16)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) (expgdp) .254
(.39)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .065 .086 .070 .088
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Diversity –.045 –.060 –.055 –.060
(.15) (.15) (.15) (.15)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.040 –.034 –.031 –.026
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Parliamentary System .006 –.004 .004 –.011
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Bicameral .076* .078* .076* .082*
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Age of Parties (log) –.063* –.058* –.048 –.051
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Number of Units (log) .013 .008 .009 .007
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Years of Democracy (log) .056** .062** .054** .057**
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.005 –.006* –.005 –.006
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Constant .032 .044 .026 .039
(.12) (.12) (.13) (.13)
Adj. R2 .322 .294 .280 .263
No. of cases 39 39 39 39
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
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Table 3.14: Robustness C: OLS Regression (Pooled Sample)
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .498*** .474***
(.13) (.12)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .602*** .460***
(.14) (.16)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .077** .088**
(.03) (.04)
Ethnic/Relig/Linguistic Diversity .130 –.079
(.15) (.14)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.033 –.046
(.05) (.05)




Number of Units (log) –.016 –.012
(.02) (.02)
Age of Parties (log) –.050** –.034*
(.02) (.02)
Country GDP per capita –.006** –.008***
(.00) (.00)
















Adj. R2 .641 .588
No. of cases 137 137
No. of countries/cases 38 38
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Country
Fiscal Decentralization (lag): revsharelagav2
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Table 3.15: Coding Regions
Country Election Year Districts Regions Notes
Argentina 1985-2007 24 24
Australia 1990-2007 148-150 8
Austria 1971-1994 9 9
1994-2006 43 9
Bangladesh 2001 300 6 Unitary




Bolivia 1985-1993 9 9
1997-2002 68 9
2005 70 9
Bosnia-Herz. 1996-2006 2 2
Botswana 1979-2004 32-57 ?
Brazil 1982 25 25
1986 26 26
1990-2006 27 27
Bulgaria 1994-2009 28 –
Canada 1972-2000 264-308 12
2004-2006 264-308 13
Chile 1997-2005 60 13
Colombia 1982-1990 33 –
1998-2006 26 26 Federal
Costa Rica 1982-2006 7 –
Croatia 2000-2003 10 22
Czech Republic 1996-1998 8 14 Unitary
2002-2006 14 14 Federal
Cyprus 1996 6 –
Denmark 1987-1998 17 17
2001-2005 16 16
Dominican Rep. 1982 27 –
1986-1998 30 –




Country Election Year Districts Regions Notes
El Salvador 2000-2003 14 –
Estonia 1992 12 –
1995-1999 11 –
Finland 1970-1991 15 –
1995-2007 15 15
France 1982-2002 556-577 96
Ghana 2004 230 10 Unitary
Guatemala 2007 22 –
Honduras 1997-2001 18 –
Germany 1990-1998 328 16
2002-2009 299 16
Germany-West 1965-1987 248 10
Greece 1981-1993 56 –
1994-2006 56 13
Hungary 1990-2006 20 20
Iceland 1979-1991 8 –
India 1980-1991 528-543 31
1996-1999 528-543 31
2004 528-543 31
Indonesia 1999 27 27
2004 69 32
Ireland 1987-1993 41 8 Unitary
1994-2002 38 8
Italy 1979-1992 95 20
1994-2008 475 20
Jamaica 1997-2007 60 14
Japan 1972-2005 124-300 47
Latvia 1993-2006 5 –
Lithuania 1992-2004 71 10
Luxembourg 1989-1999 4 –
Malta 1998 13 –
Mauritius 1995-2000 21 –
Mexico 1994-2006 300 32
Netherlands 1989-1994 1 13 Country=District
1998-2006 1 12 Country=District
Continued
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Country Election Year Districts Regions Notes
New Zealand 1981-1987 65-97 22 Decentralized
1990-1991 65-97 14 Federal
1996-2005 62-97 16 Federal
Norway 1993-2005 19 19
Pakistan 2002 272 6
Peru 2001 25 –
Philippines 1992-2004 200-209 80
Poland 1997 52 16
2001-2005 41 16
Portugal 1991-1995 20 7
Romania 1992-2004 42 42
Russia 1993-2003 450 ?
Slovakia 1998-2006 1 8 Country=District
Slovenia 1996-2004 8 –
South Africa 1999-2004 9 9
South Korea 1988-2008 225-245 16
Spain 1979-2008 52 19
Sri Lanka 1994 21 9
2000-2004 22 9
St. Kitts & Nevis 2000 11 –
Sweden 1994-2006 29 21
Switzerland 1995-2003 26 26
Taiwan 2001-2004 31 –
Thailand 1983-1992 133-142 9
Trinidad&Tobago 1981-2000 36 15
Turkey 1971-2002 107-84 81
United Kingdom 1974-2005 635 4
Ukraine 1998 1 27 Country=District
United States 1970-2006 4̃35 50
Venezuela 1958-1988 22-23 22-23
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Table 3.16: Countries and Election Years
Code Country National Legislative Election Years
AR Argentina 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007
AU Australia 1980d, 1984d, 1990r, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007
AT Austria 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006
BE Bangladeshr 2001
BE Belgium 1981, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
BO Bolivia 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2005
BH Bosnia Herz. 1996, 1998, 2006
BW Botswana 1979, 1984, 1999, 2004
BR Brazil 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
BU Bulgaria 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009
CA Canada 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004r, 2006
CH Chile 1997, 2001, 2005
CO Colombia 1982, 1986, 1990, 1998, 2002, 2006
CR Costa Rica 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
CRO Croatiad 2000, 2003
CZ Czech Republic 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006
CY Cyprus 1996
DK Denmark 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005
DR Dominican Rep. 1982, 1986, 1994, 1998r
EC Ecuador 1984, 2006r
EL El Salvadord 2000, 2003
ES Estonia 1992, 1995, 1999
FI Finland 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
FR France 1986r, 1988r, 1993, 1997, 2002
GH Ghana 2004
GU Guatemalar 2007
HO Hondurasr 1997, 2001
DEW West Germany 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987
DE Germany 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002r, 2005r, 2009r
GR Greece 1980d, 1981, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000
HU Hungary 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
ICE Iceland 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991
IN India 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004
IND Indonesia 1999, 2004
IRE Irelandd 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002
IT Italy 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008
JA Jamaica 1997, 2002
JP Japan 1972, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005
LA Latvia 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006
LI Lithuania 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
LU Luxembourg 1989, 1994, 1999
Continued Note
r = only regional level electoral data
d = only district level electoral data
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Code Country National Legislative Election Years
MA Malta 1998
MAU Mauritius 1995, 2000
MX Mexico 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006
NE Netherlands 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006
NZ New Zealandd 1981, 1984, 1986, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005
NO Norway 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005
PA Pakistanr 2002
PE Peru 2001
PH Philippinesd 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004
PO Poland 1997r, 2001, 2005r
PT Portugal 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009
RO Romania 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
RU Russiad 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003
SR Slovak Republic 1998, 2002, 2006r
SL Slovenia 1996, 2000, 2004
SA South Africa 1999, 2004
SK South Korea 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004r, 2008
SP Spain 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008
SRI Sri Lanka 1994, 2000, 2001, 2004
ST St. Kitts & Nevis 2000
SW Sweden 1994, 1998, 2002
SW Switzerland 1995, 1999, 2003
TW Taiwan 2001, 2004
TH Thailand 1983, 1986, 1988, 1992
TR Trinidad&Tobagod 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000
TU Turkeyd 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002
UK United Kingdom 1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001r, 2005
UKR Ukraine 1998
US United States 1970 – every two years – 2006
VZ Venezuela 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988
Note
r = only regional level electoral data
d = only district level electoral data
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Table 3.17: Sources of Electoral Data
Country Sources
Argentina Marcelo Leiras
Atlats Electoral de Andy Tow : http://towsa.com/andy/totalpais/




















Costa Rica Atlas Electoral Digital de Costa Rica 1953-2006
CLEA (Psephos)
Croatia EED
















Guatemala Electoral Geography 2.0










Italian Ministry of Interior
Electoral Resources on the Internet
1953-1972: Instituto Cattaneo









Mexico Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)
Netherlands
New Zealand Government of New Zealand: http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/
Norway EED
Pakistan CLEA












National Election Commission of Korea
Spain CLEA
Ministerio del Interior (http://www.elecciones.mir.es/)
Sri-Lanka CLEA











UK Electoral Commission: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/
UK Elections Forecasting and Politics Program, UK-Elect:
http://www.ukelect.co.uk/
Ukraine Essex: www.essex.ac.uk/elections/
US US Census Bureau
Venezuela Brancati
Brancati: Dawn Brancati. 2007. Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) Dataset. New York, New York.
http://www.cle.wustl.edu
CLEA: Ken Kollman, Allen Hicken, Daniele Caramani and David Backer. Constituency-Level Elections
Archive (http://www.electiondataarchive.org/). CLEA is a repository of detail results at the constituency
level. It draws from a variety of sources, which in the table above are specified in parenthesis.
EED: European Election Database
Psephos: Adam Carr’s Election Archive (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/)
PDA: Political Database of the Americas (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Col/Elecamara90.html)
Data from Marcelo Leiras: I want to thank Marcelo Leiras for providing electoral data disaggregated
at the regional level for several Latin American countries.
Electoral Geography 2.0: http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/
Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (Peru): http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/
Instituto Cattaneo: http://www.cattaneo.org/
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Table 3.18: Sources for Regional GDP and Regional Popula-
tion
Country Source
Argentina UNLP (Universidad Nacional de la Plata), Departamento de Economia*
Australia OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Austria OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Bangladesh –
Belgium OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Bolivia INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Botswana –
Bosnia-Herz. –
Brazil Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica: http://www.ibge.gov.br/
Bulgaria Eurostat Regional Statistics
Canada CANSIM
Chile Oficina Regional de la FAO para America Latina
http://www.rlc.fao.org/proyecto/gcp/rla/126/jpn/ciren/chi pop.htm
Colombia DANE: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica
Costa Rica –
Croatia Eurostat Regional Statistics
Czech Republic Lessman**
Cyprus –
Denmark OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Dominican Rep. –
Ecuador Banco Central de Ecuador : http://www.bce.fin.ec
El Salvador –
Estonia –
Finland OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
France OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Ghana –
Germany OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Germany-West OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Greece OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Guatemala –
Honduras –
Hungary OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Iceland –
India 1980-2006: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation
1980-2006: http://www.mospi.gov.in/
1970-1980: Kalirajan & Takahiro (nd)
Indonesia Shankar and Shah (2003)
Ireland OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Italy OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators










Mexico OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Netherlands OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
New Zealand OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Norway Lessman
Pakistan Shankar and Shah (2003)
Peru Anuario Estadistico Peru en Numeros 2009, Richard Webb and Graciela
Fernandez Baca
Philippines Shankar and Shah (2003)
Poland OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Portugal Lessman
Romania Shankar and Shah (2003)
Eurostat
Russia Shankar and Shah
Slovakia OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Slovenia OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
South Africa Shankar and Shah
South Korea Lessman
Spain OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Sri-Lanka Shankar and Shah (2003)
St. Kitts Nevis –
Sweden OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
1920-1961: Williamson (1965)
Switzerland Office federal de la statistique, Comptes nationaux
Eurostat
Taiwan –
Thailand Shankar and Shah (2003)
Trinidad&Tobago –
Turkey –
UK OECD: Regional Statistics and Indicators
Ukraine –
US US Census Bureau
1840-1961: Williamson (1965)
Venezuela –
Countries with Data 48
Total Number Countries 71
*I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo for providing the data for Argentina, which comes from the project
Desigualdades Regionales y Federalismo Fiscal, Departamento de Economia, UNLP (Universidad Nacional
de la Plata).
**I would like to thank Lessman for kindly sharing his economic data for most European countries.
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Table 3.20: Coding Democracy
Country Democratic Boix (2005) Freedom House Index Polity Score
Argentina 1973–1975 1973–1975 PF: 1981–1983, 2001–2002 6:1973–1975
1983–2009 1983–1994 F: 1983–2000, 2002–2010 6+: 1983-2009
Australia 1901–2009 1901–1994 F: 1972–2010 10: 1901-2009
Austria 1946–2009 1946–1994 F: 1972–2010 8: 1920–1932
10: 1946–2009
Bangladesh 1972–1973 1986–1994 PF: 1972–2009 (NF:1975) 8: 1972–1973
1991–2006 6: 1991–2006
5:2009
Belgium 1944–2009 1945–1994 F: 1972–2009 6+: 1853–1938
10: 1944-2009
Bolivia 1982–2009 1982–1994 PF: 1972–1973, 1976–1979 7+: 1982–2009
PF: 2003–2009
F: 1981–2002
Bosnia Herz. 1996–2009 PF: 1996–2009
Botswana* 1966-1986 A:1966–1994 PF: 1972 6+: 1966–2009
Brazil* 1985–2009 1979–1994 PF: 1972–1984, 1993–2001 7+: 1985–2009
F: 1984–1992, 2002–2009
Bulgaria 1990-2009 1990–2009 PF: 1990 8+: 1990
F: 1991–2009 8+: 1989–2009
Canada* 1888–2009 1867–1994 F: 1972–2009 8+: 1888-2009
Chile* 1964–1972 1934–1972 PF: 1979–1989 6: 1964–1972
1989–2009 1990–1994 F: 1972, 1990–2009 8+: 1989
Colombia 1957–2009 1958-1994 PF: 1988–2009 6+: 1957–2009
F: 1972–1988
Costa Rica* 1875–2009 1948–1994 F: 1972-2009 6+: 1875–2009
Croatia 2000–2009 A: 1991–1994 PF: 1991–1999 8+: 2000–2009
F: 2000–2009
Cyprus* 1967–2009 1977-1994 PF: 1974-1980 7+: 1967–2009
F: 1972–1973, 1981-2009
Czech Republic 1993–2009 1993–1994 F: 1993–2009 10: 1993–2009
Denmark 1945–2009 1945–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1945–2009
Dominican Rep.* 1978–2009 1966-1994 PF: 1974–1977, 1993–1997 6+: 1978–2009
F:1972–1973, 1978–1992
F:1998–2009
Ecuador 1979–2006 1979–1994 PF: 1972–1978, 1996–1997 6+: 1979–2006
PF: 2000–2009
F: 1979–1995, 1998–1999
El Salvador 1984–2009 1984–1994 PF: 1976–1996 6+:1984–2009
F: 1972–1975, 1997–2009
Estonia 1991-2009 1991-1994 F: 1991-2009 6+:1991-2009
Finland** 1917–2009 1917–1994 F: 1972–2009 8+:1917–1929
4:1930–1943
10:1944–2009
France 1946–2009 1946–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1946–2009
Continued
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Country Democratic Boix (2005) Freedom House Index+ Polity Score
Germany 1990–2009 1990–1994 F: 1990–2009 10: 1990–2009
Germany, West 1949-1990 1949–1990 F: 1972–1989 10: 1949–1990
Ghana* 2001-2009 1979–1980 PF: 1977–1979, 1992–1999 6+:2001-2009
F: 1980, 2000–2009
Greece 1975–2009 1974–1994 F: 1974–2009 8+: 1975–2009
Guatemala* 1996–2009 1966–1981 PF: 1974–1980, 1984–2009 8: 1996-2009
1986–1994 F: 1972–1973
Honduras 1982–2009 1982–1994 PF: 1972–1982, 1993–2009 6+:1982–2009
F: 1983–1992 5:1985-1988
Hungary 1990–2009 1990–1994 PF: 1983-1989 10:1990-2009
F: 1990–2009
Iceland 1918–2009 1918–1994 F: 1972–2009 NA
India 1950–2009 1950–1994 PF: 1975–1976, 1991–1997
F: 1972–1974, 1977–1990
F: 1998–2009
Indonesia 1999-2009 1955–1956 PF: 1972–1992, 1998–2004 6+:1999-2009
F: 2005–2009
Ireland 1921–2009 1922-1994 F: 1972–2009 8+: 1921–2009
Italy* 1948–2009 1946–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1948–2009
Jamaica* 1959–2009 1962–2009 F: 1972–2009 9+: 1959–2009
Japan 1952–2009 F: 1972–2009 10:1952–2009
Latvia 1991-2009 1993-1994 PF: 1992–1993 8+: 1991-2009
F: 1991, 1994–2009
Lithuania 1991–2009 1992–1994 F: 1991-2009 10: 1991–2009
Luxembourg 1945–2009 1945–1994 F: 1972–2009 NA
Malta 1964–2009 1964–1994 F: 1974–2009 NA
Mauritius 1968–2009 1968–2009 F: 1972–2009 9: 1968–2009
Mexico 1997–2009 A PF: 1972–1999 6+: 1997–2009
F: 2000–2009
Moldova 1993–2009 NA PF: 1991-2009 7+:1993–2009
Netherlands 1945–2009 1945–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1945–2009
New Zealand 1857–2009 1857–1994 F: 1972–2009 9+: 1857–2009
Norway 1945–2009 1945–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1945–2009
Pakistan* 1973–1976 1988–1994 PF: 1972–1978, 1984–1998 8:1973–1976
1988–1998 PF: 2008–2009 7+: 1988–1998
Peru 1980–1991 1980–1989 PF: 1975–1979. 1989–2000 7+: 1980–1991
2001-2009 F: 1980–1988, 2001–2009 9: 2001-2009
Philippines 1987–2009 1986–1994 PF: 1972–1985, 1990–1995 8: 1987–2009
PF: 2005–2009
F: 1986–1989, 1996–2004
Poland 1991–2009 1989–1994 PF: 1978–1989 8+: 1991-2009
F: 1990–2009
Portugal 1976–2009 1976–1994 PF: 1974–1975 9+:1976-2009
F: 1976–2009




Country Democratic Boix (2005) Freedom House Index+ Polity Score
Russia** 1993–1995 1993-1994 PF: 1991-2003 6:2000–2006
2000–2006
Slovakia 1993–2009 1993-1994 PF: 1993, 1996-1997 7+:1993-2009
F: 1994–1995, 1998-2009
Slovenia 1991–2009 1991-1994 F: 1991–2009 10:1991-2009
South Africa 1994–2009 A: 1910–1914 PF: 1972–1980, 1982-1993 9: 1994–2009
F: 1994–2009
South Korea** 1988–2009 1988–1994 PF: 1973–1975, 1977–1987 9: 1993–2009
F: 1987–2009
Spain 1978–2009 1977–1994 PF: 1974–1976 9+: 1978–2009
F: 1977–2009
Sri Lanka* 1948–1981 1948–1976 PF: 1975, 1981–2009 6+: 1948–1981
2001–2002 1991-1994 F: 1972–1974, 1976–1980 6: 2001–2002
2006–2009 6: 2006-2009
St. Kitts&Nevis 1984–2009 1984–1994 F: 1981-2009 NA
Sweden* 1917–2009 1911–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1917–2009
Switzerland 1848–2009 1848–1994 F: 1972–2009 10: 1848–2009
Taiwan* 1992-2009 A PF: 1976–1995 7+:1992-2009
F: 1996–2009
Thailand 1992–2005 1983–1990 PF: 1973–1974, 1978-1988 9: 1992–2005
1992–1994 PF: 1991-1997, 2005, 2007–2009
F: 1975, 1989–1990, 1998-2004
Trinidad&Tobago 1962–2009 1962–1994 PF: 2001–2004 8+: 1962–2009
F: 1972–2000, 2005–2009
Turkey 1983–2009 1983-1994 PF: 1980–2009 7+: 1983–2009
F: 1974–1979
United Kingdom* 1880–2009 1885–1994 F: 1972–2009 6+: 1880–2009
Ukraine 1991–2009 1991-1994 PF: 1991-2004 6+: 1991–2009
F: 2005-2009
United States* 1809–2009 1800-1994 F: 1972–2009 9+: 1809–2009
Venezuela 1958–2005 1959–1994 PF: 1992–1995, 1999–2009 6+: 1958–2005




** = Boix coding
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Table 3.19: Sources for Other Variables
Variable Source
Fiscal Decentralization World Bank Fiscal Indicators
Political Decentralization Hooghe at al. (2010)
Treisman (2007)
Own coding based on country sources
Bicameralism Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
Wallack et al. (2003)
Executive Type Golder et al. (2005)
Political Database of the Americas (PDA)
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
Electoral System Golder et al. (2005)
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
Political Database of the Americas (PDA)
Number of Units Golder et al. (2005)
Hooghe at al. (2010)
Own coding based on country sources
Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Diversity Alesina et al. (2003)
Territorial Concentration of Religion Selway (2011)
Territorial Concentration of Language Selway (2011)
Territorial Concentration of Income Selway (2011)
Age of main parties Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
Years of Democracy Freedom House
Polity IV
Country GDP per capita Penn World Tables
Party Cohesion Wallack et al. (2003)
Own coding based on country sources
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CHAPTER IV
Party Discipline, Bicameralism and Party System
Territorialization
In Chapter 3 I find that countries with large territorial economic inequalities are more likely
to develop territorialized party systems, whereas countries with small territorial economic
inequalities are more likely to develop nationalized party systems. Though economic geog-
raphy is important it is not the sole factor affecting party systems. In the present chapter
I turn to the role that party discipline and bicameral institutions play in modifying the
effect of economic geography on the party system. In support of my argument I present
quantitive evidence using the dataset introduced in Chapter 3 as well as evidence from two
case studies: post-World War II Italy and Progressive Era United States.
4.1 Hypotheses and Key Variables
4.1.1 The Modifying Role of Party Discipline
In Chapter 2 I argued that party discipline modifies the costs associated with intra-party
heterogeneity. In particular I posit that loosely disciplined political parties can prevent a
party system from territorializing in the face of structural pressure to do so. If a candidate
has economic preferences very different from those of the rest of candidates in the country
she risks having her voice overrun by that of the rest of candidates within the national party
once in office. Given this situation she is more likely to stick with a national political party
if she expects to be able to pursue her own policy agenda once in office. A candidate with
divergent economic policy preferences will remain with the national party if the national
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party allows for a strong degree of candidate autonomy vis-a-vis party leaders, that is if the
party has weak party discipline. In contrast, she will be less likely to remain affiliated with
a national party if the party requires individual candidates to follow the wishes of party
leaders, and thus does not allow candidates to pursue their own policy agendas once in
office. In other words, I expect that highly disciplined political parties are likely to create
incentives for candidates with divergent policy preferences to form smaller regional or local
parties in order to better represent their constituents’ economic interests.
At the aggregate level this means that countries with large territorial economic dispari-
ties are less likely to produce territorialized party systems if national political parties have
weak party discipline and allow for a substantial degree of candidate autonomy. Conversely,
countries with large territorial economic disparities are more likely to produce territorialized
parties and party systems if national parties have strong party discipline and do not allow
for candidate autonomy. This proposition runs counter to the argument commonly found
in the literature that loose party organizations are actually more likely to fragment1.
The level of party discipline is influenced by a variety of factors. On the one hand, the
literature examining American politics (which mostly aims at explaining changes in party
discipline over time within a single country) has argued that the degree of ideological hetero-
geneity affects whether members will impose strong or weak party discipline (Rohde, 1991;
Aldrich, 1995). On the other hand, scholars interested in explaining cross-country variation
in levels of party discipline have been more focused on how institutional structures generate
“different incentives for parties to impose discipline and maintain cohesion (Cox & McCub-
bins 1993, Cain et al. 1987)” (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2004, 2). For example,
Carey and Shugart (1995) and Wallack et al. (2003) argue that electoral institutions affect
the degree to which electoral competition revolves around political parties versus individual
candidates, or what Carey and Shugart (1995) have called the “incentives to cultivate a
personal vote.” More specifically closed list proportional representation systems with multi-
1In his book Building Party System in Developing Democracies, Hicken (2009) argues that party cohesion
is a factor affecting the incentives of candidates to join national party organizations. His argument however
leads him to make a prediction opposite to the one I make in the present chapter. He argues that weak parties
(i.e. parties that lack party cohesion) should discourage “aggregation” (which is his term for coordination,
and thus for the formation of nation-wide political organizations). In contrast I predict that weak parties
should encourage individual candidates to stick with national parties.
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member districts tend to encourage party discipline, whereas plurality systems with single
member districts tend to discourage party discipline (or encourage candidate autonomy).2
In addition to electoral institutions, scholars have argued that regime type also has powerful
influence on parties’ and candidates’ incentives to be more or less disciplined. In particular,
political parties in parliamentary systems are much more disciplined than in presidential
systems (Huber and Stanig, 2009; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita, 2004). In this project I use the insights from the literature that focuses on in-
stitutions to measure differences in party discipline across countries and time, and to test
whether these differences play a role in moderating the effect of intra-party heterogeneity
on party system nationalization or territorialization. I take this route because of potential
issues of endogeneity.
4.1.1.1 Excursus on Endogeneity
Over a sufficiently long period of time it is certainly the case that party discipline is
partly related to intra-party heterogeneity as well as to the nationalization or territori-
alization of parties and party systems (the dependent variable in my models). In other
words, the association between weak party discipline and heterogeneous national political
parties is at least partially due to national party leaders not enforcing party discipline in
order to keep the national party together.3 This interpretation features prominently in the
literature on American legislative behavior. In Aldrich (1995) and Rohde (1991)’s theory
of conditional party government the degree of preference agreement within parties is the
most important factor explaining whether parties in the legislature will be strong or weak
(Aldrich and Rohde, 2001). Figure 4.1 illustrates this potential feedback. Aldrich and Ro-
hde argue that “parties delegate authority to leaders only when there is sufficient ideological
homogeneity among party members and polarization between the parties” (Ashworth and
Bueno de Mesquita, 2004, 25). In contrast, when there is ideological heterogeneity among
2Mixed member systems and proportional representation systems with open list should encourage more
party discipline than plurality systems but less party discipline than closed list proportional systems.
3Hicken (2009) raises this same concern about endogeneity when exploring the relationship between the
level of party discipline and candidate incentives to “aggregate” (i.e. to form nation-wide parties). As he
puts it, “[s]tronger incentives to coordinate across districts may induce smaller groups/parties to ally under
the banner of a larger party. The net effect of this might be an increase in intra-party factionalism” (Hicken,
2009, 37-38).
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party members, “they will be reluctant to delegate significant power to party leaders, for
fear that that power could be used to force them into supporting policies (or being identified
with policies) that would make them vulnerable” (Aldrich and Rohde, 2001, 275).
In other words, party leaders will change the rules of the game that affect party discipline
in response to the degree of intra-party heterogeneity. The “rules of the game” can be
either internal party rules about selection of candidates, advancement within the party
etc., or rules of behavior within the legislature, such as who has agenda-setting power or
who gets appointed to committees for example. The latter type of rules is mostly what
scholars of American legislative behavior have in mind to explain party discipline levels. In
addition, the rules of the game affecting party discipline can also be broader constitutional
or institutional features such as the electoral system or regime type. Although the literature
does not explicitly link the change in electoral institutions or regime type to the degree of
intra-party preference heterogeneity, one could extend the above argument to assert that in
the long run heterogeneous societies might opt for certain types of constitutional features
that accommodate the representation of divergent policy interests.













 “go national” or 
“go regional”
The fact that over a sufficiently long period of time there might be a feedback mecha-
nism is not surprising. Przeworski (2003) argues that “[e]verything, and thus nothing, is
‘primary’. The only motor of history is endogeneity” (Przeworski, 2003, 5). Acknowledging
this endogeneity, however, should not keep us from trying to untangle the short-term recip-
rocal effects between these variables (Przeworski, 2003). I tackle this issue of endogeneity in
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three ways. First, my proxy measures of “party discipline” are based on institutional rules
that cannot be so easily changed by party leaders in response to changes in the electoral
composition of interests. Instead of focusing on internal party rules or on rules of legislative
behavior I focus on how features of the electoral system and of the type of regime affect
party discipline. Although in the long run these features might be endogenous to the elec-
toral composition of interests in society, they can be considered fairly exogenous in the short
term.4 Second, where possible I lag these variables. And third, I present two case studies
in which there is an institutional change that affects party discipline that is exogenous to
any of my other variables, and show the effect of this institutional change on the territorial
nature of the party system.
4.1.1.2 Hypotheses Regarding the Role of Party Discipline
The literature on the personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Wallack et al., 2003)
distinguishes between systems where “politicians’ careers depend most on party fortunes to
particularistic systems, where candidates must focus on narrow geographic constituencies”
(Wallack et al., 2003, 136) and suggests that electoral institutions create incentives that
drive these differences. Carey and Shugart (1995) and Wallack et al. (2003) have developed
measures of personal versus party vote based on different electoral incentives. The data for
this measures come from Johnson and Wallack (2006)’s dataset “Electoral Systems and the
Personal Vote.”5 This dataset focuses specifically on aspects of electoral institutions that
affect the internal organization of parties, especially regarding the incentives for candidates
to cultivate a personal vote rather than cater to party leaders’ wishes (Johnson and Wallack,
2006, 2). This dataset spans 180 countries between 1978 and 2005, which makes it ideal for
my cross-sectional time-series analysis.
I focus on three core variables in their dataset: “ballot,” “pool,” and “vote.” “Ballot”
4Hicken (2009, 38) follows this same strategy and uses electoral incentives as a proxy for party cohesion.
I use the same strategy, but in addition I look at the incentives of type of regime (especially the vote of no
confidence) on party cohesion.
5This dataset is an update of Wallack et al. (2003)’s “Database of Particularism,” and “has evolved
to cover more aspects of electoral systems as well, providing additional information on more complex sys-
tems with multiple tiers and runoffs. Both data sets as well as supplementary material may be found at
http://dss.ucsd.edu/jwjohnso/espv.html”(Johnson and Wallack, 2006, 1). These two data sets are based on
Carey and Shugart (1995)’s work on the incentives that electoral systems provide to cultivate a personal
vote.
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refers to the party leaders’ control over candidate nominations. “Pool” refers to “the extent
to which votes among candidates from the same party are pooled” (Johnson and Wallack,
2006, 3).6 “Vote” refers to “whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple
votes or a party-level vote (Carey and Shugart 1995, p. 417)”(Johnson and Wallack, 2006,
4). In order to account for the complexities of mixed-member systems (which combine two
tiers of membership), Johnson and Wallack code these three aspects of electoral systems
(pool, ballot and vote) separately for single-member district tiers and for multi-member
district tiers, and then they calculate an average measure of these two tiers for each of these
the three dimensions (Johnson and Wallack, 2006, 10). Each of these averaged measures
(avballot, avpool, avvote) provide some information about the extent to which candidates
have incentives to follow party leaders or to cultivate a personal vote. I combine these three
measures to create an average measure called “candidate autonomy” that ranges from 0
(low candidate autonomy) to 2 (high candidate autonomy). In the dataset the measure
ranges from 0 to 1.67. Low values of candidate autonomy indicate that there is strong
party discipline while high values of candidate autonomy indicate that party discipline is
low. According to my theory I should expect the following:
H1: Low levels of candidate autonomy mitigate the positive effect of territorial
economic inequalities on party system territorialization. In contrast, high levels
of candidate autonomy exacerbate the positive effect of territorial economic
inequalities on party system territorialization.
Several scholars (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Huber and Stanig, 2009; Diermeier and
Feddersen, 1998) have argued “regime type” is also an important factor affecting party
discipline. According to Carey and Shugart “[...] if an assembly’s primary function is to
select and maintain in office an executive dependent on parliamentary confidence, we can
expect party cohesion to be more important, and personal reputation thereby less, than
when the origin and survival of the executive is independent of the assembly (Shugart
and Carey, 1992). So, ceteris paribus, personal reputation will be more important in a
presidential than in a parliamentary system” (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 42). Diermeier
6Systems that do not pool across co-partisans are coded 2; systems that pool across subsets of co-partisans
are coded 1, and systems that do not pool votes among co-partisans are coded 0 (Johnson and Wallack,
2006, 3).
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and Feddersen (1998) and Huber and Stanig (2009) argue more specifically that the vote
of confidence procedure that is characteristic of parliamentary system is the key feature
affecting party discipline. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) argues that “the confidence
procedure allows a ruling coalition to propose a bill without allowing any amendments and
to link the adoption of the bill with the survival of the coalition (Huber 1996). It thus
creates an incentive for all those who profit from the current government to vote for the
government’s proposals” (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998, 611). I thus expect the following:
H2: Parliamentary systems exacerbate the positive effect of territorial economic
inequalities on party system territorialization. In contrast, presidential systems
mitigate the positive effect of territorial economic inequalities on party system
territorialization.
These two hypotheses provide a good test of the role of party discipline in modifying
the effect of economic geography on the party system. I turn now to the second proposition
in this chapter, the modifying role of bicameralism.
4.1.2 The Modifying Role of Bicameralism
In Chapter 2 I argue that the presence of a directly elected upper chamber affects
the incentives of candidates to join regional political parties. More specifically I argue
that the presence of an upper legislative chamber should decrease the likelihood that our
candidate will join a regional or local political party. In Chapter 3 I tested the direct
effect of “bicameralism” on party system territorialization. The results of these analyses
suggested that “bicameralism” did not have a robust effect. The variable that I used in
these regressions (in Chapter 3) was coded dichotomously as 1 if a country has an upper
legislative chamber and 0 if a country is unicameral. This measure however is somewhat
crude since upper legislative chambers vary considerably across countries in terms of their
formal powers and in terms of how their members are elected (or selected). For example,
in Canada the members of the upper legislative chamber (or Senate) are appointed by the
Governor General on the recommendation of the Primer Minister, and they hold office until
they are 75 years of age (IPU, 2012). In the UK, the House of Lords (the upper legislative
chamber) has “710 life peers appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister, 92
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hereditary peers and 25 archbishops and bishops”(IPU, 2012). The logic of my argument
regarding the role of upper legislative chambers only holds if upper chambers are truly
representative of citizens’ interests. I posit that upper chambers are an institutionalized way
to offer territorial representation at the national-level, so countries with this institutionalized
mechanisms are less likely to have regional or local political parties. Given this logic,
countries such as UK or Canada should not be considered to have a representative upper
chamber.
I thus create a measure that is more appropriate to my argument and I call this measure
“elected bicameralism” that captures the extent to which a country has a representative
upper legislative chamber. I classify countries based on the selection of the members of
their upper legislative chamber into four categories: 0= country does not have an upper
legislative chamber; 1= country has upper legislative chamber with non-elected members;
2=country has upper legislative chamber with indirectly elected members; 3= country has
upper legislative chamber that is directly elected. I base my coding of bicameral chambers
based on information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). I also create a dichotomous
version of this measure “elected bicameralism (dic)” which takes the value of 1 if a country
has an upper legislative chamber that is directly elected, and 0 otherwise. I will perform
analyses with the three measures: “bicameralism dic)”, “elected bicameralism” and “elected
bicameralism (dic)”.7
Whether regional parties can influence national-level politics depends on several institu-
tional factors. These institutional factors should only matter when “territorial inequalities
are large”. When territorial inequalities are small, institutions should not play a role since
there are no incentives to create regional political parties from the part of candidates.
H3: Directly elected upper chambers mitigate the positive effect of territorial
economic inequalities on party system territorialization. In contrast, the absence
of a directly elected upper chamber exacerbates the positive effect of territorial
economic inequalities on party system territorialization.
7Ideally it would be even better to have a more fine-grained coding of bicameralism along several dimen-
sions: formal powers, balance of power between lower and upper houses and extent of territorial represen-
tation. As far as I know such a dataset that is comparative across several countries and time periods does
not currently exist. This is an avenue for further research.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Party System Territorialization 0.153 0.156 -0.08 0.73 352
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) 0.351 0.225 0.09 1.58 181
Candidate Autonomy (lag) 0.872 0.612 0 1.67 263
Candidate Autonomy (av) (lag) 0.806 0.603 0 1.67 252
Bicameralism (dic) 0.649 0.478 0 1 353
Elected Bicameralism 1.53 1.296 0 3 349
Elected Bicameralism (dic) 0.358 0.48 0 1 349
Parliamentary System 0.524 0.5 0 1 357
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) 0.205 0.135 0.002 0.538 225
Political Decentralization (dic) (lag) 0.599 0.491 0 1 337
Ethnic/Relig/Linguistic Diversity 0.34 0.159 0.07 0.830 361
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.272 0.446 0 1 349
Age of main parties (log) 3.499 1.024 0.693 5.236 319
Number of Units (log) 2.947 0.916 0.693 6.109 350
Years of Democracy (log) 3.313 1.17 0 5.283 342
Country GDP/capita (thousands $US) 17.031 10.221 1.429 59.292 349
4.1.3 Model and Empirical Strategy
The dependent variable that I use in this chapter –party system territorialization– is the
same as in Chapter 3. As a reminder, “party system territorialization” ranges from values
close to 0 indicating greater party system nationalization to high values around 1 indicating
greater party system territorialization. The three main independent variables on which I
focus on in this chapter are: party discipline, executive type and bicameralism. I analyze
the ways in which these variables interact with “territorial economic inequality” which is
the same variable introduced in Chapter 3. The rest of variables included in the analyses
to follow are controls and are the same as those included in the analyses in Chapter 3.
Summary statistics for all variables included in the analyses of this chapter are in Table 4.1
in page 135.
The modeling strategy is very similar to the one deployed in Chapter 3 in terms of
using time lags and robust standard errors clustered by country.8 The main difference
between the analysis in Chapter 3 and that of the present chapter is that in the present
chapter I analyze three interactive models. The first model shown in equation 4.1 examines
8Refer to Chapter 3 for details.
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the interaction between “territorial economic inequality” and “candidate autonomy”. I
present two different versions of this model corresponding to the two operationalizations of
“candidate autonomy”. The second model shown in equation 4.2 examines the interaction
between “territorial economic inequality” and “parliamentary system”. And the third model
shown in equation 4.3 examines the interaction between “territorial economic inequality”
and “bicameralism”. I will present three different versions of this model corresponding to
three different operationalizations of “bicameralism”. For each model I also present results
without the interaction in order to compare the direct effect of the institutional variables
with the interacted effect. I present the results with the pooled sample in the text, but
include the results with the averaged sample at the end of the chapter.
Party System Territorializationi, t = β0 + β1 Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-1 +
β2 Candidate Autonomyi, t +
β3 (Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-5 * Candidate Autonomyi, t-5) +
β4 Xi, t-5 + β5 Zi, t + β6 Pi + εi,t (4.1)
Party System Territorializationi, t = β0 + β1 Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-5 +
β2 Parliamentaryi, t + β3 (Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-5 * Parliamentaryi, t) +
β4 Xi, t-5 + β5 Zi, t + β6 Pi + εi,t (4.2)
Party System Territorializationi, t = β0 + β1 Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-5 +
β2 Bicameralismi, t + β3 (Territorial Economic Inequalityi, t-5 * Bicameralismi, t) +
β4 Xi, t-1 + β5 Zi, t + β6 Pi + εi,t (4.3)
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4.2 Empirical Analysis: The Role of Party Discipline
Table 4.2 presents the results of the regression analysis to test the first hypothesis with
two different measures of “candidate autonomy”. The first two models (Model 1 and Model
2) show the direct effect of all variables (no interactions). We can compare these models
with the last two models (Model 3 and Model 4) that include the interaction term between
“territorial economic inequality” and the two different measures of “candidate autonomy”.
The first two models show that “candidate autonomy” on its own does not have a
significant effect on party system territorialization. In contrast, the interactive models
suggest that “candidate autonomy” becomes significant when interacted with “territorial
economic inequality”. Unfortunately, interactive terms (and their significance) are difficult
to interpret solely through an analysis of the coefficients in Models 3 and 4.9 What is
important in interaction terms is to gauge the significance of the marginal effect of one of
the interacted variables over the range of the other variables and vice-versa. Following Kam
and Franzese (2007) and Brambor et al. (2006) I calculate and draw the relevant marginal
effects. This allows me to better interpret the magnitude, direction and significance of the
coefficient of the interaction term. Figure 4.2 shows the marginal effects calculated from
Model 3 in Table 4.2. The marginal effect is represented by the thick black line. If the
marginal effect line is above 0 then the marginal effect is positive; if it is below 0 then the
marginal effect is negative. The curved dotted bands represent the 95% confidence intervals.
The marginal effect is statistically significant if neither of the bands crosses the 0 line. Each
interactive effect can be expressed as two graphs.
Figure 4.2a shows the marginal effect of “territorial economic inequality” on party sys-
tem territorialization as personal vote changes from 0 (low personal vote / high party dis-
cipline) to 1.6 (high personal vote / low party discipline). What the graph tells us is that
“territorial economic inequality” always has a positive effect on party system territorializa-
tion (since the marginal effect line is above 0). However, the effect decreases in magnitude
as “candidate autonomy” increases within parties. This means that higher levels of “ter-
ritorial economic inequality” lead to more party system territorialization especially when
9When using interaction terms the “standard errors on the interaction term and the constituent variables
are uninterpretable (Kam and Franzese; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005)” (Hicken, 2009, 78).
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party organizations in the country have high party discipline. Conversely, institutions that
encourage low party discipline are likely to mitigate the effect of economic inequalities on
party system territorialization.
Figure 4.2b on the other hand shows the marginal effect of “personal vote” on party
system territorialization as “territorial economic inequality” changes from 0 (low levels
of “territorial economic inequality”) to 1 (high levels of “territorial economic inequality” ).
The figure shows two important elements of the relationship between “candidate autonomy”
and party system territorialization. First, the effect of candidate autonomy on the party
system is only significant under high levels of “territorial economic inequality”. When
“territorial economic inequality” is low (values between 0 and 0.5) the internal organization
of parties does not have an effect. This result fits with my theory as there are no economic
incentives to form regional parties under low “territorial economic inequality”. Second,
the graph shows that under high “territorial economic inequality” conditions, the effect
of personal vote on party system territorialization is negative. This means that under
conditions of high “territorial economic inequality” countries with parties that encourage
personal vote are more likely to have nationalized party systems than countries that have
very disciplined party organizations. This is an interesting finding since it contradicts the
general expectation that countries with parties that are loose and that allow for candidate
autonomy are more fragmented and thus more territorialized. The regression results and
marginal effect graphs for the averaged sample are presented in Table 4.7 and in Figure 4.9
starting on page 166. Although the significance of these marginal effects is reduced in these
regressions, the trend of the lines is the same.
Finally, Table 4.3 presents the results for the second hypothesis, which is represented in
equation 4.3. The first model (M1) shows the direct effect of all variables (no interactions)
whereas the second model (M2) include the interaction terms between “territorial economic
inequality” and “parliamentary system”. Once more parliamentarism seems to matter in
the second model with interactions but not in the model without interactions. Figure 4.3a
shows the marginal effect of “territorial economic inequality” on party system territorial-
ization as executive type changes from 0 (presidentialism) to 1 (parliamentarism). The
graph tells us is that “territorial economic inequality” always has a positive effect on party
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression – Pooled Sample
Direct Effect Direct Effect Interaction Interaction
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .430*** .445*** .644*** .615***
(.12) (.12) (.13) (.12)
Candidate Autonomy (lag) –.058 .077 .047
(.05) (.09) (.07)
Candidate Autonomy (av) (lag) –.047
(.04)
Econ. Ineq. x Cand. Autonomy –.324**
(.15)
Econ. Ineq. x Cand. Autonomy(av) –.275**
(.12)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .385** .384** .368** .370**
(.19) (.18) (.17) (.17)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .078* .076 .037 .040
(.05) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Ethnic/Relig/Language Diversity –.156 –.127 –.125 –.092
(.16) (.15) (.15) (.16)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.017 –.037 –.056 –.057
(.06) (.06) (.05) (.06)
Parliamentary System .025 .022 .050 .049
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Bicameralism .034 .029 .027 .024
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Number of Units (log) –.018 –.015 –.001 .002
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.03)
Age of Parties (log) –.026 –.026 –.022 –.023
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Country GDP per capita –.008*** –.008*** –.009*** –.009***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .076** .079** .081** .090***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Constant –.015 –.037 –.146 –.168
(.10) (.10) (.11) (.11)
Adj. R2 .581 .586 .615 .611
No. of cases 127 128 127 126
No. of countries/clusters 35 36 35 35
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
139



















































C nd d te Autonomy
Candidate Autonomy









































Te ritorial Economic I equality
Territorial Economic Inequality
(b) Marginal Effect of Personal Vote on Party System Territorialization
140
system territorialization (since the marginal effect line is above 0), but this effect is larger
in parliamentary than in presidential systems. In other words, parliamentarism magnifies
the effect of economic inequalities on party system territorialization.
Figure 4.3b shows the marginal effect of “parliamentarism” on party system territo-
rialization as “territorial economic inequality” changes from 0 (low levels of “territorial
economic inequality”) to 1 (high levels of “territorial economic inequality”). The figure
shows that a parliamentary system increases party system territorialization under condi-
tions of high territorial economic inequalities. The effect becomes negative (but hardly
significant) when economic inequalities are extremely low. Once more results are robust
when using the averaged sample (see Table 4.9 and Figure 4.13 on page 172).
I now turn to two case studies that illustrate the ways in which party discipline affects
the development of nationalized or territorialized party systems. In order to isolate the
modifying effect of party discipline on party system territorialization, I have identified
two countries in which territorial economic inequalities are relatively high and constant
over time, and in which the level of party discipline changes due to a change in electoral
institutions. The two cases are Italy post-World War II and the United States during the
late 19th and early 20th century. These cases also illustrate how the theory can help explains
variation in party system territorialization across time within the same country.
4.3 Evidence from Post-World War II Italy
The Italian party system has changed substantially from the end of World War II to
the present. During the first three decades after World War II (1950s, 1960s, and 1970’s)
Italy’s party system was dominated by a single center-right party Democrazia Christiana,10
and overall the party system was quite nationalized. In the late 1980’s however the Italian
party system became increasingly territorialized as a result of the break-up of Democrazia
Christiana and the emergence on the national political stage of Lega Nord,11 Italy’s main
regional political party. And in the following two decades (early 1990’s to the present) the
10In English, Christian Democratic Party.
11In English, the Northern League.
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression – Pooled Sample
Direct Effect Interaction
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .430*** .281**
(.12) (.12)
Parliamentary System .025 –.121**
(.04) (.06)
Territorial Econ. Inequality (lag) x Parliamentary .502***
(.15)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .385** .492***
(.19) (.15)
Candidate Autonomy (lag) –.058 –.066
(.05) (.05)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .078* .069**
(.05) (.03)
Ethnic/Relig/Language Diversity –.156 –.252
(.16) (.15)




Number of Units (log) –.018 –.010
(.03) (.02)
Age of Parties (log) –.026 –.011
(.02) (.02)
Country GDP per capita –.008*** –.007***
(.00) (.00)




Adj. R2 .581 .639
No. of cases 127 127
No. of countries/clusters 35 35
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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degree of territorialization of the Italian party system has changed, as has the electoral
success of Lega Nord.
Current explanations of party system territorialization cannot account for changes over
time in the degree of party system territorialization in Italy. On the one hand, sociologi-
cal explanations of regional party success tend to emphasize ethnic, linguistic or religious
interests as the basis for regional political parties yet the Lega Nord is not your typical
ethno-territorial political party. As Giordano argues:
“[...] the LN’s [Lega Nord ] political project is not based in an area that has
historic claims to nationhood. Instead, the LN has attempted to invent an
ethnicity for the North of Italy (or Padania) in order to justify its political
claims for the protection of the economic interests of the region” (Giordano,
2000, 445).
On the other hand, institutional explanations linked to the role of decentralization
(Brancati, 2009; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004) cannot explain why the Lega Nord emerged
more than a decade after the process of decentralization had started in Italy,12 or why the
Italian party system became very nationalized in the 1990’s (under an already consolidated
decentralized political system).
According to the argument I develop in this dissertation, the territorialization of the
Italian party system (caused mainly by the rise of the Lega Nord) is a response to the uneven
distribution of economic interests across the regions of Italy. One of the distinctive aspects
of the Lega Nord is that it has exploited the North-South economic divide in Italy and
has articulated a political project based on economic grievances rather than on ethnic or
linguistic difference. The presence of large territorial economic inequalities in Italy cannot be
the whole story however, since these economic inequalities have remained relatively constant
over time, yet party system territorialization has fluctuated. In what follows I argue that the
changes in the Lega Nord ’s electoral success, and more generally the changes in the degree
of territorialization of Italy’s party system, can be explained by changes in party discipline.
Italy is one of the few countries in the world that has experienced two major electoral
reforms in a relatively short period of time. In this section, I posit that these electoral
12As I will explain later the process of decentralization in Italy started in 1949 for some regions, and then
was extended to all regions in the 1970’s.
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reforms changed party discipline incentives and in turn affected the territorialization of the
party system.
4.3.1 Electoral Reforms and Party System Territorialization
Italy post-World War II experienced two major changes in its electoral institutions. The
1948 Italian Constitution established an electoral system based on multi-member districts
(MMD) and seats allocated by open-list proportional representation.13 This electoral system
was changed by referendum in 1992 to a mixed member system in which 75% of the seats
(475 seats) in the Chamber of Deputies were allocated by plurality in single-member districts
(SMD) and 25% (155 seats) were allocated by proportional representation (EED, 2012;
Jusko, 2006). A decade later, in 2005, the electoral system changed to a bonus-adjusted
closed list proportional representation system with multi-member constituencies.14 These
changes in electoral rules created new incentives for stronger or weaker party discipline.
According to Carey and Shugart (1995) the periods under proportional representation (1948-
1991 and 2005-present) should be characterized by stronger party discipline than the period
under a mixed electoral system (1992-2004).
According to my argument these changes in the levels of party discipline should affect
the territorial nature of the Italian party system. Under the two periods of stronger party
discipline (i.e. under PR-type electoral systems) we should observe an increase in party
system territorialization, and more specifically an increase in votes to regional political
parties (such as the Northern League). In contrast, under the period of weaker party
discipline corresponding to the mixed electoral system we should observe a more nationalized
party system. Figure 4.4 on page 147 traces the association between Italy’s electoral reforms
13According to Renwick et al. (2009) this was a very permissive electoral system: “[t]he effective threshold
for elections to the lower house of the national parliament was barely 1 percent” (Renwick et al., 2009, 2).
14According to Renwick et al. (2009) under this new system,
“[...] voters vote for closed party lists, and seats are initially allocated proportionally subject
to thresholds of 2 per cent for parties belonging to a coalition, 4 per cent for parties not
belonging to a coalition, and 10 per cent for coalitions. If, however, no party or coalition gains
340 seats (55 per cent of the domestic total) through proportional allocation, the largest party
or coalition in terms of votes automatically receives 340 seats (the premio di maggioranza, or
majority premium). These seats are allocated proportionally among those coalition parties
that passed the threshold, and the remaining seats are allocated proportionally among the
other above-threshold parties” (Renwick et al., 2009, 2).
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and the degree of party system territorialization since the end of World War II. The solid
line shows the degree of party system territorialization in Italy between 1953 and 2008 based
on the inflation measure used as the dependent variable in the quantitative analyses. Low
values indicate greater party system nationalization whereas high values indicate greater
party system territorialization. The graph is divided into three periods which are separated
by the two changes in electoral institutions during the post-World War II period. Finally,
the dotted line represents the degree of territorial economic inequality (measured by the
weighted coefficient of variation).15
The graph reveals that changes in electoral institutions are associated with changes in the
level of party system territorialization. During the open-list PR period (1953 to 1991) party
system territorialization initially hovered around 0.08 and progressively increased to 0.18
in 1992. This trend towards greater territorialization is reversed after the 1993 electoral
reform that introduced a mixed electoral system. The three general elections conducted
under this new electoral system produced a more nationalized party system. Finally, when
the electoral system switched back to closed-list proportional representation in 2005, the
trend was reversed yet again and points towards a greater territorialization of the Italian
party system (especially in the 2008 election). These broad patterns conform with the
theoretical expectations laid out in this chapter. Table 4.4 (page 148) shows the percentage
of the vote obtained by the Lega Nord in both general and regional elections. The first big
electoral victory of the Lega Nord was in 1992 when it obtained 8.7% of the vote nationally
(and 23% in Lombardia). The period under a mixed member electoral system (1994 through
2011) witness a slight decrease in electoral strength (with the exception of 1996). Finally
the Table indicates that the last two general elections conducted under closed-list PR (as
well as the 2012 regional elections) have marked a come back for the Lega Nord.
15Note that there are two different scales in the graph. The y-axis on the left corresponds to the measure






































































Table 4.4: Northern League % of the Vote
Year Election % Vote in Italy % Vote in Lombardia Notes
1987 General 1 2.6 Northern League competes on its own
1992 General 8.7 23 Northern League competes on its own
1994 General 8.4 22.1 Part of Pollo della Liberta coalition
1996 General 10.1 25.5 Northern League competes on its own
2001 General 3.9 12.1 Part of Casa della Liberta coalition
2006 General 4.6 11.7 Part of Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition






One aspect of Figure 4.4 (page 147) however is puzzling. The Italian party system is
very nationalized during the 1950s’, 1960’s and early 1970s, despite relatively large levels of
territorial economic disparities (between Northern and Southern regions) and a proportional
representation electoral system. Given the argument presented in this dissertation we might
expect to see a greater level of party system territorialization in those early decades. Instead,
territorialization only starts in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, with the rise of the Lega Nord
and other regional political parties. What explains delayed territorialization of the Italian
party system?
There are two factors that I argue contribute to suppress territorialization in these early
decades after World War II. The first factor has to do with the profound ideological divide
that existed between Italian communists and the rest of political forces and political interests
in Italy. In the aftermath of World War II, as the iron curtain fell, the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) which was very strong electorally, came to be perceived as a menace. In
reaction to this, Democrazia Christiana (the main center-right party in Italy) forged an
“agreement with its minor-party allies permanently to exclude from office the left and right
extremes” (Newell, 2000, 9). This tacit agreement has been referred to as the conventio
ad excludendum (“agreement to exclude), and it kept the Italian Communist Party (PCI)
from governing. It also created an unusual situation of hegemony in which the Democrazia
Christiana (DC) was the only party able to govern in Italy, resulting in its unchallenged
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dominance during the first decades after World War II. This one-party dominance had the
effect of reducing party discipline. During the post-World War II period party discipline in
Italy was unusually low given that Italy was a parliamentary system with a proportional
representation electoral system.
“The Christian Democrats in particular, knowing that they would always be the
mainstay of any feasible governing coalition, therefore also knew that the costs
of disunity were low. And in fact, the DC was notorious for its factionalism”
(Newell, 2000, 9).
Party discipline was low because parties (and especially Democrazia Christiana) did not
need to be cohesive to stay in power.16 Their hold on power was practically guaranteed
as long as the Communist Party remained strong and the conventio ad excludendum was
maintained. This situation prevented small parties from emerging by capitalizing on new
cleavages. This situation, however, started to change when the collapse of communism
in the 1980’s broke the hegemony of Democrazia Christiana. It is at this time that we
see the emergence of regional political parties, and the progressive territorialization of the
party system. The most important regional political party in Italy, the Northern League,
emerged in the early 1980’s under the name of Lega Lombarda,17 and its leader Umberto
Bossi entered parliament for the first time in 1987 (Donovan, 1995, 52). The Northern
League achieved its first important victory in the 1992 General Election when it obtained
8.7% of the national vote (and 23% of the vote in Lombardia) (see Table 4.4), and became
the fourth largest political party in the Italian Parliament. The Northern League enjoyed
electoral success until 1996 after which it began to dwindle.18
The second factor that contributed to Italy’s unusual party system nationalization
between 1950 and 1970 involved the structure of the state. The 1948 Italian Consti-
tution “had mandated directly elected regional governments (regioni) with enumerated
powers for the whole of Italy, but these provisions were put into practice only for five
regions with special autonomous statute (regioni autonomae a statuto speciale): Sicilia,
16The low levels of party discipline were “reflected in parliament’s procedures, especially in the frequent
use of secret voting, both in the Chamber and the Senate” (Newell, 2000, 10).
17The Northern League was official founded in 1991.
18The Northern League has had a strong come back in the past two elections, which I will address later
on in this section.
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Sardegna, Valle d’Aosta/Vallee d’Aoste, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (since 1963), and Trentino-
Alto Adige/Sudtirol” (Hooghe et al., 2008, 196). It was not until 1970 (through a constitu-
tional revision) that Italy became a fully fledged decentralized or quasi-federal polity with
the creation of fifteen ordinary-statute regions (regioni a statuto ordinario) “each with a
directly elected regional council and an executive responsible to it” (Hooghe et al., 2008,
196). The unitary structure of the state in the early decades functioned to suppress the
emergence (or success) of regional political parties. Italy’s decentralization in the 1970’s co-
incided with the emergence of regional political parties. Still the timing of decentralization
does not explain the emergence of regional parties as well as the collapse of communism
and the end of the conventio ad excludendum (“agreement to exclude). Furthermore, the
fact that decentralization was well underway in the 1990’s and early 2000’s when the party
system became nationalized again, suggests that the effect of decentralization is not as
powerful as some scholars expect.
In sum, this brief case study illustrate how changes in electoral rules produce changes in
the incentives for party discipline and these changes in turn can help explain variation in the
territorial nature of the party system in Italy. Certainly there are other important factors
that influence the nature of the Italian party system (especially during the first decades
after World War II), but the changes in electoral rules can help explain some important
fluctuations in the the success of the Northern League during the more recent decades.
4.4 Evidence from Progressive Era United States
The United States might seem an unlikely candidate to illustrate the impact of institu-
tional changes on party discipline and in turn on the territorial nature of the party system,
since the United States’ main institutional features – a presidential regime with a plural-
ity rule single member district electoral system– have remained rather constant over time.
Given this institutional continuity, scholars of American politics have attributed changes
in party discipline in the United States to changes in the electorate’s preferences and in
the ideological composition of US parties (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995), instead of to in-
stitutional changes in regime type or electoral system. Focusing on changes in intra-party
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ideological diversity (as proxies for changes in party discipline) however is inappropriate
for my purpose since intra-party ideological diversity is too close of a concept to my key
independent variable: the territorial distribution of (economic) preferences.
Instead I focus on a rarely studied electoral institutional change in the United States that
recent scholars (Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Harvey and Mukherjee, 2006) link to changes
in party discipline: the state adoption of direct primaries as the method for nominating
candidates for the U.S. House in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
Before 1896 parties controlled the nomination process. Between 1896 and 1915, states began
adopting the open primary, and although “different states adopted the primer at different
times”, the reforms happened in a relatively short period of time. By 1915 “[...] all but
a handful of states adopted the primary as the chief method of nominating candidates for
federal, state, and local offices” (Ansolabehere et al., 2004, 1). Table 4.5 shows the year in
which states implemented open primaries. The table combines two sources Ansolabehere
et al. (2004) and Harvey and Mukherjee (2006).19 By 1915 most states had implemented
these changes in electoral institutions, the exceptions being Delaware, only switched to
open primaries in 1978, Connecticut in 1955, New Mexico in 1939, Rhode Island in 1947
and Utah in 1937 (see Table 4.5 on page 152).
Several scholars have tied the introduction of direct primaries in the United States to the
weakening of party discipline. Harvey and Mukherjee (2006) argue that the “direct primary
had the effect of reducing the observability of partisan behavior” (Harvey and Mukherjee,
2006, 376), which lead to a weakening of party discipline. In support of this argument they
find a strong correlation between the introduction of primaries and split-ticket voting20
between 1880 and 1940 in the United States.21 Furthermore, as Galderisi and Ginsberg
(1986) argue:
“[the direct primary] can be seen as an antiparty reform on three separate counts.
First, by weakening party leaders’ capacity to control nominating processes,
primary elections undermine the organizational coherence of established parties.
Second, primaries tend to direct the attention of voters and political activists
19Several Southern states do not appear in the table because scholars have had difficulty coding them.
20Split-ticket voting is a fairly conventional measure of party discipline
21Harvey and Mukherjee (2006) specifically look at the geographic variation in party discipline in the
United States between 1880 and 1940.
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Table 4.5: Dates of Direct Primary Use in U.S. House Elections
State Year State Year
AZ 1909 NV 1909
CA 1909 NH 1909
CO 1910 NJ 1911
CT 1955 NM 1939
DE 1978 NY 1913
ID 1909-1919, 1931 ND 1907
IL 1910 OH 1913
IN 1915 OK 1907
IA 1907 OR 1904
KS 1908 PA 1907
KY 1912 RI 1947
ME 1911 SD 1907
MD 1910 TN 1909
MA 1911 UT 1937
MI 1909 VT 1915
MN 1901 WA 1907
MO 1907 WV 1915
MT 1912 WI 1904
NE 1907 WY 1911
FL* 1913 LA* 1906
MS* 1902 NC* 1915
SC* 1915
Sources: Ansolabehere et al. (2004), p. 31.
*Harvey and Mukherjee (2006), p. 380.
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toward the nominating contests of the party most likely to win the general
election, and away from the interparty race. [...] Last, and most interesting,
primary elections have the effect of inhibiting the formation of new parties”
(Galderisi and Ginsberg, 1986, 116)
We can thus use the introduction of direct primaries for the US House as a proxy for a
change in the levels of party discipline that lead to weaker party cohesion within US parties.
This change in electoral procedure is particularly appropriate for our analyses because the
reforms happened in a relatively short period of time, and they were mostly introduced for
reasons other than trying to change party discipline or more importantly, other than trying
to change the level of party system territorialization.
“At the turn of the century progressives had high hopes for the primary, ex-
pecting that it would reduce the power of party machines and bosses, help more
independent-minded, honest, and progressive politicians win once, increase voter
participation and give voters a greater sense of political efficacy, and generally
help reduce corruption in government” (Ansolabehere et al., 2004, 5).
In other words, this electoral change was mostly exogenous to the territorial nature of
the party system. According to the theory developed in this dissertation, exogenous changes
in party discipline should be associated with changes in the territorial nature of the party
system. More specifically, in the case of the United States we should expect an increase in
party system nationalization after the introduction of open primaries in 1915.
Figure 4.5 on page 157 shows the changes in party system localization in the United
States from the end of the Civil War in 1866 to the early 1960’s (solid line). The data for
this long time series come from the CLEA database (Kollman et al., 2012), and was used
in Chhibber and Kollman’s book The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism
and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States (2004).
This measure of party system localization is the same as the measure of party system
territorialization I use in this dissertation. I call this measure “localization” in the present
discussion because it uses the “district” instead of the “state” as the minimal territorial
unit.22 Figure 4.5 also shows the changes in territorial economic inequalities during the
22I use the district level because the historical data was readily available at this level of analysis. In the
future, however, I intend to produce a similar measure using the “state” as the unit of analysis, and even
using the “north-south” division as the unit of analysis. We should find stronger support for my argument
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same period. The measure of territorial economic inequality is the weighted coefficient of
variation of state GDP/capita. The economic data for this series come from Williamson
(1965), which in turn collected the data from a variety of sources.23 The data points are
very sparse until 1929, but become fairly regular thereafter. The general trend suggests
that territorial economic disparities in the United States were relatively high until the early
1940’s,24 after which they drop significantly.25 Finally, the vertical line divides the graph
into two periods indicating when most states had adopted open primaries as a method of
electing candidates for federal, state and local office.
What we see in the graph is that party system localization was relatively high (and
extremely volatile) before the early twentieth century, but after 1915 the party system na-
tionalizes and becomes more stable around relatively low levels of party system localization.
The horizontal dotted lines indicate the average party localization score for the period before
1915 (average=0.15) and for the period after 1915 (average=0.12).26 In other words, before
1915 party discipline is higher and we observe greater party system localization, whereas
after 1915 party discipline is lower and what we observe is an increase in party system na-
tionalization. Furthermore, territorial economic inequalities remain relatively constant (and
high) during this period of electoral reform towards the end of the nineteenth century and
beginning of the twentieth century, which helps isolate the effect of the change in electoral
rules on the party system.
This graphs also allows to asses the impact of one of the most important alternative
explanations of party system nationalization: centralization of power. As explained in
Chapter 2, Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that the nationalization of party systems is
if the measure were calculated using “states” or using the ”north-south” territorial division, so using the
district biases the results against me.
23See Williamson (1965, 27) for a list of sources.
24And very similar level to those of the Italian case presented earlier
25These disparities can be mostly attributed to North-South economic differences, which most likely
decreased after the New Deal as a consequence of redistribution programs, as well as to population migration
from the South to the North [citation needed]. Western European nations experienced a similar reduction
in territorial economic inequalities right after World War II, which coincided with the golden age of the
welfare state. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, with the dwindeling of the welfare state and the end of protectionist
policies, many Western European countries experienced a slight increase in territorial economic disparities.
There might be a connection between centralization of power, creation of a strong welfare state, reduction
of inequalities and party system nationalization that I would like to explore in the future.
26The party system before the American Civil War was even more localized and more volatile than after
the Civil War. In fact, the average party system localization between 1834 and 1915 is 0.19. It should also
be noted that in recent decades (1980’s, 1990’s, 2000’s) the US party system has become more localized.
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linked to the centralization of power. In the United States, centralization happened over a
long period of time, but according to Chhibber and Kollman, the most significant expansion
of the federal government occurred after the New Deal. “On the whole, prior to the New
Deal, governance in the United States was quite decentralized, with the states controlling
most areas of policies about which voters cared” (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004, 147). The
graph shows that the party system in the United States actually started nationalizing before
the New Deal, that is before any significant centralization of power at the federal level. The
centralization of power at the federal level after the New Deal (1933) and the reduction
of inter-territorial economic inequalities in the 1940’s most likely contributed to a further
consolidation of a nationalized party system. What is key for my argument however is that
institutions affecting party discipline in the United States also had an important impact on
the territorial nature of the party system, and this effect can be isolated from the process
of centralization, which happened later.
In addition to the role of centralization, Chhibber and Kollman point to the nature of
the executive and argue that in the case of the United States “presidentialism” contributed
to the nationalization of the US party system.
“Why Southern elites did not separate from the Democratic Party following
reconstruction in the 1870’s and form a new, Southern political party is an
intriguing question. Why did they rejoin forces with northern and western
Democrats? Our answer is that this is where the American presidential system
has its most potent effect in its history. Voting for Democrats was the southern
elite’s way of making sure they had a unified voice in presidential politics –the
unified south had a veto on Democratic presidential candidates because of voting
rules in the nominating conventions –and a way of countering a centralized threat
through unified voting and scuttling of action on racial matters in the Congress.
[...] By bolting from the Democratic Party, the South would have reduced its
role in choosing presidents. Consider how much presidents like Cleveland and
Wilson had to cater to the South because they needed southern delegates to win
within their own party” (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004, 218).
In this dissertation I also argue that presidential systems tend to encourage party sys-
tem nationalization. The mechanism I posit however works through party discipline. As
explained earlier in this chapter, presidential systems promote weak party discipline, which
in turn helps keep national coalitions together. As Rodden and Warshaw (2009) argue “[...]
one of the most basic facts about U.S. style presidentialism is that the lack of a no-confidence
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procedure in the legislature absolves candidates in the districts of the need to adopt com-
mon platforms or act cohesively (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998) and co-partisan House
candidates manifestly do not adopt common platforms in practice” (Rodden and Warshaw,
2009, 19). The relatively low levels of party discipline in the United States (compared to
other countries with parliamentary systems of government) certainly contributed to prevent
the split of the South and to maintain a fairly nationalized party system throughout most
of the twentieth century. However, the effect of presidentialism is supposed to be constant
over time and thus cannot explain why there was a change towards more nationalization in
the United States right after the first decade of the twentieth century.
In sum, although various factors (executive type, party discipline, centralization of
power) have an influence on the territorial nature of party systems in a country, the change
in party system nationalization that took place in the United States at the beginning of
the twentieth century can only be attributed to a change in party discipline that happened
after a significant change in electoral rules. Alternative explanations such as centralization
of power or presidentialism cannot account for this specific change at this moment in time.
This case thus serves to illustrate the important role of party discipline in affecting the


























































































































































4.5 Empirical Analysis: The Role of Elected Bicameralism
Table 4.6 presents the results for the third hypothesis, which is modeled in equation 4.3
on page 136. The first three regression models (M1, M2 and M3) show the direct effect
of all variables (no interactions) with each of the three different measures of bicameralism,
whereas the last three models (M4, M5 and M6) include the interaction terms between
“territorial economic inequality” and the three different measures of bicameralism. The
first three models show that “bicameralism”, “elected bicameralism” and “elected bicamer-
alism (dic)” do not have a significant direct effect on party system territorialization. This
is consistent with the findings in Chapter 3. In contrast, the interactive models (M4, M5,
M6) show that under some operationalizations bicameralism is significant when interacted
with “territorial economic inequality”. Once again, in order to correctly interpret the mag-
nitude and significance of the coefficients of these three interactions I graph their respective
marginal effects.
Figure 4.6a shows the marginal effect of “territorial economic inequality” on party sys-
tem territorialization as “bicameralism” changes from 0 to 1.27 The graph tells us that
“territorial economic inequality” always has a positive effect on party system territorial-
ization (since the marginal effect line is above 0), but this effect is only significant when
“bicameralism” is equal to 1, that is when countries have an upper legislative chamber.
The effect is not significant when “bicameralism” is equal to 0. In other words, in uni-
cameral countries the effect of “territorial economic inequality” on the party system is not
significantly distinguishable from 0. Figure 4.6b shows the marginal effect of “bicameral-
ism” on party system territorialization as “territorial economic inequality” changes from
0 (low levels of “territorial economic inequality”) to 1 (high levels of “territorial economic
inequality”). The figure suggests that the effect of bicameralism is practically 0 and it is not
statistically significant (since the dotted confidence lines are not simultaneously above or
below 0, which means that they include 0). In other words, bicameralism (coded to reflect
whether a country has an upper legislative chamber or not), does not seem to play a modi-
fying role. This is not surprising given the crudeness of the measure (as explained earlier).
27Note that although the marginal effect is a line, we should only care about the relevant values for 0 and
1, since “bicameralism” is a dichotomous variable.
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I proceed to show the marginal effect graphs for the other two measures of bicameralism:
“elected bicameralism” and its dichotomous version, “elected bicameralism (dic).”
Figure 4.7a shows the marginal effect of “territorial economic inequality” on party sys-
tem territorialization as “elected bicameralism” changes from 0 to 3. The graph tells us that
“territorial economic inequality” always has a positive effect on party system territorializa-
tion (since the marginal effect line is above 0), but this effect decreases as upper legislative
chambers become more representative (i.e. become directly elected). Figure 4.7b shows the
marginal effect of “elected bicameralism” on party system territorialization as “territorial
economic inequality” changes from 0 (low levels of “territorial economic inequality”) to 1
(high levels of “territorial economic inequality”). The graph shows that under conditions
of high “territorial economic inequality,” the effect of having a directly elected upper leg-
islative chamber on party system territorialization is negative. The effect is statistically
significant between the values of 0.5 and 1 on the “territorial economic inequality” vari-
able (x-axis). This means that under conditions of high “territorial economic inequality”
countries with upper legislative chambers that are truly representative and directly elected
are more likely to have nationalized party systems than countries that do not have elected
upper legislative chambers (or that have chambers that are indirectly elected or appointed).
Furthermore, this figure suggests that when “territorial economic inequality” is very low
having a representative upper legislative chamber has a slightly positive (and statistically
significant) effect on party system territorialization. This positive effect (which only holds
under low inequalities) confirms Hicken’s argument that the presence of upper legislative
chambers should have a positive effect on party system territorialization. In other words,
this interactive hypothesis reveals potentially two distinct and opposing effect of bicameral-
ism, which correspond to the Hicken (2009)’s logic on the one hand and to my logic on the
other. These opposing effects also explain why the direct effect of bicameralism (as shown
in Chapter 3 or in Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 4.6 are not significant).
Finally, Figure 4.8a and Figure 4.8b present the marginal effects of Model 6 in Table
4.6, which test the interactive term “elected bicameralism (dic)” with “territorial economic
inequality.” The results of this interaction are consistent with those in Figure 4.7a and Figure
4.7b. Figure 4.8a shows that “territorial economic inequality” always has a positive effect
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression – Pooled Sample
Direct Effect Interaction
DV: Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Territ. Econ. Inequality (lag) .430*** .433*** .436*** .221 .873*** .826***
(.12) (.12) (.11) (.31) (.29) (.12)
Bicameralism .021 –.026
(.04) (.10)
Elected Bicameralism .002 .040
(.01) (.03)
Elected Bicameralism (dic) –.006 .150**
(.03) (.06)
Econ. Ineq. x Bic. .216
(.35)
Econ. Ineq. x Elect. Bic. –.165
(.11)
Econ. Ineq. x Elect. Bic.(dic) –.536***
(.17)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .386* .380* .376* .373* .444** .519***
(.20) (.20) (.20) (.21) (.20) (.17)
Candidate Autonomy (lag) –.063 –.060 –.060 –.058 –.074 –.074
(.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Political Decentralization(lag) .067 .075 .079 .070 .055 .027
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.03)
Parliamentary System .022 .019 .015 .018 .018 .007
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Majoritarian Elec System –.035 –.028 –.023 –.034 –.039 –.048
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Number of Units (log) –.012 –.016 –.016 –.015 –.002 .008
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Age of Parties (log) –.034 –.033 –.032 –.038 –.025 –.023
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.007*** –.007*** –.007*** –.007** –.007*** –.006***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .075** .072** .070** .072** .072** .057**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Constant –.037 –.014 –.008 .030 –.170 –.170
(.11) (.10) (.10) (.19) (.15) (.13)
Adj. R2 .574 .572 .572 .572 .583 .627
No. of cases 127 127 127 127 127 127
No. of countries/clusters 35 35 35 35 35 35
*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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on party system territorialization (since the marginal effect line is above 0), but this effect
decreases as upper legislative chambers become more representative (i.e. become directly
elected). Figure 4.8b suggests that having an elected upper legislative chamber matters
positively under low levels of “territorial economic inequality”, whereas it matters negatively
under high levels of “territorial economic inequality”. In other words, bicameralism has
opposite effects depending on the level of inequality.28
In sum, the results of these analyses suggest that bicameralism has an important modi-
fying role on the effect of economic inequalities. I find however that the simple presence of
an upper legislative chamber is not sufficient for these effects to take place. The mechanism
I posit depends on the upper legislative chamber being directly elected. The results of
these regressions also show that elected bicameralism has different (and opposing effects)
depending on the level of territorial economic inequalities, which explains why the direct
effects of these variables are not significant.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents evidence in support of the propositions that “party discipline”
and “elected bicameralism” have an effect on the territorial nature of party systems. More
specifically, the chapter demonstrates that this effect is not direct. Instead “party discipline”
and “elected bicameralism” modify the pressures of territorial economic inequalities on
party system territorialization. When parties and national-level institutions are able to
incorporate territorially-based diversity, then we should not expect the party system to be
territorialized. However, territorially-based parties are more likely to emerge if national-level
institutions and existing parties are not able to incorporate territorially disparate interests.
The large-N analyses lend strong support for these claims. Furthermore, the cases of Italy
and United States provide an illustration of how changes in electoral institutions (and thus
in party discipline) can lead to changes in party system territorialization. Focusing on this
institutional change also helps explain aspects of party system change within these countries
that have not previously been explained.
28The regression results and marginal effect graphs for the averaged sample are presented in Table 4.8 and
in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 starting on page 168. The findings are robust when using the averaged sample.
162





























0 1 2 3
Elected Bicameralism


























0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Territorial Economic Inequality
(b) Marginal Effect of Elected Bicameralism on Party System Territorialization
163



































































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Territorial Economic Inequality
(b) Marginal Effect of Elected Bicameralism (dic) on Party System Territorialization
164
Finally, the findings in this chapter shed some light into some of the existing literature’s
contradictory empirical findings on the role of institutions such as bicameralism, executive
type or the electoral system. In particular I show that these institutions do not have a
direct effect on party system territorialization and that instead their effect depends on the
structure of economic inequality. The case of bicameralism illustrates how institutions can
have effects that pull in opposite directions, which can lead to misleading conclusions about
their role in affecting party systems if their effects are not correctly specified and tested.
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Table 4.7: OLS Regression – Averaged Sample
Direct Effect Direct Effect Interaction Interaction
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .315* .349** .423* .386*
(.15) (.15) (.23) (.22)
Candidate Autonomy (lag) –.097 –.038 –.064
(.09) (.13) (.11)
Candidate Autonomy (av) (lag) –.085
(.07)
Econ. Ineq. (lag) x Cand. Autonomy (lag) –.161
(.26)
Econ. Ineq. (lag) x Cand. Autonomy(av)(lag) –.101
(.22)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .566* .564* .587* .585*
(.28) (.27) (.29) (.29)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .094 .077 .083 .083
(.07) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Diversity –.163 –.104 –.182 –.151
(.23) (.21) (.23) (.23)
Majoritarian Electoral System .005 –.032 .005 –.002
(.12) (.10) (.12) (.12)
Parliamentary System .046 .050 .048 .050
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Bicameral .052 .046 .047 .048
(.06) (.06) (.07) (.07)
Number of Units (log) .007 .017 .007 .009
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Age of Parties (log) .009 .004 .008 .006
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Country GDP per capita –.010** –.009** –.010** –.010*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .086 .094* .084 .090
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Constant –.224 –.283 –.239 –.249
(.23) (.21) (.23) (.24)
Adj. R2 .334 .363 .311 .304
No. of cases 31 32 31 31
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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Table 4.8: OLS Regression – Averaged Sample
Direct Effect Interaction
DV: PS Territorialization M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Territ. Economic Inequality (lag) .313* .330** .359** 1.039 1.257** .894***
(.15) (.16) (.15) (.61) (.48) (.26)
Bicameralism .039 .219
(.06) (.16)
Elected Bicameralism –.007 .080
(.02) (.05)
Elected Bicameralism (dic) –.064 .137
(.06) (.10)
Econ. Ineq.(lag) x Bic. –.736
(.60)
Econ. Ineq.(lag) x Elec. Bic. –.337*
(.17)
Econ. Ineq.(lag) x Elec. Bic. (dic) –.694**
(.28)
Fiscal Decentralization (lag) .588** .586** .655** .674** .697** .714***
(.27) (.28) (.28) (.28) (.26) (.25)
Candidate Autonomy (lag) –.092 –.078 –.068 –.122 –.109 –.086
(.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.08) (.07)
Political Decentralization(lag)(dic) .083 .098 .095 .065 .058 .055
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.06)
Parliamentary System .038 .031 .020 .052 .024 –.008
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Majoritarian Electoral System –.015 .000 .007 –.029 –.029 –.018
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.10)
Number of Units (log) .013 .006 .009 .030 .033 .033
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Age of Parties (log) –.001 .002 –.003 .011 .020 .013
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.008* –.008* –.008* –.009** –.008** –.006*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Years of Democracy (log) .085 .077 .067 .108* .093* .061
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04)
Constant –.261 –.208 –.189 –.566 –.587** –.402*
(.22) (.22) (.21) (.33) (.28) (.21)
Adj. R2 .351 .340 .378 .368 .433 .508
No. of cases 31 31 31 31 31 31
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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Table 4.9: OLS Regression – Averaged Sample
Direct Effect Interaction
DV: Party System Territorialization M1 M2
Territorial Economic Inequality (lag) .315* .147
(.15) (.14)
Parliamentary System .046 –.176*
(.06) (.09)
Territorial Econ. Inequality (lag) x Parliamentary .755**
(.26)
Fiscal Decen (lag) (revsharelagav2) .566* .667**
(.28) (.24)
Candidate Autonomy (lag) –.097 –.102
(.09) (.07)
Political Decentralization (lag) (dic) .094 .104
(.07) (.06)
Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Diversity –.163 –.223
(.23) (.19)




Number of Units (log) .007 .004
(.04) (.03)
Age of Parties (log) .009 .021
(.04) (.03)
Country GDP per capita –.010** –.008*
(.00) (.00)




Adj. R2 .334 .526
No. of cases 31 31
Sig:*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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CHAPTER V
German Reunification, Redistributive Conflicts and Party
System Change
“East German to West German: ‘We are one people!’
West German to East German: ‘So are we!’”
– Popular joke in Germany (Minkenberg, 1993)
In Chapter 4 I used the cases of Post-World War II Italy and Progressive Era United States
to illustrate how a change in electoral institutions (and thus in levels of party discipline) can
affect the territorial nature of the party system while holding the geography of economic
interests constant. This chapter turns to a comparative case study of Germany to asses
how changes in the geography of economic interests effect the party system where there is
no change in institutions.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical and
methodological justification for the choice of Germany as a case study. The second section
compares the party system under the Federal Republic of Germany to the party system un-
der unified Germany. This comparison reveals that the party system under unified Germany
is more fragmented and more territorialized. The third section links these transformations
to the changing structure of territorial inequality and to debates about the redistribution
of resources across Länder. This last section also points to the role of party strategy in
mitigating the effects of an unequal economic geography.
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5.1 Setting Up the Case Study
Germany is a good case to explore the impact of an unequal economic geography on
the territorial nature of parties and party systems for several reasons. First, Germany is
relatively homogenous ethnically and linguistically, which allows us to rule out arguments
that link territorialization with the emergence of local or regional parties based on territo-
rially concentrated linguistic, ethnic or religious demands. Second, whereas the economic
geography of Germany changed drastically in a matter of months due to reunification, the
institutional structure remained constant. Third, Germany’s institutions (regime type, elec-
toral system, federal structure) are moderately permissive, which means that I expect the
institutional context to allow for the emergence of localized or territorialized parties if there
is a demand for these types of parties. In what follows I elaborate on these points.
5.1.1 A Change in the Geography of Economic Interests
The political reunification of East and West Germany after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in
1990 produced a dramatic shift in the geography of economic interests in a relatively short
period of time (Beramendi, 2011). By way of an example, Figure 5.1 on page 177 compares
the degree of territorial economic inequality in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
and in unified Germany across time. The measure that I use is the weighted coefficient of
variation introduced in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. This measure captures the dispersion
of Länder GDP per capita around the mean GDP per capita in the country.1 I use the
weighted version of the coefficient of variation because it is more appropriate when making
comparisons across polities with a different number of territorial units, which is the case
here.2 For the period between 1950-1955 I use secondary source data. The data comes
from Williamson (1965).3 For the period between 1980 and 2007 I calculate the weighted
1Throughout this chapter I consider the Länder to be the politically relevant territorial unit per my
justification in Chapter 3.
2The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was composed of 10 Länder. Saarland was a French protec-
torate until 1956 after which it was incorporated back into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), so until
1956 there are 9 Länder in the FRG. The new unified Germany is composed of 16 Länder: 10 Länder from
the old FRG and 6 Länder from the old Democratic Republic of Germany (DRG).
3The weighted coefficient of variation reported in Williamson (1965) is based on the net product at factor
cost per capita and it includes nine West German Länder instead of 10 Länder since Williamson (1965)
excludes the Saar (French protectorate until 1955) and Berlin, which is also occupied after World War II.
This earlier series should be taken with a grain of salt since they are based on secondary literature that uses
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coefficient of variation based on raw data from the OECD Regional Statistics database. As
a reminder to the reader, higher values indicate a more uneven distribution of GDP per
capita across Länder, whereas lower values indicate that all Länder have a similar GDP per
capita.
The data in this figure reveal significant differences in the economic geography of Ger-
many pre-unification and Germany post-unification. Immediately following World War II
the distribution of economic interests across Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) was relatively uneven. Unfortunately I do not have data for the 1960’s and 1970’s,
but the trend of the time series indicates that the distribution of economic interests across
Länder became more equitable as time passed. By 1980 the FRG has a relatively even dis-
tribution of economic interests across its Länder. In contrast, the new unified Germany has
had relatively high territorial economic disparities since its foundation in 1990. These large
territorial economic inequalities are the result of the incorporation of the five poorer East
German Länder into the Federal Republic of Germany. The trend shows a slight increase
in economic inequalities at the end of the 1990’s and beginning of 2000’s.
To have a relative measure of these changes, Figure 5.2 compares Germany pre and
post-unification with other West European countries. The measure of territorial economic
inequality is the same as the one used in Figure 5.1, but for this figure I average the
weighted coefficient of variation across time within each country.4 The figure suggests that
the FRG during the 1980’s was one of the most equal countries in Western Europe (similar to
Denmark). In contrast, unified Germany (1990-2007) has a much more uneven distribution
of economic resources across Länder, with a level of territorial economic inequality similar
to that of Switzerland, Austria and Spain.
In this chapter, I explore the consequences of this change in economic inequalities for
the territorial nature of the party system. For the most part, a country’s level of territorial
economic inequality changes very slowly over time, which makes it hard to identify its causal
effect on the political landscape. One of the empirical complications of such a slow change
is that it would require to have relevant data for a long period of time, which is often
different data than the data used for the later series.
4Note that different countries have different time series, and that for the Federal Republic of Germany I
take the average starting in 1980 (not 1953) since that is when the data is most reliable.
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unavailable. One of the analytical complications of such slow change is that it is hard to
disentangle the effects of economic geography on the party system from the effects of other
key contextual variables (i.e. institutions) which are also changing. The change in economic
geography that Germany experienced however is exceptional for two reasons: first, it was
a relatively large change; second, the change essentially happened overnight (Beramendi,
2011, 83), which means that other contextual factors remained constant; and third, the
change was mostly exogenous to the outcome that I am trying to explain – the party
system–, and to other relevant variables in my model, mainly the country’s institutional
structure (electoral system, regime type and federal structure).
“It was the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a result, its system of satellite
states that launched the process [of German reunification] and shaped Western
Germany’s approach to it. Indeed, it is commonly recognized that the coup
in Russia in 1990 was a major factor in driving western elites to speed up the
process of incorporating Eastern Germany as much as possible (Wiesenthal 1995,
1996)” (Beramendi, 2011, 83).
In sum, the historical process of reunification, which lead to an increase in territorial
economic inequality, can be treated as an exogenous shock or a critical juncture (Falleti
and Lynch, 2009) that is unrelated to the territorial nature of the party system. As I will
explain in more detail later in this chapter, the CDU/CSU which was in power in the Federal
Republic of Germany at the time the Berlin Wall fell was strategic enough to accelerate
the process of unification and to frame the discourse around this process so that it would
benefit them electorally.
“[...] Only a high pace of unification would guarantee the governing Chris-
tian Democratic-Liberal coalition government the opportunity to time the all-
German elections sufficiently early to take advantage of the initial popular en-
thusiasm and optimism before its costs and frictions could surface and lead to
disenchantment” (Wiesenthal, 2003, 39).
Furthermore, the CDU/CSU was able to delay the pressing question of revamping the
fiscal system of inter-territorial redistribution with the creation of a separate and temporary
fund that would finance the cost of reunification. Thus the actions taken by the CDU/CSU
altered the initial conditions of the change in economic inequalities and somewhat muted its
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effects for the first years after unification. This allowed the CDU/CSU to obtain substantial
electoral support both in Western and Eastern Länder during the first Bundestag Elections
under the new unified Germany, which for the first years kept its support relatively na-
tionalized. However, the effects of an unequal economic geography soon kicked in, and the
CDU/CSU’s initial advantage soon wore off.
5.1.2 Institutional Incentives
The constitutional and institutional framework that was established in the 1949 Consti-
tution for the Federal Republic of Germany was transplanted to the new unified Germany
with few alterations. Several features of this institutional framework deserve attention for
the effects my argument predicts they will have on the incentives of candidates and parties
to form nation-wide alliances: the electoral system, the type of executive and the bicameral
structure of the national legislature. In what follows I make two points. First, I argue that
these institutions of the German political system changed little over time. Second, I ague
that the incentives of these institutions in the German case are mixed in terms of facilitating
or hindering territorialization.
The 1949 Constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany established an institutional
framework that was particularly favorable to the development of few nationally oriented
political parties (Beramendi, 2011). After World War II, German elites were intent on
avoiding the situation that lead to the collapse of the Weimar Republic in 1933, which had
fallen due to fragmentation, political instability and the rise of extremist forces. German
elites thus placed particular emphasis on the design of the electoral system to prevent party
fragmentation. The 1949 Constitution established that elections to Germany’s lower house
(Bundestag) would be governed by a mixed member proportional system. According to this
electoral system each voter has two votes, one goes to elect a candidate by majority rule in
single member districts (SMD) and the other one goes to elect a party list in multimember
constituencies (corresponding with the Länder) (EED, 2012; Jusko, 2006; IPU, 2012).
This electoral system, which has remained mostly unchanged to the present,5 creates
5There have been a few minor changes in the electoral system between 1949 and the present that are
worth mentioning. From 1949 to 1953 the threshold rule was more permissive since it “required political
parties to receive at least five percent of the vote in at least one Länder” (Álvarez-Rivera, 2012) or obtain
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mixed incentives for party discipline. Most Western European countries are parliamentary
democracies with PR electoral systems. Both of these institutional features promote strong
party discipline. Germany is different in that despite being a parliamentary system, it has
a mixed electoral system, which means that German political parties should have relatively
lower levels of party discipline than most countries in Western Europe. Party discipline
among German parties, however, should be higher than in countries with purely majoritar-
ian systems. Figure 5.3 uses the Wallack et al. (2003) data on personal vote to compare
levels of party discipline across countries.6 The figure suggests that both the FRG and
unified Germany have similar levels of party discipline (i.e. candidate autonomy) and that
candidate autonomy is relatively high compared to other Western European countries. It is
only lower in the UK, Ireland and Italy post-1992. These relatively low levels of party disci-
pline (or high levels of candidate autonomy) should discourage territorialization compared
to countries with more disciplined parties.
A second distinctive aspect of the German electoral system is that in order to qualify
in the national allocation of seats, a party must obtain at least 5 percent of the national
vote, or win three single member constituency seats (Jusko, 2006, 3). This specific aspect
of the German electoral system makes it very hard for small parties to gain seats in the
lower house, since obtaining 5% of the national vote is difficult if you are not a large
national party7 On its own this threshold would certainly preclude the formation of smaller
political parties; however, the national threshold rule can be trumped if a party wins three
one single member constituency seat. In 1953 the 5% threshold requirement changed to be a nation-wide
threshold (Álvarez-Rivera, 2012), and in 1957 the rule of 1 SMD seat was changed to 3 SMD seats. After
1957 the threshold remained unchanged with the exception of a one-time change in the December 1990
election (which was the first election under unified Germany) in which party lists needed only to secure five
per cent of the votes cast in either East or West Germany in order to qualify for the first allocation of seats
(Jusko, 2006, 10). The second exception has to do with the method of calculating the translation of votes
into seats. The actual formula has changed from the d’Hondt formula between 1956-1984, to Niemeyer from
1985 to 2005, and to Sainte-League/Schepers introduced for the first time in the 2009 Bundestag election
(Álvarez-Rivera, 2012). In addition in 2002 the number of single member constituencies was reduced from
328 to 299 and the number of members in parliament was reduced from 656 to 598. More specifically, prior
to 1990 there were 496 seats, from 1990 to 2001 there were 656 seats, and in 2002 and afterwards there were
598 seats in the Bundestag.
6This is the same data used to measure party discipline (i.e. candidate autonomy) in the quantitative
analyses in Chapter 4. As a reminder to the reader, higher values on the y-axis indicate more candidate
autonomy / less party discipline, whereas lower values on the y-axis indicate less candidate autonomy /
more party discipline.
7This threshold was explicitly introduced in the 1949 Constitution as a “safeguard against the coalition
instability that paralyzed the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic” (Bawn, 1993, 986).
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single member constituency seats. This means that the electoral system is more favorable
to small parties that have a geographically concentrated constituency base, than to small
parties that are nationally oriented. In addition, “a party is entitled to keep any SMD seats
it wins in excess of its national allocation (excessive mandate), which allows geographically
concentrated interests to be overrepresented by comparison to the national distribution of
support” (Jusko, 2006, 3). In sum, although the German electoral system acts to suppress
smaller political parties and favor large national electoral alliances, it has some mechanism
that would allow for a minimal success of smaller territorially concentrated parties.
Finally, in terms of the federal structure, the architecture of the German federation that
was established in the 1949 Constitution was also kept unchanged after reunification. The
federal structure was designed to promote cooperation between levels of government, and
gives a disproportionate amount of fiscal power to the central government. In other words,
the 1949 Constitution established a fiscally centralized federation. In the late 1990’s and
early 2000’s there were several attempts to reform German federal institutions (Gunlicks,
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2005), but these were not successful (Beramendi, 2011; Scharpf, 2005). The only major
change to the federal structure occurred with the incorporation of the Eastern Länder
into the Bundesrat (the German upper legislative chamber). Each Eastern Länder was
given 4 votes (with the exception of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, which was given three
votes) (Swenden, 2004).8 According to the argument of this dissertation, the presence of an
upper legislative chamber representing territorial interests and with significant legislative
prerogatives should discourage party system territorialization.9
In sum, the institutional structure of the Federal Republic of Germany and of unified Ger-
many has remained largely untouched over time. Numerous scholars describe the incentives
of German institutions as “nationalizing” or “centralizing” (Beramendi, 2011; Scharpf, 2005,
1988). The brief review of German institutions in this section corroborates – to a certain
extent– this common view of Germany. The German institutional context certainly encour-
ages large nation-wide alliances more so than other countries in Western Europe; however,
the German institutional context still allows room for the success of smaller local or re-
gional political parties. The mixed incentives of this institutional structure work in my
favor since finding any small evidence of party system territorialization after reunification
would support my argument. The next section turns to comparing the party system of
Federal Republic of Germany to that of unified Germany in terms of two characteristics:
fragmentation and territorialization.
5.2 Comparing Party Systems
In order to compare the degree of party system territorialization of the Federal Republic
of Germany to that of unified Germany I use a measure of party system territorialization
that is standardized to account for the different number of territorial units in each of the
two polities (Bochsler, 2006).10 Equation 5.1 presents the formula used to calculate this
8Votes in the Bundesrat are given in proportion to population.
9In 2007 there was a constitutional reform that decreased the power of the Bundesrat in approving certain
types of national legislation. This change might have an effect on the party system, but it is still too early
to tell.
10This standardized measure is different from the inflation measure that I use in Chapter 3 and Chapter
4 of this dissertation. The inflation measure used in those chapters is based on the effective number of
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measure:
Party System Territorialization (standardized) = PSTs =
∑
PTsi ∗ pi (5.1)
In order to create this party system measure I first calculate a measure of territorial-
ization for each political party that I call “Party Territorialization (standardized)”. This
measure is based on Jones and Mainwaring’s “Party Nationalization Score” (Jones and
Mainwaring, 2003), which uses the Gini coefficient to calculate the unequal distribution of
vote shares across territorial units for each political party. The formula for this party-level
measure is presented in equation 5.2 below:




In this equation Gi is the Gini coefficient that is calculated for each political party at
each election.11 The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of inequality, and in this
case
“[it] assesses the extent to which a party wins equal vote shares across all sub-
national units. A Gini coefficient of 0 signifies that a party received the same
share of the vote in every sub-national units. A Gini coefficient of 1 means that
it received 100 percent of its vote in one sub-national unit and 0 in all the rest”
(Jones and Mainwaring, 2003, 142).12
One of the problems with the Gini coefficient is that it is sensitive to the number of ter-
ritorial units (i.e. subnational units) in a country. This is problematic in this case because
we are comparing two polities with a different number of units: the Federal Republic of
Germany had 10 Länder,13 whereas unified Germany has 16 Länder. In order to correct for
the differences in the number of territorial units Bochsler (2006) proposes to standardize the
parties (instead of on the Gini coefficient) and it is not standardized since I already control for the number
of territorial units in the regression analyses. For an excellent summary of different measures of party system
territorialization (or its converse, party system nationalization), see the codebook from the CLEA project
(Kollman et al., 2012), and also see Bochsler (2006) and Kasuya and Moenius (2008).
11I used the Stata program INEQDEC0 (Jenkins, 1999) to calculate the gini coefficient.
12Jones and Mainwaring (2003) who are the first to devise this measure subtract the gini coefficient from 1
so that high scores indicate a high level of nationalization. I do not do this subtraction because throughout
the dissertation, high values in my measures indicate greater party system territorialization.
13In the 1953 Bundestag election the Federal Republic of Germany had 9 Länder instead of 10.
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Jones and Mainwaring measure using the log of the number of territorial units in a country
(log(d)), which yields the formula presented in Equation 5.2. In order to obtain a party sys-
tem measure of territorialization, I weight each party’s standardized territorialization score
by the party’s share of the national vote (pi), and sum these values across all parties in the
country. See Equation 5.1. I call this measure “party system territorialization (standard-
ized)” and the measure ranges from 0 (indicating greater party system nationalization) to 1
(indicating greater party system territorialization). This standardization allows to correctly
compare the party system in the Federal Republic of Germany with the party system in
unified Germany. Figure 5.4 on page 186 presents the standardized party system territo-
rialization score (calculated based on Equation 5.1) for every Bundestag election between
1953 and 2009. The figure shows that on average the party system in the Federal Republic
of Germany (1953-1987 Bundestag elections) was more nationalized than the party system
in unified Germany (1990-2009 Bundestag elections).
For most of the period between the first Bundestag14 election in 1949 and German
Reunification in 1990 two large national parties (CDU and SPD) dominated the electoral
landscape of the Federal Republic of Germany.15 As an illustration of this bipartisan dom-
inance, between the Bundestag election of 1957 and the Bundestag election of 1987 these
two parties obtained between 80 and 90 percent of the total national vote in the Federal
Republic of Germany.16 Figure 5.5 on page 187 shows the combined vote share for these two
parties over time. The top solid line corresponds to the combined share of the vote for the
two main parties including the votes for the CSU. The CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union) is a
regional political party that only fields candidates and obtain votes in the region of Bavaria
and is organizationally independent from the CDU. However the CSU has always formed
a coalition with the CDU in the national parliament (called The Union). The bottom line
14The Bundestag is the lower chamber of parliament at the national/federal level in Germany. From now
on in this chapter I will use the term “national election” to refer to the Bundestag election.
15The CDU (Christlich-Demokratische Union) was founded after World War II with many members of
the old Centre Party. It occupied the center-right of the political spectrum. The SPD (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands) is a much older party established in 1875 that occupied the center-left of the political
spectrum.
16I use the national election of 1957 as a reference here because it took some time for the German party
system to consolidate in the first years of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany after World War
II. The SPD was an old party that had been created in 1875 and had strong roots in German society but
the CDU/CSU was created in 1949 and was therefore less consolidated.
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represents the combined vote share of SPD and CDU not including the CSU votes. As
expected the total vote share excluding the CSU is lower; however what is important is
that the trend over time is exactly the same. What we observe from Figure 5.5 is that for
most of the period between 1953 and 1989 two main parties (SPD and CDU) dominated the
German political landscape. At its peak, in 1976 German voters gave SPD and CDU/CSU
a combined total of 91 percent of the vote.













































































Federal Republic of Germany
Unified Germany
Not only did SPD and CDU garner most of the votes in the Federal Republic of Germany,
but their support was evenly distributed across Länder. The CDU was a bit less nationalized
than the SPD because of the CSU, but on average the two main national parties competed
everywhere and obtained votes fairly evenly across all Länder. Figure 5.6 on page 189 shows
the standardized party territorialization score for each major party in the Federal Republic
of Germany as well as in unified Germany. Focusing on the Federal Republic of Germany
we see that the SPD is more nationalized than the CDU, but overall both parties are fairly
nationalized. A third minor party – the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei)– was founded
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in 1948 as a right classical liberal political party, and was present since the first Bundestag
election in 1949. During this period it obtained between 7 and 12 percent of the vote and
became a frequent coalition partner for the party in government (SPD or CDU). According
to Figure 5.6, the FDP was also a fairly nationalized party.
In sum,“[f]or most of the post-war period the German party system at the
national level [...] remained perhaps the most solid and unspectacular in Europe.
Within 15 years of the introduction of democratic elections, minor parties were
largely sidelined and a “two-and-a-half” party system had, by 1961, become the
norm”(Hough and Koss, 2009, 50).
This stable party system was somewhat disrupted in the early 80’s with the emergence
of the Greens (Die Grünen), which were founded in 1980 and competed in the 1983 and
1987 Bundestag elections obtaining 5 percent and 7 percent of the vote respectively. These
percentages were high enough for the Greens to gain representation in the Bundestag, which
increased the overall number of parties in the German party system. It did not, however,
increase territorialization. The Greens, although a small political party, was not a regional
political party. As Figure 5.6 shows their vote share was evenly distributed across Länder
under the Federal Republic of Germany.17
5.2.1 The Party System Post-Reunification: Fragmentation and Territorializa-
tion
After reunification in 1990, the relatively stable party system of the Federal Republic
of Germany underwent some significant changes. As Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.6 suggest the
party system in unified Germany looks quite different from the party system of the Federal
Republic of Germany. Although there were no institutional changes the party system under
17During the first three Bundestag elections (1949-1972) the SPD, CDU and FDP were slightly more
territorialized. This is probably due to the fact that during these first elections there were other minor
and more localized parties that won votes and seats. The party system was more fragmented and more
territorialized during these first elections due to slightly different electoral rules. Although the German
electoral system has not changed much over time, three elections had slightly different rules. In 1949 the
5% threshold was applied by Länder and not nationally and parties only needed 1 SMD seat. In 1953 the
threshold was changed to 5% nationally, but the 1 SMD seat remained unchanged. Finally in 1957 the
electoral system is 5% threshold nationally and/or 3 SMD seats. It has remained unchanged since then with
the exception of the 1990 elections in which the threshold was 5% by Länder. This was a one-time change
though (Partch, 1980).
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unified Germany became very different in two important respects: first, the number of
political parties increased; and second, all political parties became more territorialized.
The support for the two main national parties in Germany (SPD and CDU) began to
decline after 1990. In 2002 the SPD and CDU/CSU together received 77 percent of the total
vote, in 2005 their combined total declined to 69.4 percent and in 2009 they received 56.8
percent of the total vote share. See Figure 5.5 (page 187). This decline in support for the two
largest national parties in Germany was mirrored by an increase in the electoral importance
of smaller political parties, in particular the FDP, the Greens and the PDS. As explained
earlier the FDP and the Greens already existed under the Federal Republic of Germany.18
The PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) was the legal successor of the SED (Socialist
Unity Party) that governed the Democratic Republic of Germany until 1990. Figure 5.7 on
page 191 shows the vote share for these three parties over time. The top graph shows their
vote share disaggregated by party and the bottom graph shows the vote share combined.19
The vote share of these three parties has increased over time in the unified republic of
Germany. This increase is particularly striking in the last two Bundestag elections of 2005
and 2009. This increase in minor parties’ vote share is paralleled by a decline in vote share
from the two main national parties (SPD and CDU).
These changes have led to an increase in the number of relevant parties competing
in German national elections; in other words, it has led to an increase in “party system
fragmentation” (Lees, 2006; Weldon and Nusser, 2010). Figure 5.8 on page 192 shows the
effective number of parties (ENP) for all Bundestag elections from 1953 to 2009,20 and shows
18Although these are minor parties they all consistently obtain seat representation in the national assembly.
I have excluded from these graphs other minor parties that do not obtain sufficient votes to get represented
at the national level.
19I present the result counting the CSU as an independent party and thus part of the small parties in
Germany (top line), or as a branch of CDU and thus excluded from the average vote share of minor parties
(bottom line). Once more what matters is that the trend is similar.
20The effective number of parties (ENP) is a measure of the number of parties in a political system
weighted by their electoral importance. This measure was created by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and it








In equation 5.3, v is the number of votes obtained by party i and V is the total number of votes cast at
the national level; so the effective number of parties (ENP) at the national level is 1 divided by the sum of
squared vote shares. This measure weights parties according to their size, so that parties with a larger share
of the vote are counted more than parties with a smaller vote share. “If one party captures all of the votes
in a country then ENP=1. If n parties have equal share of the vote then ENP=n” (Hicken, 2009, 8).
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that the number of parties increased from around 3 in 1965 under the Federal Republic of
Germany to around 5.5 in the most recent 2009 Bundestag election.









































































Federal Republic of Germany Unified Germany
This increase in party system fragmentation is puzzling given that electoral rules have
not changed over time and that the German electoral system was especially designed in the
first place to prevent fragmentation. As explained earlier in the first section of this chapter,
the electoral system established in the 1949 Constitution established that in order to obtain
representation in the Bundestag parties must obtain at least 5% of the vote nationally or
must win at least 3 SMD (single-member district) seats. The 5% threshold is a relatively
high threshold which aims at preventing small parties from gaining representation in the
Bundestag. This threshold seemed to be an effective barrier to entering the legislature
during the period of the Federal Republic of Germany during which minor parties quickly
vanished from the electoral landscape, leaving a party system dominated by two large
national parties (SPD and CDU), and one smaller party (FDP). However this same electoral
system produced a very different effect under unified Germany, where a larger number of
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smaller parties have been able to survive electorally. Why did this happen? Part of the
answer to this question has to do with the fact that the electoral law allows territorially
concentrated parties to bypass the 5% electoral threshold, since they can alternatively obtain
representation in the Bundestag by winning at least 3 SMD seats. So whereas the German
electoral system limits the rise of small national parties, it is less effective in suppressing
small territorially concentrated political parties. In other words, fragmentation in unified
Germany is related to territorialization.21
As I showed earlier in this section, the Federal Republic of Germany parties had a
relatively nationalized party system. As Detterbeck and Jeffery argue,
“[t]his reality of nationalized party system responded to a socially homogenous
electorate with no politically relevant ethnic or cultural differences. There was
a north-south economic divide that was translated into the party system, but
for the most part it was fairly nationalized. In Bavaria an integrative CSU
preferred national solutions to satisfy regional interests instead of adopting an
autonomous strategy” (Detterbeck and Jeffery, 2009, 264).
However, as Figure 5.4 on page 186 suggests, the party system became more territorial-
ized after 1989 under unified Germany. The territorialization of the German party system
after 1990 is the result of two parallel processes: a) the rise of an East German regional
political party, the PDS; and b) the “westernization” of the FDP, the Greens and to a lesser
degree of the two main national parties (SPD and CDU). By “westernization” I refer to the
phenomenon by which these parties draw greater support from Western Länder than from
Eastern Länder. If we go back to Figure 5.6 on page 189 we can see that the four parties
that dominated the political landscape in the Federal Republic of Germany (SPD, CDU,
FDP and the Greens) became more territorialized in unified Germany, which contributed
to the overall territorialization of the party system. This figure also shows that the PDS is
a regional political party. During the 1990’s and early 2000’s the PDS was extremely ter-
ritorialized competing (and obtaining votes) only in the Eastern Länder. In 2005 the PDS
21The degree of party system fragmentation is not always associated to territorialization. Party systems
with few political parties are not always nationalized party systems, and party system with many political
parties are not always territorialized. A political system may have many political parties all of which may
obtain a similar proportion of votes across electoral districts or regions. Conversely, a political system may
have just two political parties both parties might obtain votes in very different parts of the country. In the
case of unified Germany, however, fragmentation has been linked to territorialization.
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formed an pre-electoral alliance with Oskar Lafontaine’s WASG (a splinter party from the
SPD competing only in Western Lander). The party was renamed Die Linke. This alliance
was an attempt by the PDS to become a nation-wide political party. In the 2005 and 2009
Bundestag election we observe a decrease in the PDS/Die Linke’s territorialization score,
which is a direct consequence of this political alliance. Nonetheless, the PDS/DIE LINKE
has remained significantly territorialized, obtaining around 75% of its support in Eastern
Länder in 2009.22
Figure 5.9 on page 195 shows the percent of the vote for each party that comes from
Eastern Länder.23 This figure gives us a sense of the east-west divide within each party.
As expected the PDS/Die Linke’s support comes mostly from Eastern Germany (although
it has recently attempted to reach over to western voters). Both the FDP and the Greens
have remained parties with more support in Western Länder than in Eastern Länder (with
the exception of the 1990 election for the FDP), which confirms some claims that other
scholars have made. As Dalton argues:
“The Free Democratic Party (FDP) initially appealed to easterners, due in part
to Hans Dietrich Genscher’s eastern roots, but its bourgeois liberalism and con-
servative economic policies eroded its support by 1994. From 12.9 percent of
the eastern vote in 1990, the party fell to 3.5 percent in 1994 [...]. Similarly the
greens were becoming a predominantly western party as they increased their
vote share in the West and lost support in the East” (Dalton and Jou, 2010,
36).
Beramendi describes a similar process when he argues that the FDP and the Greens
increasingly “draw their support from the well-educated, well-off Western urban strata,
while at the same time they have very little electoral support in the East. They are the
quintessential organizations for the net payers of the Reunification efforts”(Beramendi, 2011,
254). Finally, the story of the CDU and of the SPD support is a more complicated one.
Their support has remained more even between East and West (especially in the case of
the CDU). The SPD is slightly more “west based” in its support, since it competes for the
PDS/Die Linke’s support base in Eastern Germany. In the next section I will show that the
22This alliance has posed numerous problems for the PDS, which is strongly identified with the East.
23The Eastern Länder are Berlin, Brandemburg, Mecklemburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and
Thuringia. I have included Berlin to be part of the East; however, excluding Berlin from the East does not
change the patterns and trends.
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relative support of these two parties in the Eastern Lander has fluctuated over time mainly
due to the different strategies that the parties have adopted to try to cater to East German
voters and to bridge the east-west divide. I show that on the margins, party strategy seems
to matter, especially in response to the rise of the PDS/Die Linke and to the conflicts over
territorial distribution of resources.
5.3 Territorial Economic Inequalities, Redistributive Conflicts and Inter-
nal Party Organization
Reunification posed a fundamental challenge to the main national parties regarding the
question of how to bridge to voters in Eastern Lander. During the first Bundestag elections
after reunification, the CDU managed to garner a substantial amount of the vote in both
Eastern and Western Länder. This initial success in bridging the east-west territorial divide
was the result of Helmut Kohl’s successful negotiation of the unification process. “While
others, especially Oskar Lafontaine and the Social Democrats (SPD), looked on the events
with wonder or uncertainty, Kohl quickly embraced the idea of closer ties between the two
Germanies” (Dalton and Jou, 2010, 35), and made promises of redistribution of resources
from East to West that would look palatable to Western Länder. To this end, in 1990,
the German Unity Fund was created, which was a fund especially dedicated to redress the
economic differences between East and West.
“Much like richer countries in the European Union, Western Länder were willing
to transfer resources interregionally to insure themselves against massive immi-
gration of dependents. The German Unity Fund consisted of an extra budgetary
provision of 115 DM billions (that actually increased to over 140 DM billions, as
reflected in Table 6.3). Out of this amount, 15 percent was dedicated to federal
spending in the new Länder and 85 percent was allocated to direct transfers
to them according to the number of inhabitants. These 140 DM billions were
raised via borrowing on credit markets and were to be paid in five years jointly
by the Bund and the Western Länder (20 DM billions initially by the Bund and
47.5 DM billions by both the federation and Western Länder as debt services
for five years). The flip-side of this effort though was the effective exclusion of
the new Länder from the formal system of interregional redistribution (FA) for
a period of five years, until the end of 1995” (Beramendi, 2011, 237).
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In other words, the CDU – motivated by a short-term reelection horizon – managed
to keep the question of inter-regional redistribution off the table for a few years, while
at the same time promising (temporary) resources to Eastern voters through the German
Unity Fund. This strategy yielded positive electoral results for the CDU/CSU during the
first Bundestag elections following reunification, and allowed CDU to receive a considerable
proportion of votes from Eastern Länder. In contrast, the SPD campaigned against (im-
mediate) reunification on the argument that it would be too costly. Oskar Lafontaine, who
was the SPD’s candidate for Chancellor in the German Bundestag election of 1990 opposed
the German reunification deal negotiated by Helmut Kohl (CDU). “Lafontaine’s lukewarm
approach to this issue [unification] hurt the SPD in the 1990 election, especially in the east,
where the SPD received only 24.5 percent of the vote. Overall, its total of 33.5 percent
represented the party’s worst performance since 1957”(Conradt, 2009, 127).
A general sense of optimism regarding unification prevailed during the first half of the
1990’s and kept the east-west tensions at bay. However, by the mid-1990’s voters in both
the East and the West started to realize that the promises of economic growth for Eastern
Länder would not be easily attained. It is around this time and throughout the latter part
of the 1990’s and early 2000’s that tensions start to surface regarding the way redistribution
schemes are going to work, and whether the old system of inter-regional solidarity should
be maintained (Ziblatt, 2002). As Beramendi states:
“Unsurprisingly, as the contours of an East-West divide become sharper, an
increasing number of leaders of Western Länder became less constrained by the
notion that massive transfers towards the East were a necessary sacrifice in
extraordinary times” (Beramendi, 2011, 254).
The resurfacing of economic tensions is first expressed in a series of attempts by the rich-
est Länder (Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hessen) to alter the German fiscal structure.
Starting in 1997 the richest Länder organize a series of informal meetings that last until the
early 2000’s. These meetings are meant to create a political and policy agenda to further
devolve fiscal power in an attempt to block excessive transfers to poorer Länder (O’Dwyer
and Ziblatt, 2006).
“While fastidiously avoiding references to the deep east-west economic divide in
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Germany, the leaders of the rich states have instead protested in their joint
statements against the flow of resources from “wirtschaffisstarken Ländern”
(“economically-strong states”) to “wirtschafisschwachen Ländern” (“economically-
weak states”)” (O’Dwyer and Ziblatt, 2006, 626).
It is within the context of these escalating tensions and the drafting of this new fiscal
policy agenda that the party system changes more dramatically. Two changes, which have
already been described in the previous section, become more pronounced towards the end
of the 1990’s: a) the electoral decline of the two main national parties, SPD and CDU (see
Figure 5.5); and b) the electoral rise of the PDS which obtains a big victory in 1998 and
then again in 2005 and 2007. According to Patton (2011) it is in the mid-1990’s that the
PDS transforms itself from being a party of the old communist elite, to becoming a regional
party specifically representing the interests of Eastern voters (Patton, 2011, 80).
In parallel to these transformations, there is a change in the internal organization of
parties allowing for a greater degree of heterogeneous views within the parties(Detterbeck
and Renzsch, 2003, 265), and a greater diversity of governmental coalitions (especially in
the Länder governments).
“In the 1990’s, there has been a tendency towards increased political auton-
omy of regional party organizations in terms of policies, coalition building and
electoral appeal. We have already seen that it has become more difficult for
regional politicians to follow national patterns of political alignments. Regional
politicians have facilitated the regionalization of party competition by agreeing
to form incongruent coalitions or by playing the ‘regional advocate’s card’ in
election campaigns”(Detterbeck and Renzsch, 2003, 265).
In other words, the process of party system territorialization described in the previous
section is accompanied by the rise of intra-party tensions, and in one instance these intra-
party tensions have led to an actual party split (Oskar Lafontaine’s split from the SPD).
“Parties have distinct regional strengths, but the same parties also have different
voter clienteles across regions. This brings party representatives together in
the Bundestag with different political constituencies and identities. The CDU
Bundestag deputy from the East has a different voter base than one from the
Catholic West. The SPD partisan in the East is more middle-class than in the
West. This diversity can erode party cohesion, and the SPD-left Party split
may be attributable partially to such tensions, such as cultural issues or policies
affecting East-West economic policy” (Dalton and Jou, 2010, 50).
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In a similar vein, in 2002 the North Rhine Westphalia branch of the SPD started a
reform process to have a stronger voice at the federal level by creating a party organization
embracing NRW as a whole. “Remarkably, opponents of the reform at the federal level have
already spoken off the record about the dangers of a ‘parochialization’ (Provinzialisierung)
of the party [...] Without doubt the reorganization of the SPD in NRW will change the
relations with other constituent parts of the party. The SPD in NRW seems to be moving
towards a role that will eventually show similarities with that of the CSU in Bavaria”
(Detterbeck and Renzsch, 2003, 265). Only time will tell whether these internal organization
changes will eventually lead to party splits, and thus to greater territorialization of the SPD.
This last section has shown that the pressures of regional disparities can manifest themselves
internally as well. To a certain extent, the institutional context of Germany and the internal
flexibility of parties has allowed German parties to cope with these tensions internally.
5.4 Conclusions
Despite an institutional structure that favors strong national parties, the German party
system has experienced fragmentation and territorialization in the past two decades. My
argument is that this change in the party system is connected to increased territorial in-
equalities and redistributive pressures generated by German reunification. This chapter
contributes to clarifying the causal story of one of the central claims in my dissertation.
Furthermore, it provides an in depth analysis of the territorial structure of the German
party system over time. Whereas scholars of German politics have studied the German
party system in terms of ideological changes and coalitional politics, fewer have focused
on the territorial nature of the party system and whether regional parties are emerging
and votes are becoming more territorialized. This chapter also suggests that territorializing





Massachusetts Democratic Congressman and Speaker of the House Tim O’Neill coined the
phrase all politics is local when referring to his first electoral defeat for the Cambridge City
Council in 1935:
“This was the only race I ever lost in my life [...] During the campaign, my
father had left me to my own devices, but when it was over, he pointed out that
I had taken my own neighborhood for granted. He was right: I had received
a tremendous vote in the other sections of the city, but I hadn’t worked hard
enough in my own backyard. ‘Let me tell you something I learned years ago,’
he said, ‘all politics is local’ ”.
Though this is a colorful anecdote with a punch-line that has left its mark on American
political culture, it reminds us that candidates running for office receive pressures from very
different constituencies. The extent to which national politics is influenced by local issues,
local support and local candidates is still an open question, and has been a source of lively
debate among pundits and scholars for quite some time (Morgenstern and Swindle, 2005).
This dissertation inserts itself within this line of inquiry through the exploration of the
role of local/regional political parties in national-level politics. Current scholars of political
parties and party systems have written at length about the reasons that lead candidates
and voters to coordinate under nation-wide party labels in national elections (Aldrich, 1995;
Cox, 1999; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Hicken, 2009). Scholars know less, however, about
why this coordination sometimes “fails” or does not occur. In other words, it is still an
open question as to why local or regional political parties dominate the national political
landscape in some countries and not others.
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In my dissertation I address this question by exploring the trade-off that candidates face
when deciding between joining a regional/local party instead of a national political party
in national-level elections. Instead of focusing on the benefits of joining national parties
(which have been substantially explored) I focus on the costs of joining national parties
as well as on the benefits of joining regional political parties. In Chapter 2 I derive some
conditions that affect this tradeoff, and I test these propositions empirically in Chapters
3, 4 and 5 with a combination of case studies and large-N quantitative analyses. In the
present concluding chapter I briefly summarize the findings of the dissertation and some of
their implications. I then review the contributions of the dissertation to the literature on
parties and party systems. Finally I present a few avenues for further research.
6.1 Summary of Findings
The basic argument of the dissertation is that the territorial nature of party systems
is shaped by candidates’ decisions as they seek reelection in their particular (geographic)
constituencies. Three factors affect candidates’ decision to join smaller regional political
parties instead of national parties when competing for national-level office.
The first factor is the geography of interests, and in particular the geography of economic
interests. A candidate is more likely to join a regional political party as the economic inter-
ests of her constituency become increasingly distinct from those of the rest of constituencies
in the country. At the aggregate level this means that countries with large territorial eco-
nomic disparities are more likely to develop territorialized party systems, whereas countries
with a fairly equal distribution of income across territorial units are more likely to develop
nationalized party systems. In Chapter 3 I find strong support for this proposition based
on a large-N statistical analysis that includes a large and diverse sample of democratic
countries over time. I find that controlling for existing explanations, countries with large
territorial economic inequalities tend to have more territorialized party systems. The results
are robust to alternative specifications. Most interestingly, the results hold when controlling
for other forms of geographically concentrated interests such as ethnicity or language. This
finding sheds some light into the puzzling fact that some of the most territorialized party
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systems in the world (such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea) are relatively
homogeneous ethnically, religiously and linguistically. However, these countries have large
territorial economic disparities, and according to my argument these economic disparities
explain why they some socially homogeneous countries have territorialized party systems.
The case of Germany in Chapter 5 lends further support to the argument that territorially
concentrated economic interests hinder the development of national parties and nationalized
party systems.
The “geography of economic interests” however is not the whole story. I argue that two
factors modify the costs associated with an unequal economic geography: one is the level of
party discipline and the other is the degree to which geographically concentrated interests
are represented within national-level institutions. I argue that weak party discipline and
directly elected upper legislative chambers reduce the costs of intra-party heterogeneity, and
thus reduce the likelihood that candidates will abandon national political parties in favor of
smaller regional or local parties. In Chapter 4 I find strong support for the modifying effect
of these two factors. The large-N analysis shows that political systems that encourage weak
party discipline (i.e. presidential systems and electoral systems that encourage a personal
vote) are less likely to develop territorialized party systems than countries with institutions
that encourage strong party discipline. The role of party discipline helps explain the changes
in Italy’s party system post-World War II. Furthermore, changes in party discipline can also
help explain why the United States’ party system became more nationalized and more stable
towards the beginning of the twentieth century, but before the New Deal. Finally, Chapter
4 also finds that having an elected upper legislative chamber mitigates the effect of an
uneven economic geography on party system territorialization. In contrast, not having a
second chamber that effectively represents territorially concentrated interests exacerbates
the effect of an uneven economic geography on party system territorialization.
6.2 Contributions
In categorizing party systems scholars usually focus on the number of parties and their
ideological diversity; however, the dimension of where (geographically speaking) parties ob-
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tain support is also extremely important (Hicken, 2009). As reviewed in Chapter 1, the local
or national character of parties influences a variety of political and economic phenomena.
Understanding when local or regional parties develop is important to understanding their
consequences for other aspects of politics. This dissertation seeks to build on existing work
to advance our understanding of territorialized parties and party system both theoretically
and empirically.
One of the theoretical contributions to the existing literature on party system nation-
alization is the emphasis I place on the role of societal preferences, and in particular the
role of economic preferences, and their interaction with institutions. I find that contrary
to most of the existing literature’s arguments, institutions such as regime type, political
decentralization, bicameralism or the electoral system do not have an independent effect on
the territorial nature of party systems. Instead, institutions interact with the geography of
preferences to account for variation in party systems. The dissertation shows that in order
to properly understand the effect of institutions on the nature of party systems we need to
correctly specify and test these effects. For example, elected bicameralism has at least two
different effects which yield opposite predictions. On the one hand, Hicken (2009) argues
that bicameralism fragments power at the national level and thus creates incentives for party
system territorialization. On the other hand, I argue that bicameralism creates incentives
against territorialization by institutionalizing voice for geographically concentrated inter-
ests. These two effects are probably operating simultaneously, which explains why we do
not see a significant independent effect of bicameralism on party system territorialization.
However, if we properly test the mechanisms of these effects then we do find strong support
for the significance of bicameralism. I find that under conditions of high territorial economic
inequalities, having an elected bicameral chamber can reduce the likelihood of party system
territorialization, which is consistent with my argument. Under conditions of low territorial
economic inequalities, however, bicameralism seems to exacerbate the likelihood of party
system territorialization, which is consistent with the effect hypothesized by Hicken (2009).
In sum, the dissertation helps clarify some of the nil findings in the literature regarding the
role of institutions.
A second aspect that this dissertation highlights is the role of political geography, which
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until recently has been mostly absent from the study of politics. For a long time the
literature on parties, party systems and electoral behavior has assumed that voters with
disparate policy interests are randomly distributed across electoral districts or regions in a
country (Rodden, 2010, 2011). My dissertation inserts itself into a body of recent research
that questions this assumption (Jusko, 2006; Rodden, 2010, 2011), and that pays particular
attention to how political preferences are distributed in space. In particular my dissertation
focuses on how the geography of economic interests and how they affect the types of parties
and party systems that develop in a country. Other scholars have also recently focused
on economic geography. For example, in his recent book Beramendi (2011) argues that
economic geography, which he defines as “cross-regional differences in terms of income
inequality and economic specialization” (Beramendi, 2011, 4) is a key factor in explaining
variation in fiscal structures and fiscal outcomes across federal countries. Similarly, Jusko’s
research agenda focuses on the interaction between economic geography and electoral rules
to explain changes in policy outcomes. In particular she shows that the concentration
of low income voters in certain districts interacts with electoral institutions to explain
anti-poverty policy programs. Finally, Rodden’s recent research agenda explores how the
concentration of left-wing voters in densely populated areas which resulted from the process
of industrialization created a bias against left wing parties in Westminster systems.
“[P]arties of the left have won more “surplus” of votes in their dominant urban
districts than have the parties of the right in their largely suburban and rural
strongholds. As a result, in order to win 50 percent of the seats, leftist parties
in democracies using single-member districts have typically needed to win more
than 50 percent of the vote” (Rodden, 2011, 4).
The findings of this research agenda, and of this dissertation, suggest that political sci-
entists and policy-makers should pay attention to the geographic concentration of economic
resources and economic interests within countries. Recent global developments (such as
trade liberalization, especially in developing countries) and the dismantling of the welfare
state in Western Europe, is contributing to a shift in the economic geography of several
countries. As with industrialization in the nineteenth century, these changes have the po-
tential to affect the economic geography of many countries with potential consequences for
the nature of politics in these countries. By way of an example, the end of protectionist
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policies in India in the 1970’s has been associated with a noticeable increase of regional
economic disparities as some regions have become more economically competitive in the
international market. These changes in the economic geography of India have coincided
in time with a complete change in the political landscape. In the early 1970’s the once-
dominant Congress Party started to loose electoral support, and since then there has been
a proliferation of regional political parties in national level politics (Ziegfeld, 2009). To
what extent these two phenomena are connected is a topic for future inquiry. Similarly, in
Western Europe the rise of regional political parties in the UK, Italy or Belgium seems to
coincide with the process of deindustrialization and trade liberalization starting the 1970’s.
In Belgium, for example, deindustrialization put the region of Wallonia (once a rich region)
in a position of economic vulnerability, which might have exacerbated the tensions with
Flanders, and the regionalization of their party system. Although these ideas are mostly
speculative at this point, they plant the seeds of further avenues of research.
6.3 Avenues for Further Research
This dissertation suggests three distinct directions for further exploration. First, the
crux of my argument is that candidates representing constituencies with very different
interests than the rest of constituencies in the country are sometimes better off running for
national office under a regional/local party than under a national party. This means that –
under certain conditions– trying to influence national policy from within a diverse national
party is more difficult than trying to influence policy as an independent (and internally
more homogenous) regional political party.
I argue that this is the case because constituents hold regional political parties account-
able for one policy issue that is of particular interest to them, so regional parties can focus
their resources on addressing a limited number of policy issues and ignoring most others; in
contrast constituents hold national parties accountable for a large number of policy issues
and thus national parties will have to make some tradeoffs on a wide range of policies.
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2002) develop this idea of accountability and argue these differences
in accountability lead “coalition parties” to produce different policies than “coalitions of
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parties.” In line with this work, it would be interesting to test this accountability mech-
anism empirically and explore whether voters in fact assign different policy responsibility
to regional parties than to national parties. It would also be interesting to further explore
the policy implications of governments ruled by “coalition parties” and governments ruled
by “coalitions of parties.” Italy and India would be good case studies for these empirical
tests since they have experienced significant changes in the in the “types of coalitions” in
government.
Second, my argument assumes a relative homogeneity of economic interests within re-
gions. I assume that wealthy regions tend to have a higher proportion of wealthy citizens,
and that poorer regions tend to have a higher proportion of poor citizens. In the future
it would be interesting to explore whether intra-regional economic inequality has an ef-
fect on candidates’ decision to join regional or national political parties. My intuition is
that greater homogeneity of economic interests within regions should increase the likelihood
of candidates joining a regional party, whereas greater heterogeneity of economic interests
within regions should decrease the likelihood that candidates will abandon national political
parties. Focusing on intra-regional economic inequalities can help explain the behavior of
regional elites and national elites. As Beramendi argues in his recent book, regional leaders
from rich regions often try to appeal to poor voters among their rich region with the follow-
ing type of discourses: “Why should a hard-working construction worker in Bavaria have
to pay for the problems of unemployment in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania?” (Ziblatt
2002: 637-638) (Beramendi, 2011, 255). If successful, these appeals can make it very hard
for national political parties to gain any votes in these regions.
Finally, this dissertation focuses exclusively on the socio-structural determinants of party
system territorialization. The geography of economic inequality and the constitutional
features of a polity play an important role in explaining cross-country variation in party
system territorialization, yet within these broad structural constraints political parties still
have some room for maneuver. In the future I intend to analyze the strategies that national
parties adopt to obtain broad national electoral support across the territory of a country. I
am interested in the following questions: How do parties with national aspirations react to
the pressures of an uneven distribution of preferences across politically relevant territorial
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units? What decisions do party leaders take to prevent party splits or new parties emerging
in certain electoral districts or regions? And are these decisions effective in fending off
these regional/local competitors? For example, in a recent article Meguid (2011) makes the
argument that decentralization is a strategy that mainstream parties use to bolster their
national electoral support when they are electorally threatened by regional parties. I argue
that national mainstream parties actually have a wider range of strategies to try to maintain
their nation-wide electoral support: a) they can pass legislation that addresses some of
the specific territorial demands made by regional political parties; b) they can propose
major constitutional changes (i.e. decentralization, changes in electoral rules, increasing the
powers of the upper chamber), and c) they can make changes to the internal organization
of their own party. I intend to analyze when and why national parties adopt these different
strategies and whether they are successful in fending off regional challengers.
In sum, this dissertation has tried to build on existing scholarship on parties and party
system to advance our understanding of the intersection between territory, political parties
and party systems. This concluding chapter has highlighted the main findings as well as
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